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Abstract
New networking technologies such as wireless mobile grids and peer-to-peer middlewa-
re are examples of a growing class of open distributed systems whose strength is the
absence of a central controlling instance and which function through the cooperation
of autonomous entities that voluntarily commit resources to a common pool. The
social dilemma in such systems is that it is advantageous for rational users to access
the common pool resources without making any commitment of their own. This is
commonly known as “free-riding”. However, if a substantial number of users followed
this selfish strategy, the system itself would fail, depriving all users of its benefits. In
this dissertation, we demonstrate how governance decisions can induce cooperation
in such systems and how normative frameworks in combination with multi-agent
system simulations can be successfully employed to analyse their effects, even at an
early development stage.
We show that our approach is not only practical and powerful, but also easily
accessible. We demonstrate its functionality by implementing a prototype to explore
the impact of enforcement mechanisms on wireless mobile grids, a concept which has
been proposed to address the energy issues arising in the next generation of mobile
phones and the networks that connect them. We also infer lessons from this example
for open distributed systems in general. Simulation experiments quantify the benefits
of enforcement mechanisms for wireless mobile grids. We analyse these results with
respect to the costs of enforcement as well as further criteria that reflect the interests
of the multiple stakeholders in the system. We conclude with some observations on
how the lessons learned from both process and outcomes may be applicable to the
broader context of open distributed systems. In particular, we highlight (i) the use
of simulation using intelligent agents and a normative framework as a means for in
silico exploration of complex systems for both business and technological objectives,
and (ii) the insight offered into a range of enforcement mechanisms and a better
understanding of the conditions and constraints under which they are applicable.
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Ausfu¨hrliche Zusammenfassung
Meine in englischer Sprache verfasste Dissertation bescha¨ftigt sich mit normati-
ven Eingriffen und deren Auswirkungen auf offene verteilte Systeme ohne zentrale
Kontrollinstanz, in denen Akteure mit mo¨glicherweise konflikta¨ren und eigennutzen-
maximierenden Interessen miteinander interagieren.
Ausgehend von sogenannten “Wireless Mobile Grids”(WMGs) – einer spezifischen
Auspra¨gung eines offenen verteilten Systems – wird in der Dissertation sowohl fu¨r das
spezifische WMG-Szenario als auch allgemein gu¨ltig fu¨r offene verteilte Systeme unter-
sucht, inwieweit nicht-technische Durchsetzungmechanismen kooperatives Verhalten
von Akteuren fo¨rdern und welche Auswirkungen unterschiedliche Mechanismen auf
die verschiedenen Stakeholder des Systems haben.
Bei WMGs handelt es sich um ein Kooperationskonzept fu¨r die vierte Mobilfunk-
generation, welche sich mit einem Energieverbrauchsproblem konfrontiert sieht. So
wandeln sich bedingt durch einen wachsenden Funktionsumfang und Anwendungen
wie bspw. große Touchscreens, Digitalkameras, GPS-Empfa¨nger und Videostreaming
Mobiltelefone derzeit zu multimedialen
”
Allesko¨nnern“ und entwickeln hierdurch
einen immensen
”
Energiehunger“. Der Energieverbrauch bei 3G-Gera¨ten hat sich im
Vergleich zu den Gera¨ten der ersten und zweiten Handygeneration verdoppelt und
dieser Zuwachs wird sich in Zukunft nicht verlangsamen (Katz and Fitzek, 2006).
Aufgrund entgegengesetzter Kundenwu¨nsche kommt eine Vergro¨ßerung des Akkus
als Lo¨sung nicht in Frage (Perrucci et al., 2009).
Aus diesem Grund wurden von Prof. Frank Fitzek und Dr. Marcos Katz WMGs
als ein mo¨glicher Lo¨sungsansatz fu¨r die erwa¨hnten Energieprobleme vorgeschlagen,
prototypisch implementiert und technisch getestet. Die Idee der WMGs stellt sich
dabei wie gefolgt dar: ausgehend von traditionellen 3G Mobilfunknetzen, welche durch
eine Konzentration der Kommunikation auf die zellulare Kommunikation zwischen
den einzelnen Mobilfunkteilnehmern mit einer Basisstation charakterisiert ist, wird
die traditionelle 3G Struktur um eine Kurz-Distanz-Verbindung erweitert.
In WMGs verbinden sich einzelne Mobilfunknutzer mittels ihrer unterschiedlichen
Endgera¨ten mit Hilfe einer Kurz-Distanz-Verbindung (bspw. WLAN oder Bluetooth)
in einer Peer-to-Peer-Manier untereinander und nutzen diese Verbindung zur Koope-
ration, d.h. zum gemeinsamen Verwenden von Ressourcen der Endgera¨te wie CPU
und Speicher, oder dem gemeinsamen Download / Streamen von Dateien. Der Vorteil
der Kurz-Distanz-Verbindung liegt in schnelleren und energieeffizienteren Kommu-
nikationsprotokollen. Die Mobilfunknutzer ko¨nnen entsprechend beispielsweise von
schnelleren Datenraten und la¨ngeren Akkulaufzeiten im Vergleich zu traditionellen
3G Verbindungen profitieren. Zudem wird aus Sicht der Mobilfunknetzbetreiber die
Netzwerkinfrastruktur entlastet.
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Trotz des theoretisch hohen Energieeinsparungspotentials gibt es derzeit von
Seiten der Mobilfunkbranche Zweifel am Konzept der WMG, welche prima¨r auf
befu¨rchtete Kooperationsprobleme zuru¨ckzufu¨hren sind. Fu¨r die Akteure im System
ist es gu¨nstiger zu betru¨gen (d.h. Ressourcen zu beziehen ohne selbst Ressourcen
zur Verfu¨gung zu stellen), da jeder Beitrag zum System in Form von Kosten (wie
beispielsweise Energiekosten) zu verstehen ist. Deshalb werden Normen beno¨tigt, um
Kooperation zu fo¨rdern.
Durch die offene dezentrale Struktur des Systems ist es nicht mo¨glich, implizit
von einer Durchsetzbarkeit der Normen auszugehen. Folglich stellt sich die Frage,
wie mo¨gliche Durchsetzungsmechanismen zur Reduktion des Kooperationsproblems
beitragen.
Basierend auf realen Handydaten1 habe ich in meiner Dissertation eine normative
Multiagenten-Simulation entwickelt, die es ermo¨glicht, verschiedene Durchsetzungs-
mechanismen zu analysieren.
In diesem Zusammenhang leistet meine Dissertation einen wissenschaftlichen
Beitrag durch die Untersuchung der folgenden zwei Hauptthesen:
1. Der Einsatz von Durchsetzungsmechanismen kann die Kooperation in einem
WMG steigern.
2. So genannte “Normative Frameworks” in Kombination mit Multiagenten-
Simultionen eignen sich sehr gut, um die dynamische Interaktion von Akteuren
eines Systems mit den im System vorhandenen Normen darstellen.
Zur Verifizierung dieser beiden Thesen pra¨sentiert diese Dissertation zuna¨chst
einen U¨berblick u¨ber die existierende Literatur zu Normen und deren Durchsetzung
in Kapitel 2. Kapitel 3 stellt im Anschluss die WMG-Fallstudie detailliert vor und
zeigt auf, in wie weit in ihr Kooperationsdilemmata bestehen. Kapitel 4 fu¨hrt in
normative Systeme ein, diskutiert deren Bedeutung fu¨r die Modellierung von Normen
und pra¨sentiert das in dieser Dissertation verwendete formale Model eines Normative
Frameworks.
Dieses formale Model wird in Kapitel 5 mit Hilfe von AnsProlog und InstAL in ein
Computermodell u¨bersetzt und die Fallstudie mit Hilfe dieses Modells implementiert.
Die Analyse der Ergebnisse dieses Modells zeigt, dass Durchsetzungsmechanismen
helfen ko¨nnen, der beschriebenen Dilemmasituation entgegenzuwirken und es sich
lohnt, detailliertere Untersuchungen vorzunehmen.
Als Resultat dessen, widmen sich Kapitel 6 und 7 der Erweiterung des zuvor
entwickelten Modells um eine Multiagenten-Simulation. Diese Dissertation beschreibt
dabei zum einen die formalen Grundlagen dieser Erweiterung. Des Weiteren wird ein
lauffa¨higer Prototyp des WMG-Beispiels implementiert.
Dieser Prototyp wird in den Kapiteln 7 bis 9 eingesetzt, um drei verschiedene
Durchsetzungsmechanismen auf Ihre Wirkungsamkeit bezu¨glich der Kooperation und
der damit verbundenen Energiekosten in WMGs zu untersuchen. Dabei zeigt sich,
dass sogenannte Polizeiagenten einen vielversprechenden Ansatz zur Reduktion des
Kooperationsdilemmas in WMGs bieten.
1Frank Fitzek und seine Forschergruppe haben bereits Prototypen von WMG-Mobiltelefonen
entwickelt und haben mir diese technischen Daten wie beispielsweise den Energievebrauch bei
verschiedenen Empfangs- und Sendezusta¨nden fu¨r die Dissertation zur Verfu¨gung gestellt.
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Kapitel 10 widment sich im Anschluss der erweiterten Analyse der Simualtionser-
gebnisse. Spezieller Fokus wird dabei auf die Interessen der verschiedenen Stakeholder
des Systems, sowie der Interpretation der Ergebnisse fu¨r offene verteilte Systeme im
allgemeinen gelegt.
Zusammenfassend besta¨tigt diese Dissertation die beiden Eingangs erwa¨hnten Hy-
pothesen. Sie leistet dadurch einen wichtigen Beitrag sowohl aus wissenschaftlicher als
auch praktischer Sicht. So gibt diese Dissertation erstmals detaillierte Einblicke in die
Kooperation in WMGs und zeigt auf, wie Normative Frameworks und Multiagenten-
Simulationen effektiv eingesetzt werden ko¨nnen um Governance-Entscheidungen
einfach und schnell zu analysieren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Failure of A Million Penguins
On February 1st 2006, Penguin Books in collaboration with the De Montfort Uni-
versity, Leicester, UK, launched the “A Million Penguins” project. The project was
based on an idea first expressed by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004), that in times
of intensified competition and decreasing profit margins, involving customers as a
community in co-creating a product is a key to business success. The idea of “A
Million Penguins” was to allow customers to create collaborative content in form of
novels by using a “wiki” (the technology that supports Wikipedia1) which could later
on be sold, for example. Despite intensive spending on marketing by Penguin Books
(The Institute of the Future of the Book, 2007) as well as high initial participation
numbers, within a month after the launch of the project, Penguin Books had to
announce its failure. The wiki was closed on March 7th, 2006 and Penguin Books
had to amortise the financial losses. In a survey by Mason and Thomas (2008)
on the reasons for the failure of the project, two main problems were identified:
negatively-perceived governance decisions as well as a contribution inequality :
1. The “A Million Penguins” project generated a wiki, which is an open distributed
system. The term open implies that anyone wanting to join the wiki could do
so, without any control on the people joining (with respect to their intentions
for joining). Distributed means that in a wiki a network of autonomous users
interacts through the wiki platform, which coordinates their actions to generate
a product that appears as a single object. After the initial launch of the
project, several hundred users registered with the wiki and tried to upload
their own completed works to it, violating the concept that the novels on the
wiki should be written collaboratively. Other users spammed the website with
non-novel related content. That is why – while the wiki was already deployed –
Penguin Books started creating a complex set of rules such as the introduction
of “reading windows”, time slots at which the wiki would be frozen for several
hours each afternoon during which editors could check for violations and readers
could catch up with reading through the changes in the novel. Despite the
good intentions, these decisions to steer the community into a certain direction
1www.wikipedia.org
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were not well-received, and a large proportion of users stopped contributing
(Mason and Thomas, 2008).
2. Furthermore, the wiki faced the problem of participation inequality or the so-
called 90-9-1 principle (Nielsen, 2008; Hill et al., 1992). This principle suggests
that in virtual communities a great majority people (estimates made by Nielsen
suggest roughly 90%) will try to free-ride (i.e. benefit from the community
without contributing themselves), 9% will occasionally contribute and only 1%
of the participants accounts for most contributions, resulting in a participation
inequality between the participants. Looking at the statistics of “A Million
Penguins” after the wiki closed down, 75,000 different people had viewed the
wiki of which 1,476 had registered and in total had produced approximately
11,000 edits. Of these edits over 25% were produced by two users only, with
the majority of the remainder being edited by a relatively small percentage
of other users. As a result, the initial community idea that one million users
could collaboratively work and co-create a product as envisioned by Prahalad
and Ramaswamy (2004) failed.
Mason and Thomas (2008) point out that before the start of “A Million Penguins”
doubts had already been raised in blogs and newspaper critiques as to what extent the
idea behind the project could be successful, and whether in the long run the project
could generate the predicted business success. Despite these doubts and critiques
being known to the development team of the project, they faced the problem that no
similar system existed. They therefore had no experience of how users might react
to such a system. Furthermore little testing was undertaken because of problems
to analyse how humans might interact with the rules in the system. Thus, for
example in the development phase, designers had contemplated limiting edits to 250
words a day per user, but could not perform sufficient tests to predict the possible
impact such a rule on users in the system before the system was launched. Testing
a system with a large number of human participants can be expensive, a problem
which is aggravated by the fact that any increased spending in the development
stage automatically results in an increase in the cost commitment to the new project
(Riggs, 1982), which increases business risks. As a result of this dilemma, Mason
and Thomas (2008) states that “The best they could do was expect the unexpected.”
From a business perspective investing in a significant project in which, due to a lack
of testing, one can only “hope for the best”, is likely to endanger to the long-term
future of the company and therefore should be avoided.
In this dissertation we look into the question of testing governance decisions
for systems which – such as the “A Million Penguins” wiki – have the following
characteristics:
 an open distributed nature,
 depend on the interaction of the users in the system and the contribution of
the users to the system,
 are in an early stage of conception, and
 relate to new business ideas, where little or no data on the performance of
similar the systems exists.
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The next section will explain this theme in more detail and formulate the two
theses that will be discussed in this dissertation. In order to be able to proof the
theses, we first will explain what we understand by the term governance.
1.2 Theses
Definition 1: Governance
The act of a system designer or governing entity in making decisions that specify
rules, define expectations, grant power, or verify performance in order to steer
the system in a desired direction is called governance.
The word governance itself is derived from the greek verb κυβρναo (kuberna´o)
which means “to steer”. Governance may be done in any organization of any size
ranging from individuals to enterprises to complete nations.
As the “A Million Penguins” project demonstrates, trying to estimate the impact
of governance decisions in open distributed systems is difficult, especially if humans
are meant to collaborate and interact in the system and no previous experience
about their behaviour in the system is available. One main reason for this is that
humans typically exhibit heterogeneous behaviour and can potentially act selfishly.
Furthermore they may only perceive their own environment and not be aware, or
care about the governing body’s desired system. Instead, they act locally on different
stimuli. Nevertheless their decisions culminate in a global result. Testing a system
under these conditions, especially before it is deployed, is therefore a difficult but
important endeavour.
The aim of this dissertation is to address this state and demonstrate how normative
frameworks, in combination with multi-agent system simulations, can be employed
to analyse the effect of governance decisions in open distributed systems. We present
a methodology which is designed to be employed in the critical time of testing a
system before it is fully deployed, or when expensive human user tests are infeasible
or inappropriate. We discuss in detail how normative frameworks can be used in
these systems to formulate governance decisions in order to steer the system in the
desired direction.
In detail, this dissertation focuses on the following two main theses:
Thesis 1:
Governance decisions realized through the introduction of enforcement mech-
anisms can help to reduce the cooperation and collaboration problems in open
distributed systems.
As pointed out above, one major problem in collaborative systems such as
the “A Million Penguins” wiki, is participation inequality. Governance in the
form of rules that encourage contribution or discourage non-contribution – which
is typically referred to as enforcement – is one way of addressing this issue. In
4 Introduction
this dissertation, we will show how a particular governance decision, namely the
introduction of enforcement mechanisms, helps to address the contribution problem
in open distributed systems. This is even the case if the entities in the system are
heterogeneous with private utility functions and act potentially selfish, i.e. try to
enjoy the advantages of the system without contributing to it. One particular focus
is on systems that are in an early prototyping stage of development, where testing
enforcement mechanisms with real humans does not seem feasible.
For answering this question we have chosen to conduct a specific case study which
concerns so-called wireless mobile grids: a concept for user interaction in future
generation mobile networks. The reason for choosing this case study is its match with
the characteristics of the systems we want to focus on, as well as the fact that whilst
wireless mobile grids are still in an early stage of development, the first prototypes of
the corresponding mobile phones exist. This allows us to underpin our analysis with
empirical transmission data for these phones, resulting in a more realistic analysis.
In order to keep the results as widely applicable as possible for any system matching
the above mentioned characteristics, despite focusing on the specific wireless mobile
grid case study, we try to keep our design decisions as generic as possible and explain
each of them in detail. Furthermore we assign one section of this dissertation to the
generalization of the results of the case study to open distributed systems in general.
In order to be able to analyse governance decisions for wireless mobile grids at
an early prototyping stage, we formulate our second thesis:
Thesis 2:
Normative frameworks and multi-agent system simulations can be used to model
and reason about the interaction of users with one another as well as with the
norms in an open distributed system.
Whenever testing with real systems is not feasible, models are used to represent
them. To the best of our knowledge, no system currently exists that models the
interaction of humans with one another as well as their behaviour in respect to
the norms (i.e. the rules) in a running system. In this dissertation we present a
methodology for developing such a model and test the enforcement mechanisms from
Thesis 1 with the help of this model. In doing so, we gain knowledge about the
effects of enforcement mechanisms for addressing the problem of free-riding in open
distributed systems.
Besides these two theses, this dissertation has one more focus which is not a
thesis as such: In a project like “A Million Penguins” several stakeholders (i.e.
interest groups) might be involved which could each be affected differently by a
governance decision. In this dissertation, we therefore will highlight the impact of the
introduction of enforcement mechanisms to an open distributed system in the light
of multiple stakeholders. However we view this question as a management question,
rather than an actual research question, as there can be no comprehensive answer
without a detailed analysis of the different stakeholder interests and such an analysis
is not part of this dissertation.
In detail this dissertation will make the following contributions:
 We give insight into wireless mobile grids and the cooperation problem in them.
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 We demonstrate how to use normative frameworks to develop a design-time
model of a normative system, in order to be able to reason about governance
decisions at design-time.
 We provide a methodology on how to generate a run-time model from the
design-time model and how to combine it with a multi-agent systems simulation.
This allows us to have a run-time focus on the analysis of governance decisions.
 We give insight into how different enforcement mechanisms affect cooperation
in open distributed systems and how different stakeholders perspectives need
to be incorporated in governance decisions.
1.3 Roadmap
In order to study the two theses formulated, following this introduction, this disser-
tation is divided into four parts consisting of ten chapters, plus four appendices. Of
these four parts, part one serves to lay out the foundations of this dissertation by
defining the main concepts as well as referencing related work. Part two focuses on
normative modelling and presents the formal model, its general implementation as
well as a first model of the wireless mobile grid case study. Part three then illustrates
how so-called multi-agent system simulations in combination with normative frame-
works can be used to model user interaction in open distributed systems with norms.
It furthermore presents the simulation experiments of this dissertation and analyses
the results of these experiments with respect to Thesis 1. Part four concludes this
dissertation with the summary of the main results as well as a description of their
implications. To explain the outline of this dissertation in more detail, we now briefly
present the contents of each chapter.
In Chapter 2 we outline the state of the art of ideas and concepts relevant for
the particular governance decision we are focusing on in this dissertation,
i.e. the introduction of enforcement mechanisms to open distributed systems.
Therefore, we first of all define the terminology relevant in this context. We
furthermore explain how the contribution inequality experienced in the “A
Million Penguins” wiki manifests itself in form of cooperation dilemmas in these
systems. After presenting related work that attempts to address this problem
as well as highlighting the weaknesses therein, we introduce the institutional
analysis and development framework. This framework will be used as a guide
to structure the research that proves our theses stated above.
Chapter 3 then presents the wireless mobile grid case study. Wireless mobile grids
are one example of the open distributed systems studied in this dissertation.
They are still in an early prototyping stage of development and are expected
to suffer from free-riding problems. This case study serves as the example
for showing how to model and analyse governance decisions by means of
enforcement mechanisms throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
In Chapter 4 introduces the concept of normative frameworks and presents require-
ments for them to be applicable to portray normative aspects of governance
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decisions. The chapter also provides a formal (i.e. mathematical) model of
normative frameworks.
Chapter 5 builds upon the idea of normative frameworks discussed in Chapter
4. As pointed out before, when presenting our research questions, we intend
to use multi-agent system simulations in combination with normative frame-
works. However, in order to be applicable in a simulation, the formal model
of a normative framework presented in Chapter 4 needs to be realised as a
computational model. Chapter 5 explains how such a computational model can
be realised using AnsProlog and presents a first implementation of the case
study introduced in Chapter 3. Here we present what we call a “design-time”
model in which we can examine all the possible states the system can reach.
In Chapter 6 we present multi-agent system simulations as one means to model
autonomous heterogeneous decision makers that interact with the normative
framework. In addition we outline the general structure of the chapters that
present the simulation experiments and explain the statistical foundations for
the analysis of the simulation results.
In Chapter 7 integrates the normative framework model used in Chapter 5 and the
multi-agent system simulation. Using this new simulation model, we simulate
the case study presented earlier without any enforcement mechanisms, i.e.
before any governance decisions have been made. This simulation model and
its results then serve as reference points for the analysis, once we start testing
the impact that different enforcement mechanisms have on the system.
In Chapter 8 these enforcement mechanisms are then added to the multi-agent
system simulation and tests are conducted to explore how they alter the earlier
results of the simulation experiments without any enforcement.
In Chapter 9 we extend the multi-agent systems simulations with different move-
ment models and analyse their effect on the simulation results.
Chapter 10 summarizes the simulation results from the previous chapters and
focuses on their implications for the specific wireless mobile grid case study
as well as for business concepts for open distributed systems with human
interaction which might face free-riding problems.
Chapter 11 summarizes the dissertation and discusses future work.
1.4 Supporting Publications
We have published the following papers relating to topics presented in this dissertation.
All these publications have been fully peer-reviewed by international experts if not
indicated differently.
Balke and Villatoro (2011): Balke, T. and Villatoro, D. (2011). “Operationaliz-
ation of the Sanctioning Process in Hedonic Artificial Societies.” In Workshop
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on Coordination, Organization, Institutions and Norms in Multiagent Systems
@ AAMAS 2011.
In this paper we present our definition of enforcement as well as a generic
enforcement process. Particular emphasis thereby is put on the roles associated
with the different stages of the enforcement process. Several paragraphs in
Section 2.3.3 originate from this paper.
Balke (2009): Balke, T. (2009). “A Taxonomy for Ensuring Institutional Com-
pliance in Utility Computing.” In G. Boella, P. Noriega, G. Pigozzi, and H.
Verhagen, editors, Normative Multi-Agent Systems, Number 09121 in Dagstuhl
Seminar Proceedings. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fu¨ur Informatik,
Germany. http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1901.
This paper presents the first draft of the taxonomy of enforcement mechanisms
presented in Section 8.1.
Balke et al. (2009): Balke, T., Ko¨nig, S., and Eymann, T. (2009). “A Sur-
vey on Reputation Systems for Artificial Societies.” Bayreuther Arbeit-
spapiere zur Wirtschaftsinformatik 46, University of Bayreuth. http://opus.
ub.uni-bayreuth.de/volltexte/2009/616/pdf/techreport_final.pdf.
This paper is a survey paper about the different reputation mechanisms em-
ployed in artificial societies. It has not been peer-reviewed. Text passages in
Sections 2.3.2, 2.4 and 8.1 originate from this paper.
Balke and Eymann (2010): Balke, T. and Eymann, T. (2010). “Challenges for
Social Control in Wireless Mobile Grids.” In T. Doulamis, editor, GridNets2009,
volume 25 of Lecture Notes of ICST, pages 147–154. Springer.
In this paper we present the cooperation dilemma inherent in our wireless
mobile grid case study for the first time and discuss challenges for social control
mechanisms to address these issues.
Balke et al. (2011): Balke, T., De Vos, M., Padget, J. A., and Fitzek, F. (2011).
“Using A Normative Framework to Explore the Prototyping of Wireless Grids.”
In M. De Vos, F. Nicoletta, J. V. Pitt, and G. Vouros, editors, Coordination,
Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems VI, volume 6541 of
Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 95–113. Springer.
This paper presents the first computational model of the case study used in
this dissertation with the help of normative frameworks and AnsProlog. The
model presented in this paper is a design-time model. In Chapter 5 we present
a modified version of the model presented in this paper.
Balke et al. (2011): Balke, T., De Vos, M., and Padget, J. A. (2011). “Analysing
Energy-Incentivized Cooperation in Next Generation Mobile Networks using
Normative Frameworks and an Agent-Based Simulation.” Future Generation
Computer Systems Journal, 27(8): 1092–1102 http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0167739X11000574.
A first attempt to model the wireless mobile grid case study with both a
normative framework model as well as a multi-agent system simulation is
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presented in this article. In the article the two components are developed as
separate models. It is shown which benefits each of the models has and to what
extent these two models could possibly contribute to a combined modelling
approach. Parts of this article are incorporated into Section 7.1.
Balke et al. (2011b): Balke, T., De Vos, M., Padget, J. A., and Traskas, D. (2011).
“On-line reasoning for institutionally-situated BDI agents.” In K. Tumer, P.
Yolum, L. Sonenberg, and P. Stone, editors, Proceedings of 10th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011),
pages 1109–1110.
In this short paper we present the run-time model of the wireless mobile grid
case study consisting of both a multi-agent system model as well as a normative
framework component. Parts of this paper are presented in Section 7.2.
Balke et al. (2011a): Balke, T., De Vos, M., Padget, J. A., and Traskas, D. (2011).
“Normative Run-Time Reasoning for Institutionally-Situated BDI Agents.” In
Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Coordination, Organization,
Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems (COIN) @ WI-IAT2011.
This paper is an extended version of Balke et al. (2011b). In the paper we
explain the link between the design and the run-time model in more detail as
well as present code fragments of both models. Several paragraphs of this paper
can be found in Section 7.2 as well. However, it has to be noted that the model
presented in this paper differs from the one described in this dissertation. The
difference between the two models is that we chose to model the agreements
between actors using obligations in this dissertation, which is not the case in
Balke et al. (2011a).
As these papers are our own original work, when directly citing them in this
dissertation we forgo the utilization of quotations marks, but reference the papers in
the respective sections.
Part I
Foundations and Related Work

Chapter 2
Norms and Enforcing
Cooperation in Open
Distributed Systems
Having established the theses that this dissertation will answer, this chapter lays the
foundations for doing so by defining the most important terms and explaining the
most important concepts associated with them. In detail, we will start by examining
norms which are one of the major instruments of governance. This will be followed
by an explanation of the notion of open distributed systems used in this dissertation
as well as an explanation of the cooperation problems inherent in them. Afterwards
the focus will shift to enforcement of norms as one means to address the cooperation
problem. In detail we will present a general view on enforcement first before reviewing
the existing literature on the cooperation problem and norm enforcement. One of
the major aims of this dissertation is to compare governance decisions, with a special
focus on enforcement concepts. For this reason the last part of this chapter is devoted
to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which provides a
methodology for analysing and comparing the implications of governance decisions.
2.1 What is a Norm?
Norms have been studied in a variety of research domains including natural sciences,
social and formal sciences as well as applied sciences. As a consequence a universal
definition of the term does not exist in literature (Horne, 2001). Reviewing the
existing literature on norms numerous topologies (Morris, 1956), categorizations
(Lo´pez y Lo´pez, 2003) and specialized definitions of the term (Gibbs, 1965) can be
found. Each of these has its own merits, however they were all written from the
perspective of a specific research discipline, thus stressing points that are particular
to that discipline. This makes it hard to find a universal definition of the term and
attempts usually end in a very broad definition which is difficult to apply to specific
problems at hand (Hollander and Wu, 2011). When looking up the term “norm”
in Websters Electronic Dictionary (2011) for example, several explanations of the
term can be found reflecting the different views on the term in different scientific
disciplines such as social science (e.g. sociology, psychology, philosophy, economics
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and legal theory), natural science, formal science (e.g. deontic logic), applied sciences
(e.g. computer science and engineering), etc.:
1. an authoritative standard
2. a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to
guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behaviour
3. average as:
4. a: a set standard of development or achievement usually derived from the
average or median achievement of a large group
b: a pattern or trait taken to be typical in the behaviour of a social group
c: a widespread or usual practice, procedure, or custom <standing ovations
became the norm>
5. etc.
Although its broad focus makes this definition impractical for the purpose of this
dissertation it is a useful starting point to review the existing literature on norms in
order to define the term afterwards. Keeping the above definition in mind, in the
next paragraphs this dissertation will look at the different research domains and
the typical notion of norms that is being used in each of them. The goal of this
undertaking is to find similarities and differences in the usage of the term across the
various domains, as well as to point out concepts relevant to the theses addressed in
this dissertation. As this dissertation has its background in the business and social
science domain, special emphasis will be put on the ideas discussed in the respective
literature. The intention of this review is not to provide an exhaustive overview on
all the work that has been done with regard to norms, but rather to highlight the
different perspectives on norm research by briefly presenting the best known or most
representative research on the topic.
Norms in Social Science: Social science is an umbrella term for a number of
research disciplines that study different aspects of human society and the relationship
of the individual members within the society to one another and to the society.
Against this background, in the social sciences norms typically are viewed as means
to define these relationships, and portraying as well as regulating the behaviour of
the members of a group or society as well as the society as a whole (Neumann, 2008).
Research on norms in the social sciences tends to focus on the social function of
norms (see the ideas by Merton (1968) for example), the social impact of norms (e.g.
North (1993)), or mechanisms leading to the emergence and creation of norms (e.g.
Gilbert (1995)).
With regard to the aspect of the social function, norms are often concerned with
the behaviour members of a social group should (or should not) perform regardless
of the possible consequences (also referred to as obligations). Furthermore they deal
with the expectations resulting from the anticipation of the other actors in the system
with regard to this behaviour.
This idea is formalized by Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela (1995) for example,
who specify a social norm as a norm having the following form: “An [individual]
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of the kind F in group G ought to perform task T in situation C.”1 and thereby
highlight the four major aspects of norms in social science: (i) that individuals can
be different in their behaviour and might perform different roles in a society (i.e. F ),
(ii) the importance of the relationship of the individual to a group or society (i.e. G),
(iii) the obligation to perform (and indirectly not to perform) certain tasks (i.e. T )
as a result of a norm, as well as (iv) the notion of context-dependency (i.e. C) of a
norms, i.e. that norms might only be valid in particular situations.
Another important aspect Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela stress is the distinc-
tion between so-called “r-norms” and “s-norms”. The former are norms that are
“created by an authority or body of agents authorized to represent the group (this
body can also be the entire group)” (Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1995). This
authority might for example be a governing or legislative body, the operator of a
platform, a chosen leader, etc. S-norms are norms emerging as a feature of a (social)
normative context, i.e. the result of mutual beliefs about the way a particular situ-
ation should be handled, general codes of conduct or conventions. Thus, in contrast
to r-norms, s-norms are not based on rules defined by any authority, but tend to
highlight the social aspect of norms. The inclusion of s-norms in this distinction is
a rather important feature of the social science. Based on the idea of s-norm, in
addition to the notion of norms being guidance on what actors are ought or expected
to do, in the social sciences norms are also viewed as an information source of what
is perceived to be “normal” in a group or population (Therborn, 2002). In the social
sciences, this “normal” behaviour is explained as emerging as a general pattern of
behaviour by the actors of a society making choices without any centralized planning
(Andrighetto et al., 2007).
With regard to research on the social impact of norms, the focus is placed on the
utility provided to or taken away from the actors involved in an interaction. Utility
is defined here as the relative (both positive and negative) satisfaction achieved by
the actors. This utility can be either internal, such as emotion levels, energy, etc.,
or external, in the case of money, etc. Social impact research analyses the effect of
utilities of the different stakeholders in a society resulting from specific norms as well
as on the society as a whole (North, 1990).
Besides these works on the social function, the social impact as well as the
emergence and creation of norms, in the social sciences (in particular in philosophy)
further important scientific contributions have been made dealing with normative
positions (Sergot, 2001). The two normative positions we have talked about in this
chapter so far are permissions and obligations. Although these describe norms to a
large extent, within the world of legal theory several more positions can be found,
including power, duty, right, liability, disability, claim and immunity for example
(Hohfeld, 1913). With regard to this dissertation, the position of power is of particular
interest as a restraint on the (physical) power of autonomous entities. In social
science, power can have two different forms, which are both described by Makinson
(1986): (i) legal power, and (ii) physical power.
Whereas the former specifies whether an actor is “empowered” to perform a
certain action in a legal sense, the latter establishes whether he is physically able to
1Despite the strong emphasis of this statement on obligations i.e. what one ought to do, Tuomela
and Bonnevier-Tuomela in the course of their definition broaden it to include permission (i.e what
one may do) as well.
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carry out the actions necessary to exercise his legal power (Jones and Sergot, 1996).
Whereas this distinction between physical and normative power is relatively easy to
make, it is important not to confuse normative power and the term “permissions”
explained earlier. To explain the difference between normative power and permission
(Makinson, 1986, p. 409) gives an illustrative example:
. . . consider the case of a priest of a certain religion who does not have
the permission, according to instructions issued by the ecclesiastical
authorities, to marry two people, only one of whom is of that religion,
unless they both promise to bring up the children in that religion. He
may [in his function as priest] nevertheless have the power to marry the
couple even in the absence of such a promise, in the sense that if he goes
ahead and performs the ceremony, it still counts as a valid act of marriage
under the rules of the same church even though the priest may be subject
to reprimand or more severe penalty for having performed it.
What is important to note besides this difference between permission and legal
power, is the difference in legal and physical power. Thus, despite the priest having
the legal power, physical power does not follow automatically. Thus, the priest might
be incapacitated by being sick for example, and as a consequence is physically not
able to perform the normative action of marrying two people, despite having the
legal power to do so. In the opposite direction the two notions of power also do not
have a coercive relation: having the practical possibility and power to act does not
necessarily imply that a legal power is also existing. To give an example, someone
might not have the legal power to conduct a marriage, despite being physically able
to do so (e.g. by not being physically incapacitated and knowing the procedure etc.).
Norms in Natural Science: In science, the term natural science refers to the
sciences such as biology, chemistry, or physics that use a naturalistic approach in order
to study objects and phenomena of the physical world, which is understood as obeying
rules or laws of natural origin. As a result of this focus on laws of nature or natural
constants, the term norm in the natural science is typically used when speaking about
proven phenomena and generally accepted standards (i.e. “is-statements” (Kelsen,
1960)), rather then being viewed in the “ought to” or “is permitted to” context such
as in the social sciences. That does not mean that no research is being done on what
is understood by the term “norms” in the social sciences (in natural science research
is being done on topics such as group behaviour and the interaction of individuals in
a group or kin selection for example). However, despite this research often including
normative considerations similar to the ones on in the social sciences, researchers in
this area do not commonly refer to the term “norm”.
Norms in Formal Science: Formal sciences such as mathematics, logics, theor-
etical computer science or statistics, are research domains that use formal systems
to generate knowledge. Thus, unlike other sciences, the formal sciences are not
concerned with the validity of theories based on observations in the real world, but
instead with the properties of formal systems based on definitions and rules. Research
topics on norms in the formal science therefore include the formal representation
of the deontics of norms (such as the modality O(X) for obligations) (von Wright,
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1951), the reasoning about the consistency of normative specifications and the formal
validity of norms in specific situations (Vasconcelos et al., 2004), as well as the
determination and verification on whether certain normative states can be reached or
not (Vigano` and Colombetti, 2007). Of particular note in the field is dynamic deontic
logic (Meyer, 1988). Dynamic deontic logic is a re-formulation of standard deontic
logic in the dynamic logic syntax. It differs from classical logics in that it (i) includes
early attempts to reason about temporal aspects of norms, (ii) allows for the explicit
treatment of actions and events as well as their consequences, and (iii) allows for
concurrent, sequential and non-deterministic actions (Cliffe, 2007). Based on these
features, dynamic deontic logic includes two types of formulae: (i) action formulae
that focus on the execution of actions and the order of actions, and (ii) propositional
formulae that (combined with each other) feature complex properties relating to the
sequence of actions and their consequences. This make it possible to reason about
the sequence of actions and their consequences as well as about temporal aspects of
norms, and analyse how particular system states can be achieved. This inclusion of
temporal aspects is important, as it allowed for the formal modelling of deadlines, i.e.
normative statements that something needs to be done by a certain point of time or
before a certain other action can be performed (Broersen et al., 2004; Dignum et al.,
2004).
Norms in Applied Science: Applied sciences apply and draw inspiration from
the scientific knowledge of other scientific fields and transfer it into a physical
environment to solve practical problems. Examples of applied science are applied
computer science, artificial intelligence or engineering for example. One major focus
of norms in applied sciences is – based on the knowledge from other domains –
their application and applicability to real world problems. In computer science and
engineering for example norms are mainly dealt with in terms of their application
to computing and engineering processes in which they tend to be used as tools to
complete the task of regulating and controlling a systems or system components (in
very much the same manner contracts, protocols, etc. do) (Minsky, 1991b).
Norms (as defined in this dissertation): Looking at how norms are considered
and treated in the different research domains, despite the varying perspectives, some
common features can be found, such as the idea that norms are rules that define
what is considered right or wrong by the majority of a population. The definition of
the majority of the population as well as of the particular features of the population
(i.e. its size or composition) thereby are domain dependent (Hollander and Wu,
2011). Norms furthermore spread; that means they are acquired and communicated
through direct (e.g. communication between the actors in a system) and indirect
means (such as adaption and learning processes by the actors).
Taking these common features into account and extending them with the main
idea of the social science literature on norms which has influenced this dissertation
the most, in this dissertation the following definition of norms will be used:
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Definition 2: Norms
Norms are restrictions on patterns of behaviour of actors that are actively or
passively transmitted. These patterns are sometimes represented as actions
to be performed (Axelrod, 1986). In principle they dictate what actions (or
outcomes) are permitted, empowered, prohibited or obligatory under a given set
of conditions as well as specify effects of complying or not complying with the
norms (Balke and Villatoro, 2011). Norms should be contextual, prescriptive
and followable (Schimanoff, 1980).
The notion of contextuality refers to norms only being applicable in a specific
context and not in general. To give an example: despite being generally valid, rules
for driving a car are only applicable in traffic settings and these traffic settings provide
the context for the application of the respective norms. This notion of contextuality
also sets a scope to the time a norm is in force and consequently requires the definition
of the activation, as well as existence and deactivation of a norm. That norms should
be prescriptive refers to the fact that “those who are knowledgeable of a rule also
know that they can be held accountable if they break it” (Schimanoff, 1980, p. 41)2.
Thus, norms specify what actions an actor “must not” perform (prohibition), “is
empowered to perform” (legal power), “must perform” (obligation) or may perform
(“permission”) if the actors want to avoid sanctions for non-compliance with the
norms being imposed on them. Finally, rules should be followable in the sense that
it should be physically possible for the actors in a system to both perform and not
to perform prohibited, obligatory or permitted actions, as well as to obtain the legal
power to do so.
This dissertation focuses on explicit3 “r-norms” as defined by Tuomela and
Bonnevier-Tuomela (1995); Tuomela (1995) only, hence norms that are “created
by an authority or body of agents authorized to represent the group (this body
can also be the entire group)”. Despite the broader definition of the term above,
when speaking of “norms” this dissertation refers to “r-norms” and if not specified
otherwise does not consider s-norms.
2.2 Open Distributed Systems
As pointed out in the introduction, the focus of this dissertation is open distributed
systems. In order to create an understanding of what is meant by this term, in
this section the term will be defined and be explained in more detail. Looking
at the term, it consists of two objectives specifying the system term: “open” and
“distributed”. For this reason, in order to explain the term “open distributed” system,
2This does not necessarily imply the opposite to be true, i.e. that one can only be held accountable
if one knew about a norm.
3In general, r-norms are explicit, i.e. they have been brought into existence by a proper authority
(e.g., group members with authority) and have been formally articulated, specified and written down.
Examples of formally articulated norms are laws and regulations for example. If norms have not
been written down, but only passed on orally or assumed to be understood by all actors in a system
without any formal specification, one talks about “implicit norms”. In this dissertation the focus
will be on explicit norms only.
2.2 Open Distributed Systems 17
this dissertation starts from the definitions of its objectives – i.e. open systems and
distributed systems – and then combine the two terms to arrive at an integrated
definition as well as explain the relevance of norms to these systems.
Definition 3: Open System
An open system is a system in which autonomous heterogeneous entities with
incomplete knowledge pursue their own goals and possibly interact with other
entities (Lo´pez y Lo´pez, 2003, p. 2). The system is “open” in the respect that
entities can freely join and leave the system (Davidsson, 2001).
As a result of the openness and the autonomy of the entities, several problems
arise. One is that entities do not only pursue their own goals in a system, but perform
actions because of what they expect other entities or the system to do. Thus, it needs
to be established how expected behaviour is defined. This is normally done with
the help of norms. However, the specification of expected behaviour with the help
of norms does not necessarily imply that the entities in the system will exhibit the
expected behaviour. Thus in order to participate effectively in the system the entities
need to be able to take into account possible malicious and unexpected behaviour of
other entities and adjust accordingly.
In contrast to the term “open system”, that mainly focuses on the system
composition and entry/access components, the term “distributed system” is mainly
used for describing a system’s appearance from the outside. The term itself tends to
be used in computer science in particular. It is defined as follows:
Definition 4: Distributed System
A distributed system is an application such as a piece of software that executes a
collection of protocols to enable a collection of autonomous entities in the system
that are connected through a network and some middleware to coordinate their
actions, as well as share resources to appear as a single coherent facility from
outside the system (Tanenbaum and van Steen, 2007).
Two particular features are important to note about this definition. The first
feature is that similarly to open systems, distributed systems perceive the entities
acting in the system as autonomous, i.e. independently choosing their actions. These
entities possess different resources. These resources might initially only be accessible
to specific entities and can be made available to other entities via communication,
coordination and/or cooperation mechanisms. This coordination results in the
second particular feature of distributed systems: the appearance as a single coherent
system from the outside. Hence, despite the underlying distribution of resources and
interaction of the entities of the system, from outside the system, this distribution is
not visible. An abstraction level is added that covers the distribution and lets the
system appear as one component.
Combining the notions of open systems and distributed systems, open distributed
systems are defined as follows for the purpose of this dissertation:
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Definition 5: Open Distributed System
Open distributed systems are systems in which autonomous entities with some
form of social relationship with one another are free to join and leave the system as
well as perform actions in the system such as interacting with other entities. They
base their decisions and actions on their own goals as well as their expectations
about the system and the behaviour of the other entities. The result of the
combined individual decisions and actions is a global system emergent behaviour
that – in contrast to the individual decision making processes – can be perceived
from the outside of the system.
From an economic perspective, this definition is rooted in the ideas of the Austrian
School, especially the concept of “methodological individualism” (Schumpeter, 1908).
Methodological individualism perceives system-wide developments as the aggregation
of decision and actions by individual entities (Hayek, 1996) and tries to explain
emergent system behaviour in a bottom-up approach (Lukes, 1968).
From an analytical perspective, methodological individualism can take two forms.
It can explain emergent system properties: (i) in terms of individuals alone, and
(ii) in terms of individuals plus relations between individuals.
As Arrow (1994) argues, the first version is not achievable in practice, as the
social structures and the environment individuals are embedded in will always have
an impact on the individuals and therefore should not be neglected. That is why
he argues that the broader view should be taken. Following his line of argument,
we focus on the latter form of methodological individualism when researching the
effects of governance decisions in open distributed systems. Thus, despite analysing
system-wide changes as a result of norm changes, in this dissertation the system-wide
changes are viewed as result of the individual entities’ decisions and their interaction
between them. As a consequence the effects of norm changes on individuals, their
actions as well as their social structures will be the starting point of the normative
analysis conducted in this dissertation.
To elaborate in more detail on what kind of systems this dissertation refers
to when speaking of open distributed systems, let us look at some examples of
these systems and their applications. Table 2.1 provides an overview of major open
distributed systems, grouping them by their intended application.
The first group of open distributed systems we consider are those – such as mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs) – that have been designed with relay routing as their
primary application. Typically in a MANET bandwidth is shared in order to allow
communication between individuals (referred to as mobile nodes). If two mobile nodes
are out of reach of one another’s mobile antennas, for example, and cannot directly
communicate with each other, they can use other nodes as a communication channel,
routing their communication through them. Currently, two big challenges have been
identified for this kind of systems: the first is the mobility of participants, which
the routing protocols need to account for. The second challenge is the participation
of the mobile nodes as relays. Relaying information costs energy. The problem
with this is that battery-powered mobile nodes have a limited power life cycle,
which is drained every time they relay messages. As a consequence, MANET users
might be tempted to free-ride, i.e. to enjoy the benefits of the MANET, but not
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Table 2.1: Classification of Open Distributed Systems (Oram, 2001; Wrona,
2005)
application system shared
resources
example
relay routing
mobile ad hoc
networks
bandwidth, buffer
memory
ad hoc on-demand
distance vector
routing (AODV),
dynamic source
routing (DSR)
wireless mesh
networks
bandwidth, CPU RoofNet, Rooftop
P2P networking
file-sharing bandwidth, disk
space
Gnutella, Napster,
BitTorrent
anonymous
publishing
bandwidth, disk
space
Publius
Publishing
System,
FreeHaven,
Freenet
grid computing CPU SETI@home
communication &
conversation
bandwidth, CPU Skype, Jabber
anti-censorship
news accessing
bandwidth, disk
space
Red Rover
cloud computing service provision software,
platforms,
infrastructural
components
(CPU, bandwidth,
memory, . . . )
Amazon S3,
Amazon EC2,
Eucalyptus Cloud
Computing
Service
virtual teams MMORPGs character abilities,
resources,
manpower, . . .
guilds, clans or
teams in World of
Warcraft, Guild
Wars, EverQuest
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to contribute to the MANET by routing other nodes’ communications (Buchegger
and Chuang, 2007). This, however, puts the whole network at risk. The reason
for this is simple: as pointed out, network users can exhibit strategic behaviour
and are not necessarily cooperating by making their resources available without the
prospect of rewards for their good behaviour. However, unreciprocated, there is no
inherent value in cooperation for a user. A lone cooperating user draws no benefit
from their cooperation, even if the rest of the network does. Guaranteed cost paired
with uncertainty or even lack of any resulting benefit does not induce cooperation
in a (bounded) rational4, utility-maximizing user. Without any further incentives,
rational users therefore would not cooperate in such an environment and all be worse
off than if they cooperated. This phenomenon is referred to as “Tragedy of the
Commons” in literature (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990)5. As a result, enforcement
mechanisms are required in open distributed relay routing applications to reduce the
prevalence of free-riding.
Another example of open distributed systems are Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks.
They are a way to organize a group of participants/nodes with equal privileges
to allow for the partition of tasks or workloads between these participants/nodes.
These participants/nodes are referred to as peers (Milojicic et al., 2002). The best
known example of task partition is probably file-sharing (e.g. BitTorrent or Gnutella).
File-sharing comprises the idea that the individual users (called peers) offer files
to share across a P2P network. On request by another peer these files can be sent
to the requesting peer. The problem in this kind of systems is that sending and
providing files does not have any immediate benefit for the providing peer, resulting
in the already described tragedy of the commons and free-riding issues. Furthermore,
P2P networks typically are large scale networks and as a consequence, individual
participants or nodes are unlikely to have global knowledge of the whole network,
but only local information. That is why one of the main issues in P2P networks is
to provide mechanisms to help to search for information. This is normally done by
routing information requests through the P2P network. With regard to this routing
one major issue is the robustness of the system, which is required in several forms.
Firstly, due to the open nature of the system (i.e. participants/nodes can join and
leave at any point), its general functionality needs to be ensured. Thus, the system’s
functionality and the protocols (i) should not rely on single nodes, (ii) need to able
to handle the entrance and leaving of any number of nodes, and (iii) need to be able
to cope with malicious nodes (i.e. nodes that on purpose intend to harm the system’s
functionality).
Secondly, robustness against free-riding is required, i.e. that users do not only use
resources, but share their own resources in return. Thus, if too many free-riders exist
in a P2P system, the performance of the whole network could be at risk, depriving
all nodes from the network’s intended advantages. Just like in MANETs and other
relay routing applications, taking actions against free-riding is therefore essential for
the success or even the survival of the network.
Cloud computing – the penultimate application presented in Table 2.1 – is a
4The term “bounded rationality is defined on page 28 in detail.
5The problem described by Hardin as well as Ostrom et al. originally – as the name indicated –
referred to common pool resources (which will be explained later in this chapter) only. However, in
recent publications the term has also been used for other types of goods such as public goods. In
this dissertation we will use this more recent broader view of the term.
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newer paradigm that is often associated with the concept of service provision. The
general idea behind this is to envision a system in the form of different scalable
modules or resources that are coupled together. These modules/resources are defined
as services which can be commodities and are provided/acquired over wide area
networks (such as the Internet) via standardized interfaces or technologies. The
services can range from simple resources such as CPU or disk space to software
applications or whole infrastructures and can theoretically be offered and developed
by different, possibly competing organizations6. Currently only few cloud computing
providers exist, hence the described scenario is still a vision. If one follows the ideas
of this vision however, predicts a situation where several service providers might
compete with one another for the attention of possible customers, especially if the
services provided are being paid for. From a service consumer’s point of view it is
important to choose a provider that satisfies his requirements the best. Enforcement
mechanisms are one tool for ensuring a better average user satisfaction under these
circumstances and therefore, also play an important role in current cloud computing
research.
The last application presented in Table 2.1 is often not considered a classical
open distributed system, despite having all the features of it: Massively multiplayer
online role-playing games (MMORPGs). MMORPGs are video/computer games in
which a very large number of players interact with one another within a virtual game
world. The human players therefore often assume the role of a virtual character and
guide it through the virtual world. The virtual worlds normally are persistent, i.e.
constantly existing and evolving, however the player can log in and out at anytime.
One basic feature of MMORPGs is that they require social interaction between the
players. In order to develop their character a player may have to cooperate with
other players, as certain tasks in a MMORPG require a certain amount of teamwork7.
These tasks usually require players to combine the specialized skills of their virtual
characters and take on roles/tasks (based on these skills) in the team. Examples of
such tasks are protecting other players from damage (called “tanking”), “healing”
damage done to other players or damaging enemies in a battle for example. The
players in these settings rely on each other to have a better chance of succeeding.
Very often the reward for succeeding then needs to be shared by all the members
of the group who have survive the task. This situation results in a dilemma for
the player. Despite needing a strong group for better chances of success, the more
players survive at the end, the more have to share the reward. Furthermore, a player
might steal the reward and run off with it hoping that the players that have used
their strength in the course of fulfilling the task do not have enough strength left to
pursue them. As a result – although wanting to benefit from the task completion
(and resulting reward), players are discouraged from contributing to save their own
resources, which in turn however weakens their group. Consequently, in MMORPGs
the tragedy of the commons can be found resulting in the need for mechanisms to
encourage cooperation.
6An overview over current cloud computing providers can be found in Leavitt (2009) for example.
7The most common types of these teams are called “Pugs” (Pick up groups). Pugs are small
groups with a short lifespan and often have the focus of completing a specific quest. Larger groups
with a longer lifespan are called Guilds (Johansson and Verhagen, 2010).
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2.3 Ensuring Compliance with Norms
In the last section, we examined open distributed systems and their particular
features. One dominant theme was that they face the tragedy of the commons, i.e.
free-riding problems due to their open, distributed and large scale nature. If not
solved, these free-riding problems can endanger a complete network and deprive all
users of the possible benefits. Enforcement mechanisms are one way of addressing
the free-riding problem and we now examine them more closely.
So far, although mentioning enforcement in the definition of norms, little was
said about enforcement itself, but indirectly the assumption was made that norms
are generally enforceable, i.e. it can be made sure that everyone follows the norms.
This assumption is rather unrealistic in open distributed systems and one aim of this
dissertation is to address this problem by looking more closely into the effects that
different enforcement mechanisms have on these systems. Therefore in this section
the theoretical foundations are laid for the concept of enforcement as one means to
ensure compliance with norms.
In general two mechanisms for ensuring compliance with norms can be found in
the literature: (i) In the first it is assumed that the actors (and/or their actions)
in a system can be controlled (this includes the control of the physical power of
actors) and any non-normative actions can be stopped before they can take place and
affect the system. This notion is typically referred to as regimentation (Grossi et al.,
2007) or control-based enforcement (CBE) (Perreau de Pinninck Bas, 2010, p. 14).
(ii) The second point of view portrays the complete opposite: it assumes that only
the actors in a system themselves have control over their physical powers. Hence,
they can choose and control the actions they perform and therefore enforcement
must be executed after the actions have taken place with the help of incentives such
as sanctions or rewards. This form of enforcement is referred to as incentive-based
enforcement (IBE).
To make the distinction between the two forms of enforcement easier, for the
purpose of this dissertation, when talking about “enforcement” we refer to the notion
of IBE; otherwise the term “regimentation” will be used.
2.3.1 Regimentation
As explained earlier, regimentation tries to bring about a state in which the deviation
from a norm is physically not possible, or where the deviation from the norm does
not have any effect on the rest of the participants in a system. This idea is especially
popular in artificial societies, i.e. societies such as multi-agent systems in computer
science (Weiss, 1999; Russell and Norvig, 2002; Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995) –
that are inhabited by artificial entities that perform tasks on behalf of their owners.
Minsky (1991b) for example distinguished two modes of regimentation which together
comprise the regimentation idea: regimentation by interception and regimentation
by compilation.
Regimentation by compilation assumes that all participants’ mental states are
accessible to the system (closed systems), and can be altered to be in accordance with
the normative framework. Thus, participants are treated as a “white box” whose
content can be analysed and altered as needed by the regimenting entity of the
system (Balke, 2009). Minsky gives an example of a computer program component
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that is supposed to join a running system. In his example the source code of this
new program is accessible to the regimenting entity of the system and this entity
can check whether based on the source code the program can conduct any actions
that deviate from the norms of the system. If this is the case it can either stop the
program from joining the system or urge a change to the program. This concept is
applied for example in the KAoS architecture (Bradshaw et al., 1995).
In the case that the mental states are not accessible to the system (i.e. the
inner states of the participants are a black box to the system) norm compliance is
ensured by indirectly constraining the actions of the individual participants. Thus,
regimentation by interception uses a regimentation component (typically a piece of
middleware in computer systems) that at run-time intercepts all actions (in computer
systems this normally refers to messages being sent to the rest of the components) and
dismisses those that are not in accordance with the norms of the system. This idea is
used in systems such as ISLANDER, that uses so-called “governors” as regimentation
entities (Esteva et al., 2002). Thus, when two participants want to interact with each
other they have do so by using the governors as a proxy for their communication.
The governor parses their messages and verifies their conformance with the norms
of the system. If the messages conform to the norms it routes the corresponding
messages to the appropriate recipients and interaction can take place. Otherwise the
messages are dismissed and no non-norm-conforming interaction will be initiated.
Looking at the implementation side of interception-based regimentation, in
artificial societies, according to (Perreau de Pinninck Bas, 2010, p. 15) this approach
is relatively easy to implement and deploy. Nevertheless it exhibits a number of
problems which act as drawbacks to the idea.
Interception-based regimentation relies heavily on messages being sent and checked
for unwanted behaviour. The problem with this, however, is that the basic mechanism
cannot deal with norm-deviations by messages not being sent, such as in the case
of obligations. Minsky (1991a) has proposed a way of solving this issues by giving
its regimentation components (so-called controllers) the task to keep track of the
controlled participant’s state and the obligations it has to fulfill. The controller then
sends a message on behalf of the participant it observes, if that participant misses its
obligation. However, in order to do so, it needs to know all the parameters necessary
for creating the respective message, which causes implementation difficulties and
reduces the number of unfulfilled obligations a controller can cope with. Furthermore,
the additional computing overhead produced by the interception of messages as well as
the book-keeping of the participants’ states may degrade the system’s performance. As
a result, interception-based regimentation can be a serious bottlenecks for (especially
real-time) norm enforcement.
One problem both kinds of regimentation have with regard to their applicability
to open distributed systems is that they limit the autonomy, as well as the physical
power of the participants (or at least assume this to be easily possible). In reality
however – especially if human actors are involved – this may not be the case. In
reality often situations arise, where from a business perspective regimentation is
not possible because consumers will not accept being monitored all the time or
where from a technical perspective regimentation is simply not feasible. Thus, not
only do participants frequently join and leave open distributed system where their
mental states cannot be checked (this is especially the case if humans interact with
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one another), but situations might arise in which the participants have agreed to
conduct the actual transaction outside the monitored environment (i.e. outside the
interception area). To give a real world example for such a situation, let us have a
look at eBay8. The eBay platform is used to match potential buyers with potential
sellers with the help of auctions. However, once the matching has taken place and
according to eBay regulations the transaction partners agreed to live up to their
transaction tasks (e.g. deliver a good after the money has been sent), the actual
exchange of good and money takes place outside eBay. Despite having several indirect
mechanisms in place that should encourage participants to stick to the agreements,
eBay cannot directly force them to do so, as it has no direct control over the actions
or mental states of participants outside the space of the website and consequently
makes completely effective regimentation impossible.
2.3.2 Incentive-based Enforcement
IBE has been proposed to solve compliance issues where regimentation is not feasible
or sensible. In contrast to regimentation approaches that pursue the idea of ensuring
complete compliance, IBE aims to reduce norm-deviating behaviour to the smallest
amount possible.
With regard to IBE, Ellickson (2005) proposes the usage of both “carrots” and
“sticks” – i.e. rewards and sanctions – as incentives and categorizes three types of
actions by participants that are of relevant with regard to IBE:
1. good behaviour that is to be rewarded,
2. ordinary behaviour that warrants no response (as giving a response to the most
common behaviour only tends to increase the costs of administering sanctions),
and
3. negative behaviour that is to be punished.
Ellickson’s approach uses the game-theoretic idea of utility (see Section 2.4 for
more details). This implies that the participants’ goals, motivations and decision-
making processes take into account many issues that may be combined into a
single value – utility – which is computable through a “utility function” (Balke and
Villatoro, 2011). Thus, every situation in an interaction is attributed certain utilities.
Depending on their choice of actions the participants in an interaction can achieve
these utilities. Sanctions are normally conducted in form of giving negative utilities
to the norm-deviating participant, whereas rewards come in the form of positive
utilities. Thereby it is normally assumed that the participants try to maximize their
utilities, i.e. that possible sanctions or rewards can help to induce norm-conformal
behaviour. What is important to note is that utility functions may be different for
different individuals, thus individuals might judge the same situation differently with
regard to the utilities involved and consequently might act differently given the same
setting.
One of the roles of norms in this context is to give information about which
actions are valid and which utilities might result from different actions and outcomes,
8For more information see www.ebay.com or the respective country-specific websites.
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however they have no regimenting physical power, i.e. it is the participants choice
whether to follow a norm or not.
With regard to the actual enforcement actions, two different options are available:
direct and indirect enforcement (Va´zquez-Salceda et al., 2005). Direct enforcement
affects the individuals immediately and is directly observable (like bans, fines and
physical punishment). Indirect enforcement affects only the individuals’ future
actions and may be directly visible or not (e.g. warnings, reputation).
Besides the classification into direct and indirect mechanisms, enforcement is
typically distinguished as to who enforces. IBE can be either self-enforced, enforced
by a second-party, enforced by (a group of) third-party observers, or enforced by
special enforcement entities that are being given special powers to fulfill this task
(Balke and Villatoro, 2011).
Violations can be purposeful or accidental. For self-enforcement to be effective
the violator needs to realize its own violation – even if it is accidental – and enforce
a sanction on itself.
In contrast, second-party enforcement refers to enforcement being executed by
the parties directly involved in a transaction. Imagine an actor A interacting with
another actor B. Second party enforcement then means A using incentives to improve
the likelihood that B’s actions will conform with the norms and vice versa (Yarbrough
and Yarbrough, 1999).
One problem with second-party enforcement is that the actual enforcement has
the form of an iterated game in the game-theoretic sense. Thus, if being cheated on
by actor B, actor A can only wait for the subsequent encounter between the two
to apply the enforcement (e.g. punish B by not interacting with it again). This
concept of responding to an action in kind (i.e. returning benefits for benefits, and
responding with non-cooperation or cheating to cheating) on the current or next
possible encounter is referred to as reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984).
In enforcement situations with third-party observers enforcement is executed by
entities that are not directly involved in the transaction where the violation has taken
place. In the literature the most common examples of third-party enforcement are
reputation concepts. In Balke et al. (2009) we presented a survey on reputation and
its usage in artificial societies and gave an in-depth definition of the terms relevant
to the concepts. The following sections on reputation are taken from this survey.
Definition 6: Reputation
Reputation is the process and the effect of transmission of a target’s (i.e. the
actor being evaluated) image.
Definition 7: Image
Image is a global or averaged evaluation of a given target on the part of an
individual. It consists of a set of evaluative beliefs (Miceli and Castelfranchi,
2000) about the characteristics of a target. These evaluative beliefs concern the
ability or possibility of the target to fulfil one or more of the evaluator’s goals,
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Definition 7: Image (cont.)
e.g. to behave responsibly in an economic transaction. An image, basically, tells
whether the target is “good” or “bad”, or “not so bad” etc. with respect to a
norm, a standard, a skill etc.
In the third-party enforcement example above, reputation refers to an actor C
observing an interaction between A and B, formulating its own image about the two
interacting entities and circulating that image to other system participants9.
One advantage of third-party observer enforcement is that it does not necessarily
need a centralized instance that collects all enforcement information, but rather a
large number of decentralized mechanisms exist, such as the ones described in Regan
and Cohen (2005); Zacharia et al. (1999); Yu and Singh (2002); Sabater-Mir and
Sierra (2002); Sabater-Mir et al. (2006). One problem with regard to any reputation
model however is that in general they rely heavily on information from the actors,
which might on purpose pass on false information. In the earlier example, C might
lie to others about A and B because it might be beneficial to him.
Another technique that might be employed for third-party observer enforcement is
the utilization of so-called enforcement entities. Enforcement entities are participants
in a system that are empowered by the system to monitor normative behaviour
and act upon violations. Police officers are an example of enforcement entities: in
contrast to “normal” citizens, having witnessed a norm-violation they are (legally)
empowered by the state – in their function as police officers – to carry out actions
like arrests, etc. and thus indirectly enforce norm-conformance.
2.3.3 The Enforcement Process
The preceding paragraphs, have mainly focused on the source of the enforcing action
and distinguished enforcement based on it. However, despite its high relevance for
enforcement in general, this is not the only essential part when it come to enforcement
– enforcement is a far more comprehensive process. Given the dissertation’s focus on
enforcement mechanisms as one example for governance decisions and the resulting
changes in a running system, this section looks more closely into the idea and process
of enforcement, using work that has been published in Balke and Villatoro (2011)
and Balke and Eymann (2009). In this section we present our conceptualization of
the enforcement process and try to give a complete view on the possible facets of
enforcement. This process will be explained in more detail to first of all give a detailed
overview of the design options available for enforcement and to furthermore complete
the foundations for the enforcement concepts to be discussed and implemented later
in this dissertation.
9The evaluation circulating as reputation may concern a subset of the target’s characteristics,
e.g. its willingness to comply with socially accepted norms and customs. More precisely, referring to
Conte and Paolucci (2002) we define reputation to consist of three distinct but interrelated objects:
(i) a cognitive representation, or more precisely a believed evaluation (any number of actors in
the system may have this belief as their own); (ii) a population-level dynamic, i.e., a propagating
believed evaluation; and (iii) an objective emergent property at the actor’s level, i.e., what the actor
is believed to be as a result of the circulation of the evaluation.
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As shown in Figure 2.1, this dissertation conceptualizes enforcement as a four-
stage process, with its phases – although being interlinked – being designable with a
degree of independence. The first three stages correspond roughly to the conventional
processes of arrest, trial and conviction of transgressors, while the fourth is the
process of learning and adaptation that ensues. Each stage involves distinctive
activities whose performers are actors executing particular roles. Although in general
terms most activities and roles are present in every system that includes enforceable
norms, they need to be adapted to the particularities of the normative context where
norm deviations take place. When reading this section particular focus to the roles
involved in the enforcement process presented should be given. These roles will
be of importance at a later point of this dissertation when different enforcement
mechanisms are being discussed and tested in a specific setting of an open distributed
system.
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Figure 2.1: The Enforcement Process
2.3.3.1 Detecting Non-Compliance
The first stage of the process is the detection of non-compliance. This stage has
two goals: the ascertainment of a violation and the identification of participants
involved. There are two obvious types of actors (or roles) involved in the stage:
violator and observer. One should note that, depending on the structure of the norm
that is violated, the observer may need to gather enough evidence to ascertain what
violation actually took place before any punitive actions can take place. Hence, in
order to bring about charges, observers may need to assess damages, to assign blame
and to identify victims and profiteers that may be affected by the non-compliance.
Each of these roles may be performed by more than one actor in the system and
even performed by the same actor. In the particular case of utilitarian actors, the
observer role may take different forms: (i) a first-party observer, who controls its own
compliance, (ii) a second-party observer, who observes the misbehaviour of his own
transaction partner(s) or finally a (iii) third-party observer. Third-party observers
can have different forms. They can for example come in the form of “normal” system
participants that observe norm deviations from other system participants they are
not directly interacting with, or they might come in form the of especially empowered
entities (i.e. entities that are employed by the system itself) that supervise the
behaviour of other actors in the system (Balke, 2009). In contrast to regimentation
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concepts, these entities cannot observe the whole system, but only the actions in
their vicinity.
One question that is very important with regard to the success of enforcement
in the detection stage is to what extent norm deviation may be detected and thus
might determine strategic decisions of the actors in the system with respect to norm
fulfillment. Whereas complete knowledge and information by the actors is often
assumed in many papers, in this dissertation we will make use of the “bounded
rationality assumption”. In contrast to complete knowledge and information, it is a
much weaker assumption about the actors’ capabilities. In this dissertation we us
Rubinstein’s definition of bounded rationality (Rubinstein, 1998):
Definition 8: Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality of actors implies that – in their decision processes – these
actors are limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their
minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions. When trying
to act rationally they cannot base their decision on complete (system) knowledge,
but these “rational” decisions are only rational with regard to their limited scope
instead, hence they are acting accordingly to “bounded” rationality.
Furthermore, in this dissertation we assume that actors will only deviate from a
norms if they consider that the benefits of a deviation are higher than the possible
penalty resulting from the deviation10. As a consequence it is assumed that in
scenarios where most deviations are likely to be observed and thus penalties are
likely to be imposed, participants are more likely to stick to the norms, whereas in
the opposite case – giving equal enforcement penalties (or rewards) in both cases
– participants might take the reduced probability of detection into account and
therefore are more likely to cheat.
2.3.3.2 Enforcement Determination
After the initial observation of a norm violation, the enforcement determination
takes place. This involves the appraisal of the applicability of the norm within the
normative context of the non-compliant action and, if applicable, activation of the
normative consequences of infringement and determination of the actual enforcement
to be applied. In this stage, observers bring charges to a judge who should decide if
the violator deserves a sanction and then determines the appropriate reward/sanction.
The judge may also command the execution of reparatory actions as a consequence
of the infringement. This sub-process may involve intense argumentative processes
to establish the applicability and severity of enforcement options.
Sanctions or rewards as means of enforcement are usually calculated as a function
of the violator, the victims, the effects produced by the violation, and the normative
context where the violation was detected. This enforcement calculation might
imply a cost which is absorbed by the judge. Some may need to be enacted either
automatically or commissioned by the judge.
10The benefit or penalty of deviation thereby do not have to be defined in monetary terms, but
could correspond to the satisfaction the actors receives from his actions for example.
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During enforcement calculation for utility maximizing actors, one should not
assume that all actors have the same utility function, and therefore might react
differently towards the same enforcement. A problem when wanting to take this factor
into account, is that often (and especially in open distributed systems) determining
the individual utility functions of the actors is impossible. The reason for this is
that normally this information is private (i.e. only known by the respective actor).
Hypothetically assuming that all utility functions were accessible, the enforcing
entities would be able to calculate a perfect enforcement to decrement the utility
function of the violator and/or increment the one of the norm-follower, even if they
do not share the same function. However as this is normally not the case, enforcement
can be imperfect in that respect.
One final decision has to be made before applying the enforcement action, and
this is how it should be applied. The way an enforcement action is applied can be
decided by the judge or be imposed by the normative context.
2.3.3.3 Enforcement Application
The enforcement application phase is composed of the actual execution of an enforce-
ment and the assessment of its proper application.
The outcome of the previous stage is a sentence to be carried out by the executor.
As elaborated earlier these executors may be (Balke, 2009):
The violator (“first-party”): The actor responsible for the violation himself can
act as an executor. This might for example be the case if – after violating
a norm unintentionally – the violator might want to repay the damage done
(maybe to avoid a loss in reputation or to reduce the chances of being punished
in another way).
A second-party victim: Depending on the types of norms that are controlling the
society, one actor can be directly affected by another actor’s norm violation. If
this is the situation, the victim can act as the observer, calculator and applier
of the enforcement on the violator.
A third-party observer: If an actor is seen violating a norm, the observing actor
can have the right to apply enforcement to the violator, even if this actor did
not suffer from the violation.
A group of third-party observers: The act of enforcement can be distributed
amongst a group of actors. This type of enforcement act is often used in indirect
enforcement concepts such as reputation (which has an aggregated effect such
that, the more actors use it, the more powerful it becomes).
Normative empowered entities: Normative empowered entities such as authorit-
ies are entities that are not capable to observe all actions but only the ones that
are within their vicinity. They have the power (designated by the normative
framework that they all belong to) to perform enforcement actions, i.e. applying
sanctions as well as rewards.
It is important to note that enforcement may not come for free but may have
a cost associated to its application that may be borne by executors or the system.
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Sometimes the costs are directly associated with the enforcement. A straightforward
example of costly enforcement is imprisonment, where the state has to support
prisoners. Reputation is normally one of the most effective relativized-cost enforcement
mechanisms. Transmission of (bad) information regarding an actor has a relative
cost (depending on the degree of responsibility of the information transmitted and
the retaliation level of the members of the society) to the actor transmitting the
information, however, it might also affect the target of the rumour.
After the executor has acted, the supervisor is in charge of assessing that the
violator has indeed received the enforcement, and that the enforcement has served
the purpose for which it was designed. The supervisor is also responsible for ensuring
that other actions that are associated with the infringed norm are properly triggered
and carried out. In case of compensational enforcement, in particular, it is the
supervisor ’s role to ensure that the victims are compensated.
2.3.3.4 Assimilation
Once the actual enforcement act has been performed, the last stage of the enforcement
process takes place: the assimilation. Assimilation is the processes through which
individuals or the normative system itself take advantage from enforcement to modify
subsequent behaviour.
As we have seen, by performing the corresponding roles, violators, observers,
victims, judges, supervisors and executors come into contact with information about
norm-compliance that they could ideally incorporate in their decision-making process
and may hence shape their own future behaviour. The normative system however,
may specify ways that information about the enforcement process (besides the ones
which participants obtain directly through interactions) may become available to
them. By so doing, norms about enforcement may give shape to a space for individual
evolution where specific aspects of compliance are given more relevance than others
and therefore facilitate evolution of the system along different lines.
While enforcement is intended as a motivation for specific actions, it may further-
more have an ostensible objective (compensation, retaliation, deterrence, exemplarity),
but the actual effect of enforcement on an actor’s motivations is a private matter
of convictions and thus directly unobservable for the system. Nevertheless, the
subsequent behaviour of actors is observable, hence the system as a whole, or its
legislators, may use evolution of the behaviour of individuals as input for purposeful
evolution of the normative system. In either case, modifications of behaviour need to
be observable somehow. The natural means are probes and indicators that must be
aligned with performance parameters accessible to legislators or the system’s dynamic
features. This way, the choice and balance of those conventions that determine the
availability and form of information about enforcement and norm-compliance have
significant effects on the overall collective behaviour – collective behaviour that results
from the aggregate behaviour of informed individuals, as well as collective behaviour
determined by new norms that result from legislative or autonomic adaptation.
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2.4 Enforcement and Cooperation – Related Work
In Section 2.2 we described the cooperation dilemma in open distributed systems
which comes in the form of free-riding problems. The dilemma described was that in
order for the total utility of an open distributed system not to deteriorate, it depends
on a certain amount of individual altruism from the actors in the system with regard
to their cooperation. This conflict between the interest of the individual actors in
the short run as well as the systems as a whole in the long run, is not new, but exists
in various forms in different systems and due to its social impact is often referred to
as social dilemma.
The question of free-riding and reciprocity with regard to the tragedy of the
commons dilemma and the cooperation issues related to it have been studied for a
long time in various research disciplines. In this dissertation we will draw inspiration
from these previous works. We will therefore give an overview of the works relevant
for this dissertation and highlight the respective limitations in the applicability for
the free-riding/cooperation problem in open distributed systems as outlined earlier.
2.4.1 Enforcement and Cooperation in Economic Theory
In economics-inspired works enforcement is usually studied as an incentive for rational
behaviour of utility-based agents. It is seen as an amount taken from an agent’s
benefits and the effectiveness of enforcement is usually measured against system
equilibria, in line with the theory of Becker (1968). The topic has been framed
mostly in terms of mechanism design and the issues that economists have studied
more thoroughly are the information about infraction and enforcement (Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000), as well as the amount and pervasiveness of enforcement (Dreber
et al., 2008). Methodology has been either game-theoretic (see Coleman (1998) for
example) or experimental (e.g. Gurerk et al. (2006)).
2.4.1.1 Enforcement and Cooperation in Games-Theoretic Models
One of the classical domains in which cooperation dilemmas and their solutions
are studied is game theory. Game-theoretic models typically make the following
assumptions:
 The actors are economically rational. That means they try to maximize their
expected utility based on their knowledge about possible payoffs as well as
assumptions about the actions of other actors.
 The game is symmetric, i.e. the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend
only on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them.
 With regard to preferences of solutions, actors prefer defection over unilateral
cooperation and bilateral cooperation over defection (Snidal, 1991).
As a result of these assumptions, six strategic cooperation problems have been
identified, which are all presented in Wrona (2005)11. Of these games, the cooperation
problem inherent in open distributed systems is best described by the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), which therefore is a useful starting point for future analysis.
11The six games are the Harmony Game, two forms of the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) Game, the
Coordination Game, the Chicken Game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. For a detailed description of
all these games please refer to (Wrona, 2005, p. 44ff.)
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The PD was first described and discussed in the 1950s by Merrill Flood and
Melvin Dresher as part of the RAND Corporation’s investigations into game theory12
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007). As in the cooperation setting of open
distributed systems described earlier, the general idea of the PD is that two actors
have to make decisions independently and cannot be sure of what the other actor
does. Facing that decision, for an individual actor it is always better to defect (no
matter what the other actor does) resulting in overall worse utilities for both actors
then they could have achieved in a cooperative strategy (Poundstone, 1992). The
intrinsic problem of the PD is that neither actor can do any better in the game by
switching unilaterally (Allen et al., 2010) as proven by the Nash equilibrium of the
game (Nash, 1950). As a result, in the PD’s classical form as one-shot game, no
interaction is achieved. Since single interactions consequently always pose a problem,
in a next step it was analysed whether repeated instances of the PD – also know as
iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) – help to induce positive reciprocity in cooperation
situations.
In the IPD, the PD is played repeatedly between two actors, inducing a so called
“shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984). Thus, if a PD is played repeatedly between
two actors and two requirements are fulfilled it was shown that reciprocity can be
established in the cooperation dilemma. These two requirements are (i) The actors
must be able to recognize previous cooperation partners and remember the outcome
of the interactions with them, and (ii) the number of interactions between the actors
is not allowed to be fixed in advance.
These requirements need to be fulfilled in order for an actor to be able to
distinguish between good (i.e. formerly cooperating) and bad (i.e. formerly cheating)
cooperation partners and punish the former by not cooperating with them again.
The reason for the second requirement is that the dominant strategy for the final
interaction is to cheat. Anticipating this, it is beneficial for the actors to cheat in the
next-to-last interaction to not be cheated on in the last one, etc. This results in a
spiral that goes back to the very first interaction and therefore stops any reciprocity
effects from taking place. The shadow of the future is the probability δ of a repeated
interaction between actors in the future. δ is often also interpreted as a discount
factor by which future utility (such as payments) are discounted to the present
equivalent. In the literature it is often assumed to be influenced by two factors:
(i) the average life-span of an actor, which is proportional to δ, as well as (ii) its
mobility that is indirectly proportional to δ.
According to the folk theorem (Friedman, 1971) cooperation is a feasible outcome
in an IPD if the shadow of the future (i.e. δ) is sufficiently large enough. Looking
at the examples of open distributed systems described earlier this initially positive
sounding result poses several problems: First of all, the IPD is classically an two-
person game, i.e. it looks at a pair of persons interacting only. However open
distributed systems often have multiple interacting actors at the same time. This is
often helped by portraying the interaction between each pair of actors in a group as
a single game. The problem however with this approach is that it can highly distort
utility considerations in situations where the contribution of one actor is received by
several other actors. This problem is partially solved in n-person games (Axelrod
12Despite Flood and Dresher first expressing the ideas of the PD, it was named and formalized by
Albert Trucker in the same year.
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and Dion, 1988), however further problems remain with regard to the applicability
of game-theoretic approaches to open distributed systems. Secondly, the IPD (both
in the two-player and the n-player version) heavily relies on a high value of δ. As
pointed out, most open distributed systems have large numbers of participants and
possibly can show a high mobility of the individual actors (e.g. in the relay routing
applications). As a consequence the probability of repeated interaction between two
actors is rather low and the folk theorem therefore is not applicable. This however
means that the IPD and game-theoretic approaches are not sufficient for analysing
and addressing the cooperation issues in open distributed systems. Finally, one of
the initial PD (and consequently also IPD) assumptions was the rationality of the
actors in the system. We have already explained that this assumption is a rather
difficult one with regard to human behaviour, causing another applicability problem
of game-theoretic approaches to the problems at hand.
2.4.1.2 Enforcement and Cooperation in Experimental Economics
As outlined earlier, one of the problems with regard to game-theoretic approaches is
that their are based on rather rigid assumptions, such as the “Homo Economicus”
rationale that actors in a system always act in a way which is rational and utility-
maximizing. Although this simplification is helpful in developing first ideas and
theories about cooperation situations, especially with human actor involvement,
it has been criticized for its over-simplification and possible invalidity of results.
Experimental economics tries to address this issue by placing humans as decision-
makers in the center of their analysis (Smith, 1990, p. 1). The aim of experimental
economics is two-fold: the testing of theoretical findings in “real-world settings”
and/or the generation of new scientific theories. This originally natural science based
approach in social science bears the challenge of including human behaviour and
decision making in the experiments. Humans act consciously and unconsciously. The
decision calculus, on what they take into account when deciding about something is
different from person to person. As a result a multitude of relevant decision criteria
exists and the analysis of cause-and-effect relations is difficult, both with regard
to initially identifying the relevant (set of) parameters as well as identifying the
interdependencies between them.
One of the first experimental economics experiments was conducted by Chamberlin
(1948) who analysed strategic behaviour with regard to demand and supply of a
homogeneous product with the help of laboratory experiments. Since his article,
extensive research has been conducted in experimental economics. With regard to
the cooperation dilemma and enforcement some of the most cited articles are on the
research of R. Selten13, G. Bolton and A. Ockenfels (see Bolton (1991) or Bolton et al.
(1998) for example) as well as E. Ostrom (who – together with Oliver E. Williamson
– was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for “her analysis
of economic governance, especially the commons” (The Nobel Foundation, 2009)).
In Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), the authors described results from classroom
experiments on cooperation in basic game-theoretic settings and were able to show
that humans act strategically. However in contrast to game-theoretic ideas not only
13R. Selten was awarded the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with John
Harsanyi and John Nash) for his research on this topic.
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pecuniary payoff is relevant for the decision making but also relative payoff standing
as well (this is referred to as ERC theory by the authors) and in later works they
were able to show that in small groups, a propensity to punish non-contributors
exists. They conclude that this propensity might be one way of (partially) solving the
free-riding problem inherent in systems like the open distributed systems described
earlier. Similar results are shown in Gu¨th (1995) and Fehr et al. (1997) for example.
One weakness of their approach that is pointed out by Gu¨th and Ockenfels is that
the ERC theory focuses on “local behaviour in the sense that it explains stationary
patterns for relatively simple games, played over a short time span in a constant frame”
(Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, p. 198). As a consequence it poses some problems in
the applicability to open distributed systems, where larger time-frames and variable
settings (e.g. with regard to the number of actors in a group) are dominant.
Whereas Bolton’s and Ockenfels’ research was mainly conducted in form of
classroom experiments, Ostrom is particularly known for her field studies concerning
common pool resources. Examples of her studies include communal tenure in high
mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland, Zanjera irrigation communities in the
Philippines, Sri Lankan and Nova Scotian fishery grounds, Californian groundwater
basins, etc. (Ostrom, 1990).
One of the results of her research was a more specific classification of cooperation
dilemmas with regard to the goods they concerned as well as a good-specific problem
discussion. Her classification is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: The Four Basic Types of Goods distinguished by Ostrom (2005)
(originally published in (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977, p. 12))
Ostrom distinguished the difficulty of excluding possible beneficiaries as well as
the substractability of use. The former is particularly interesting with regard to the
free-riding issues described. If exclusion of others is difficult or costly to achieve,
strong incentives exist to benefit from the goods without contributing. The latter
criterion – substractability – refers to the question whether the consumption of a
resource limits the quantity available for others (e.g. when withdrawing water for
irrigation purposes from a water basin) or not (e.g. watching a DVD that can be
watched by others afterwards).
In her works, amongst other findings, Ostrom has shown how to address cooper-
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ation dilemmas for both free-riding types of goods (i.e. public and common-pool
goods) and stated very general rules about her findings. These rules include the
application of reciprocal monitoring techniques, the requirement that norms need to
be defined by the community they are effecting, etc. Despite Ostrom’s success of
solving most of the free-riding problems in her field studies, with regard to the open
distributed systems issues at hand, applying Ostrom’s results proves difficult. As
stated by Ostrom herself, her results are based on field studies with small groups
sizes only, whereas open distributed systems are often large scale systems with thou-
sands of participants. Furthermore, a second problem exists that is common to all
experimental economic approaches with regard to the early prototyping focus taken
in this dissertation. As pointed out in the introduction, in an early prototyping phase
of development it is crucial to arrive at initial ideas about how interactions in the
open distributed systems might work and how issues arising from these interactions
could be resolved. By definition it is not yet possible to test a running system, but
from a business perspective one wants to test the system/product before putting it
onto the market. Even though this could be done by testing the respective open
distributed system ideas with few participants only and extrapolating the results, as
discussed by Ostrom for example, sample sizes have a significant impact on the results
in cooperation dilemmas, possibly causing problems to the results interpretation.
Finally, testing with human subjects is costly. Especially at an early prototyping
stage of development, companies might not want to spend these incremental costs
without knowing whether their investment might result in positive returns.
2.4.2 Enforcement and Cooperation in Formal Logics Research
Besides economics, cooperation and enforcement have been studied in formal logics
research as well. In this domain, some works deal with enforcement, and incentives
in general, as a component of the notion of norms and thus study the structural
relationships of those components, for instance the relationship between target and
victims14, the syntax of activation and deactivation conditions or links between
infractions and reparatory actions (Perreau de Pinninck Bas et al., 2010). Others
are interested in the dynamics of norm-compliance and thus deal with enforcement
as events triggered when an infraction occurs Garc´ıa-Camino (2009). Finally there
are works that take enforcement as a feature that depends on the type of norm
(conventions, social, regimented, functional,. . . (Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck, 2003)).
These authors are interested, for instance, in the operational semantics of compliance
and enforceability (Grossi et al., 2007), or in the class of incentives most naturally
associated with different norm types (Andrighetto et al., 2010).
2.4.3 Enforcement and Cooperation in Reputation Research
In Section 2.3.2 we presented the definition of reputation (and image) as well as
pointed out the role that reputation plays with regard to the establishment of trust,
which is an important prerequisite for enforcement and cooperation. In the literature,
both trust as well as reputation mechanisms can be found when it comes to the topic
of enforcement. The former mainly build upon image information and consequently
14Detailed description of our understanding of the terms is given in Section 2.3.3
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pose problems when it comes to application in open distributed systems as due
to their open large scale nature the chances for repeated interactions are rather
reduced. In contrast, reputation mechanisms augment the image information by
using circulated information from other participants and consequently reduce the
problem of limited repeated interaction probabilities.
Looking at the literature on reputation mechanisms, one can find two types
of reputation systems: the ones that store information and calculate reputation
metrics centrally (such as eBay for example) and the ones that are decentralized.
Although easier to implement, centralized systems typically face two problems: firstly
– especially in large scale systems – a central entity can become a bottleneck slowing
down the entire system; and secondly the system needs to be trustworthy (as well
as trusted by the participants) as otherwise it could take advantage of everyone
else. Both these issues are addressed by decentralized systems (e.g. (Zacharia
et al., 1999), (Yu and Singh, 2002), (Eymann, 2000), (Sabater-Mir and Sierra, 2001)
and (Sabater-Mir et al., 2006)), which however pose face problems themselves, e.g.
conflicting goals of efficiency to information loss on the one side and robustness
on the other side. Furthermore, as information from third persons is involved in
reputation systems, the systems must be able to handle false or malicious information,
to stop participants from artificially changing their own or others reputation. Typical
examples of this problem are: (i) badmouthing, (ii) ballot stuffing, (iii) colluding,
and (iv) whitewashing.
Badmouthing refers to situations where an interaction partner is giving negative
information about his partner despite being satisfied with the interaction. Reasons for
this might be possible competitive situations between the two. Thus, by evaluating
a competitor negatively the badmouther’s own reputation rises in comparison, which
might for example make him more attractive to possible customers.
Ballot stuffing typically refers to reporting feedback for interactions that did not
take place. The problem is usually solved using cryptographic mechanisms.
Colluding refers to participants faking interactions and giving themselves positive
feedback for these in order to increase their own reputation.
Whitewashing portraits the idea that participants change their identity if the
reputation of a new identity is higher then their old one. This is often “solved” by
assuming that a change of identities is not possible. If this assumption is not feasible,
one potential solution is to add costs to all newcomers (Sun et al., 2005).
All of these issues have been addressed by different researchers and we will rely on
their work with regard to the reputation mechanisms presented in this dissertation.
Thus, despite the problems mentioned, reputation has been proven to increase
enforcement in large scale systems with uncertainty about the cooperation partners’
intentions. In the latter part of this dissertation we will compare one reputation
mechanism in more detail to other means of enforcement. The choice with regard
to the mechanisms will be based on the existing literature (e.g. Balke et al. (2009);
Paolucci et al. (2006, 2009)).
2.4.4 Enforcement and Cooperation in Technical Domains
Besides the more general research on enforcement and cooperation in the domains
just highlighted, many attempts exist that try to find solutions for specific open
distributed systems by focusing on the specific features of the respective systems.
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This section will look more closely at the solutions presented for the applications
mentioned in Table 2.1.
2.4.4.1 Relay Routing
As briefly explained in Section 2.2, relay routing applications in open distributed
systems feature nodes (or participants) that are dynamically and arbitrarily located
in such a way that the communication between the nodes does not rely on a static
underlying network infrastructure (Royer, 1999). As a result of this lack of a static
infrastructure the nodes need to rely on the other nodes in the network to route their
communication (in form of packets) to the destinations, i.e. the network nodes need
to cooperate to ensure general functioning of the communication.
Typically two types of uncooperative behaviour are distinguished in these settings:
faulty/malicious and selfish behaviour. The former refers to the broad class of
misbehaviour in which nodes are either faulty and therefore cannot follow the norm
of routing, or where nodes on purpose try to attack the network (Michiardi and Molva,
2003). The latter also refers to intentional non-cooperation by the nodes. In contrast
to malicious behaviour, reasons for non-cooperation are personal utility considerations
rather then the explicit purpose of harming the system. In relay routing applications
the main threat from selfish nodes is the non-routing of data (“blackholes”) which
may result in performance degradation or communication breakdowns (Hu, 2005).
Scanning relay routing literature, with regard to the cooperation problem, very
often the problem is assumed to be non-existant (see Johnson et al. (2001); Perkins
and Royer (1999) for example). Research that does take the problem into account
and tries to address it, typically has one of the two following foci: (i) virtual currency
schemes (e.g. Nuglets (Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2000) or Sprite (Zhong et al., 2003)),
or (ii) reputation mechanisms (e.g. CONFIDANT (Buchegger and Boudec, 2002),
CORE (Michiardi and Molva, 2002), OCEAN (Bansal and Baker, 2003), Watchdog
(Marti et al., 2000) or LARS (Hu and Burmester, 2006)).
Looking at the currency schemes first, they typically either use currencies (or some
form of tokens) that the forwarding nodes get and the sending nodes need to pay; or
use receipts which a forwarding nodes gets and can exchange for the virtual currency
(or tokens) with a credit clearing service15. In both cases tamper-proof hardware
is required so nodes cannot falsify receipts or increase their virtual currency. This
dependence on tamper-proof hardware presents one big problem in the applicability
of open distributed system, as the hardware to join and interact in the system cannot
be checked centrally, but is located with the individual participants. Introducing
a central component does not seem appropriate for a truly open and distributed
system, as it would be counterproductive to the initial idea of such systems and
would reduce their benefits dramatically. Based on the same reasoning – despite
being discussed at large in literature – currency systems using a central server for
determining the charges and credits involved in a transmission of communication
messages (this is done by Sprite for example) cause problems.
One further general problem of currency-based systems for relay routing applica-
tions is that these systems according to Wang et al. (2004) suffer from the so-called
15This credit clearing service normally is in addition used to determine the value of the payments
and the charges.
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“location privilege problem”. This problem stresses that nodes in different locations
of a network have different chances to earn the virtual currencies. Thus, systems
tend to be unfair towards nodes on the periphery of a network, who have less chance
of being required for routing and thus have a low chance of earning virtual currency.
Learning from the problems of currency-based systems, reputation mechanisms
proposed for relay routing applications in open distributed systems tend to try
to avoid the centrality and local privilege problems just mentioned by relying on
neighbourhood information. As is common to reputation mechanisms in general,
in these settings, systems participants judge the reliability of possible transaction
partners based on the experience of other the other individual in the system. As this
information is stored with the individual participants it consequently theoretically
suits the decentralized idea of the system better. Nevertheless the problems described
in the previous section (i.e. badmouthing, ballot stuffing, colluding, and whitewashing)
often exist and cause difficulties for current relay routing reputation mechanisms.
2.4.4.2 P2P Networks
P2P networks are another application where the free-riding problem exists due to
their large-scale open distributed nature. To give an example of the relevance of
the free-riding problem in P2P systems several studies have been conducted. Adar
and Huberman (2000) for example examined the Gnutella network, which – at the
point of its launch in March 2000 – was the one of the first decentralized peer-to-peer
networks, pioneering later networks adopting the model. In their experiments Adar
and Huberman showed that already soon after Gnutella’s launch, a large proportion
of the user population – upwards of 70% – were free-riders (i.e. enjoyed the benefits
of the system without contributing to its content), nearly 50% of all responses in
Gnutella were returned by the top 1% of sharing hosts and the files shared where
not necessarily those desired by most users. Adar and Huberman summarized this
participation inequality problem as the tragedy of the digital commons and concluded
that for P2P systems to function in the desired way, mechanisms against free-riding
have to be found. In literature and later P2P systems various approaches to encourage
peers to cooperate and to avoid free-riding issue have been presented. Similar to relay
routing applications, the solutions range from game-theoretic analysis (Courcoubetis
and Weber, 2006), to direct reciprocity (i.e. image-related approaches) such as
employed in the BitTorrent protocol (Cohen, 2003), reputation concepts (e.g. KaZaA
(Leibowitz et al., 2003)) as well as currency-based systems (e.g. MojoNation and
Karma (Vishnumurthy et al., 2003)). With the system structure and the enforcement
concepts being very close to the ideas presented with regard to the relay routing
applications, the proposed enforcement mechanisms for P2P systems exhibit similar
problems as the ones proposed for relay routing applications.
2.4.4.3 MMORPGs
One central element of MMORPGs is the social interaction of the participants in the
virtual world with one another in form of teams. The most common form of these
teams have a short term nature and are formed with the purpose of fulfilling a certain
task. The general idea thereby is that the individual team-members contribute their
character’s special skill, etc. to the team and get a share in the reward if the team
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succeeds. One major problem for players in this context is to find team-members that
are willing to contribute to the team and will not just join a team for the possible
reward without contributing any of their resources or try to cheat the team otherwise
by trying to steal the reward.
In order to solve this problem, three approaches can be found in MMORPGs
ranging from central services (so-called matchmakers) over entities with special rights
(called game moderators) to simple image-related approaches.
The first approach – matchmakers – works similar to centralized reputation
mechanisms. In general, when matchmakers are being used, participants searching
for team partner need to register with the matchmaker. This matchmaker then
teams up players according to their skills and furthermore keeps track of their
social performance. In the matchmaker of Halo 3 for example, players are awarded
experience points for winning a match. Should they lose, no experience points will
be given. However, if the player quits the game during a match, one experience point
will be deducted from their account. The problem with this kind of mechanism is the
centralized component and the resulting additional data traffic. For this reason other
approaches than the central mechanism have become popular in MMORPGs. The
already mentioned game moderators are one of them. Game moderators (or game
masters) may be paid employees or unpaid volunteers who attempt to supervise
a virtual game world. For this purpose they are often given special rights and
information such as access to special features in the game that are not available to
“normal” players (i.e. non-game moderator).
2.4.4.4 Recapitulation
Summing up the work conducted with regard to enforcement – both from a theoretical
perspective as well as with regard to other technical domains – an unsatisfying
picture can be drawn. Whereas the theoretical solutions make assumption that
are incompatible with large scale open distributed systems, the proposal made for
specific systems large scale open distributed system, either do make system specific
assumptions as well, or are based on specific heuristics and are therefore hard to
compare with each other and so far no comparison can be found in literature. The
goal of this dissertation however is to compare the effects of different governance
decisions (especially enforcement concepts) for one system in an early prototyping
stage. This is why it is essential to be able to compare different approaches in a given
setting, instead of contrasting them against different ones. This requires a framework
that gives guidelines on what to take into account when aiming at comparing and
analysing the effects of a governance decision.
In the business related literature the soft system’s methodology (SSM) (Checkland,
1999) is often used for this purpose. SSM was developed in the 1960’s at Lancaster
University. It aims at analysing the problem situations within a company – such
as the change or introduction of a product – by examining the influencing factors
individually and combining the results afterwards in an integrated analysis. One
advantage of SSM methodology is that it specifically includes social and human
factors.
For their methodology the Lancaster team proposed several criteria that should
be specified to ensure that a given analysis is rigorous and comprehensive. These
criteria are summarized in the mnemonic CATWOE (Customer, Actors, Transforma-
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tion process, Weltanschauung (worldview), Owner, and Environment) (Smyth and
Checkland, 1976).
Other techniques that are used when analysing business change are PESTLE,
HEPTALYSIS or MOST (Abea et al., 2008). Most of the techniques take human
actors and their behaviour into account and are in that respect suited for the analysis
of the open distributed systems described earlier. However one problem all of these
techniques (including CATWOE) have in common, is their limited focus on norms.
This makes them unsuitable for this dissertation.
2.5 The Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework as a Tool for Analysing Governance
Decisions
As concluded in the last section, one of the main requirements when trying to
investigate the effects of governance decision in systems, where humans repeatedly
interact within norms that guide their choice of strategies and behaviours, is a tool
or framework that actually helps to compare the different decisions and guides the
analysis of them. One tool that has been popular with scholars from diverse research
domains when is comes to answering this question, and has the advantage of both
focusing on norms as well as including (human) actors and social aspects, is the
Institutional16 Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.
The IAD framework was originally designed and published 30 years ago by the
group of Elinor Ostrom (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982) and has since been applied to
analyse a multitude of different normative settings (Ostrom, 2005, p. 9). Examples
of its application for diverse types of research questions are:
 the impact of norms on creating effective monitoring and evaluations in gov-
ernment development projects (Gordillo and Andersson, 2004);
 the regulations of the telecommunication industry (Schaaf, 1989);
 the effects of norms on the outcome in common-pool dilemmas (e.g. Oakerson
(1990); Ostrom et al. (1994); Ostrom (2000); Ostrom and Walker (2003); Ostrom
(2005)); or
 the effects of norms on knowledge (Hess and Ostrom, 2007)17.
The wide acceptance and the sophistication of the IAD framework as well as its
focus on the problems addressed in this dissertation, namely the study of effects
of governance decisions on open distributed systems, make it an ideal analytical
scaffolding for structuring our analysis. In order to be able to use it effectively for the
dissertation, in the next paragraphs the framework will be explained in more detail.
Special focus thereby will be given to the components of the framework relevant for
the normative analysis.
The methodology of the IAD framework itself is not designed as a static model
and consists of the three clusters of components shown in Figure 2.3: the underlying
16In the current literature norms and institutions are often differentiated. As Ostrom’s usage of
the term institution is very broad and fits the definition of norms given earlier in this chapter of the
dissertation, the framework is considered applicable for norms and consequently being used in this
dissertation.
17A more detailed account of applications of the IAD framework can for example be found in
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 9) or (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, p. 42–43).
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factors affecting the normative design (represented by the three boxes on the left
of Figure 2.3), the patterns of interaction occurring within action arenas and the
outcomes.
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Figure 2.3: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Kiser
and Ostrom, 2000, p. 59) (originally published in Kiser and Ostrom (1982))
The underlying factors comprise a checklist of “those independent variables that
a researcher should keep in plain sight to explain individual and group behaviour”
(Gibson, 2005, p. 229). These variables are structured into a causal theme allowing for
a detailed analysis of specific situations and resources in the so-called “action arena”.
The outcomes of the analysis as well as so-called “patterns of interaction” (that can
have the form of any emergent behaviour) are used to evaluate the performance of
the system by employing evaluation criteria relevant for the system.
There are three ways to enter the framework when studying a question, namely at
each of the horizontal sections: one can start at the left-hand side with the underlying
factors (the physical characteristics, the attributes of the respective community, and
the rules-in-use at several levels), in the middle with the action arena, or at the
right-hand side with the outcomes. Beginning with the outcomes makes sense when
existing outcomes are available and questions concerning the specific outcomes should
be asked. This is not the case in situations in which ones wants to find out how
normative changes could influence a system, as the changes have not taken place at
that stage of early prototyping. For predictive first prototyping settings therefore,
starting at one of the other two components of the framework seems more appropriate.
In the explanation of the IAD framework we will start with the action arena, as it is
the central element of analysis (or “focal unit” in the terminology chosen by Ostrom
(2005)) within the IAD framework.
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2.5.1 The Action Arena
The action arena consists of two components (Ostrom et al., 1994):
1. an action situation and
2. the participant(s) in the situation.
Action situations refer to a distinct social space where the participants interact
in some way. From an analysis point of view, recurring structures of situations
are of particular interest, making it important to distinguish the different action
situations. For this purpose, Ostrom et al. (1994) defined seven clusters of variables
that constitute and characterize action situations and as a consequence allow to
identify unique settings:
1. participants,
2. positions,
3. actions,
4. outcomes,
5. transformation functions,
6. costs and benefits, and
7. information.
The first cluster is comprised of the participants in the action situation. The
participants are the actors in the action arena who are actively involved in an action
situation. This cluster therefore links actors (i.e. the second component of an action
arena) to the action situation.
The second cluster of the action situation are so-called positions. What Ostrom
et. al refer to as positions are roles such as “boss”, “a first mover”, “police officer”
or “judge” associated to participants in an action situation setting. These roles are
attributed specific rules such as authorized set of actions.
These actions, which a participant can take in a stage of an interaction process,
are the third element of the action situation. Examples of action are to cheat or
cooperate, or even to do nothing at all. For analysis purposes it is important to
note that in many situations it is impossible to analyse the complete array of actions
available to participants, as this might exceed the capacity of the theoretical models
and distract from the initial research question. For this reason, most analyses attempt
to identify the actions relevant to the action situation and its underlying research
problem as well as the actions that are most likely to cause a significant difference in
the outcomes of the action arena.
The fourth cluster of the action situation are the outcomes that the participants
can potentially achieve with their actions. Ostrom et al. focus mainly on the
outcomes being directly under the control of the participants, their definition however
also leaves room for accounting for the impact of the individual participants’ actions
in the system as a whole (i.e. the macro level).
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The fifth element of the action situation is a set of transformation functions
that link the participants and their actions with outcomes and thus define the
combination of input factors that can lead to certain outcomes. The nature of the
transformation functions can either be stochastic or deterministic. It is important to
note however, that the degree of certainty and completeness of the transformations
functions can vary significantly. Thus, very often only partial information about the
factors affecting the relationship between participants’ actions and certain outcomes
are available, making predictions about possible outcomes hard if not impossible.
The sixth cluster comprises the costs and benefits assigned to (the combinations
of) actions and outcomes. Thus, despite the outcome of an action being the same
at two different points of time, the costs and benefits attributed to the outcomes at
each specific time can give different positive or negative weights to them as well as
the actions leading to the outcomes18. As a consequence they can act as sources
of influence on the participants’ decision making, assuming that participants try to
optimize the weights in their favour (e.g. by maximizing the benefit/costs ratio).
The seventh cluster is closely linked to the type of transformation functions. It
is the information available to the participants when deciding about their actions.
This information can include one or more of the following: the information about
the actions available to the participants, information about the transformation
functions, information about the possible payoffs of certain outcomes as well as
information about the possible outcomes themselves. Whereas it is often assumed
that participants have complete information, in reality this is seldom the case.
In themselves these seven clusters are relatively complex leading to a large
number of unique combinations to analyse. Furthermore, each of the parts is further
comprised by a combination of input parameters from the underlying factors that
will be discussed in section 2.5.3.
The action situations are not the only components of the action arena, but are
needed for the actors to become effective. To predict how actors behave and thus
whether and how their interaction with the system will take place, Ostrom et al.
distinguish four clusters that researchers need to keep in mind when analysing an
action arena: (i) the preference evaluations (and resulting preference order) actors
attribute to potential actions and outcomes (including their possible payoffs) in
an action situation, (ii) the individual information-processing capabilities of the
actors, i.e. how the they acquire, access, process, use and retain information, (iii) the
individual resources (such as money and time) available to the actors, as well as
(iv) the selection criteria distinctive to each actor.
2.5.2 Outcomes
After the interaction has taken place in the action arena, the results of this interaction
need to be analysed. Ostrom et al. (1994) divides this part of the IAD framework
into three sub-components. Thus, she views the actual results of the interaction in
terms of emergent behaviour in accordance with the notion of Hayek (1996), as any
pattern of interaction (including chaos). Only once these patterns of interaction have
been evaluated with the help of criteria relevant to the systems, does she talk about
outcomes. Defining relevant evaluation criteria is one of the most problematic parts
18These weights can be different for each participant.
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when it comes to the outcomes analysis of the IAD framework. Very often concepts
of fairness, the efficiency of the system, etc. . . are mentioned in this context, however
as soon as several stakeholders with potentially competing interests are linked to
the system that is being analysed the task of balancing between these competing
interests and defining appropriate criteria becomes a lot more difficult. Sections 6.3
and 10.1 will deal with this issue of criteria for competing stakeholder interests in
more detail.
2.5.3 Underlying Factors
The underlying factors, as pointed out before, are the input parameters for implicit
and explicit assumptions about the action arena and serve as a checklist for variables
that researchers should keep in mind when analysing norms and institutions. The
underlying factors group the way of thinking about the action arena into three
components, i.e. the rules that are used to define right and wrong and thereby also
define relationships between the actors, the characteristics of the physical world,
as well as the attributes of the community within which the action arena occurs.
The implicit or explicit assumptions made with regard to these three categories all
influence the way in which the seven elements of the action situation and the actors in
the action arena are conceptualised. For this reason they typically form the starting
point for any normative analysis and the factors are used to identify some typical
action arena outcomes, resulting from a particular combination of the factors.
2.5.3.1 Biophysical-Technical Characteristics
The first set of components, affected by the variables of an action situation are the
biophysical-technical characteristics of the relevant physical world. These components
most importantly refer to the physical possibility/physical power of performing actions
(either biophysical or technical) and thus the basic underlying fixed physical attributes
of a system. Imagine, for example, that in order to point out that someone has
violated a rules, an actor is obliged to communicate his observation to the relevant
authorities. However, if no medium of communication is available to him (e.g. he
is not granted any access to a police station), despite having the intention to fulfil
his obligation, he might no be able to do so. Hence, the specific attributes of the
physical world (no communication available) physically limit the action space of the
actors.
2.5.3.2 Attributes of the Community
The second set of components that affects the structure of an action arena relates
to the attributes of the community (often referred to as “culture”) in which the
action situation is located. Thus, communities can vary significantly with regard
to the level of the common understanding of norms or the action arena, with the
extent to which the preferences of the actors are heterogeneous (Taylor, 1976), or
concerning the distribution of resources among the actors for example, or even the
general acceptance of norms.
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2.5.3.3 Rules-In-Use
The final component of the underlying factors, the rules-in-use are the focus of
this dissertation. Similar to norms, rules have been studied in a variety of diverse
research domains ranging from philosophy, to social and legal science and economics
for example. The way in which Ostrom and her group use the term with regard to
the IAD framework is similar to the r-norms by Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela
(1995). As a consequence it corresponds very well to the definition of norms used in
this dissertation.
Recalling the earlier given definition of norms and applying it to the rules-of-use
component in the IAD framework, two important observations can be made. Firstly,
as pointed out in the definition of norms (and as a consequence the rules-in-use) they
specify what actions an actors “must not” perform (prohibition), “must perform”
(obligation) or may perform (“permission”) if the actors want to avoid sanctions for
non-compliance with the norms being imposed on them. This distinguishes behaviour
explained with reference to a rule from behaviour based on the biophysical-technical
characteristics of a situation.
Secondly, attention should be drawn to the contextuality criterion. Thus, the
rules-in-use are contextually dependant on the action arena as well as the other
underlying factors.
The combination of rules with the physical world as well as the community thereby
generates particular types of situations and influences the way the seven components
of the action situation described earlier are conceptualized. Thus, Ostrom et al.
(1994) point out that a typical normative analysis for example might work in the
following way: starting off with the underlying factors, typical action situations
resulting from particular combination of the factors are identified and analysed with
regard to the outcomes if they are combined with the actors in the action arena.
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the impact of a change in norms in an
open distributed system (with particular focus on the enforcement of norms). That
is why in the course of this dissertation we will analyse open distributed systems in
general and a specific open distributed system scenario in particular. Hence, starting
off by identifying the underlying factors, their impact on the action arena as well
as its results will be one central element of the research in this dissertation. Thus,
by altering the rules (and in particular the enforcement rules) of the system as well
as observing and analysing the changes in the action arena and the outcomes of
the interaction in the action arena as a result of the rule-changes, the suitability
of different enforcement mechanisms for achieving certain system behaviour will be
studied in depth.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we laid out the foundations on norms and open distributed systems
by presenting the related work for the dissertation’s theses. In detail we explained
the particular features of open distributed systems and their specific requirements
with regard to the questions of cooperation and enforcement as well as analysing
governance decisions in them. One particular finding when analysing the related work
was that neither game-theoretic or empirically-based economic work are suitable for
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analysing the theses in this dissertation. In the final section we presented the IAD
framework. This framework serves as a guide for the research to be conducted in
this dissertation, by giving guidelines on which specific aspects for analysing norm
are important for which question. In detail, starting off with the underlying factors
of the IAD framework, the theses formulated in Chapter 2 can be mapped to the
framework as shown in Figure 2.4.
Biophysical Characteristics
(Technical / System Specifications)
Attributes of the Community
(Agent Reasoning & Decison Making; 
MAS simulation using Jason)
Rules in Use (Normative Level)
1
3
}
Outcomes & Evaluation
2
Figure 2.4: The Theses of this Dissertation in the Light of the IAD Framework
The first thesis (highlighted by the red circle with the number one) focuses
on the rules-in-use in the IAD terminology. This dissertation investigates which
effects a change in these rules of use has on the action arena and its outcomes. The
particular rule-changes or governance decisions we are interested in are changes in
the enforcement mechanisms in open distributed systems. With respect to these
enforcement mechanisms, particular focus will be given to the question of whether
and to what extent dynamic movement of the actors in the system has an impact
on the enforcement mechanism. Thus, one particular feature of open distributed
systems is that as a result of the movement of the actors in the system, the social
(and possibly physical) network structure dynamically changes. As this structure to a
large extent determines the patterns of interaction (e.g. who has a chance to interact
with whom), we hypothesize that it will also effect the results of the enforcement
mechanisms and analyse this hypothesis accordingly. The dissertation deals with the
analysis of the interaction of the community (i.e. the actors in a system) and norms
and with each other in the action arena. As we will outline in Chapter 5, we use
a computer simulation when analysing Thesis 1. So far, no framework that allows
for including reasoning of the actors about the norms of the system in respect to
their actions at run-time of a simulation exists. This motivates the second thesis
(highlighted by the red circle with the number two): how to incorporate such a
run-time reasoning of actors interacting with a normative system? Finally, there is
one additional aspect that this dissertation will address, but not treat as a separate
thesis, but rather as side aspect of the analysis of the enforcement mechanisms. This
aspect is concerned with the outcomes of the interaction in the action arena. The
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aspect is indicated by the red encircled number three in Figure 2.4. The complex open
distributed systems this dissertation is concerned with have multiple stakeholders
with potentially heterogeneous interests with regard to the system results. In terms
of the IAD framework, this dissertation will have a look at how evaluation criteria for
these multiple stakeholder problems can be composed and used to evaluate a system.
In detail, we do not aim to provide an answer on what optimal configurations of
the norms in the systems would be – this would be unfeasible. Instead, we aim at
pointing out how the multiple stakeholders and their interests could be incorporated
in the result evaluation.
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Chapter 3
Case-Study: The Cooperation
Dilemma in Wireless Mobile
Grids
3.1 The Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario
The last chapter presented related work focusing on the problem of governing open
distributed systems with respect to enforcing desired system behaviour. This chapter
focuses on presenting a case-study of a specific open distributed system. It will serve
as an example for analysing the general research questions throughout the rest of
this dissertation.
3.1.1 The Mobile Phone Market: Challenges Arising
The case study has its roots in the mobile phone market – a market that is currently
experiencing a fundamental structural upheaval. Whilst mobile phones already
have been available since the 1960’s, the current ubiquity mobile telecommunication
services is a relatively recent development. During the 1990’s several changes took
place resulting in a tremendous boom in the mobile phone industry (Gruber and
Verboven, 2001). Amongst these changes were the liberalisation of telecommunica-
tion regulations, the introduction of mobile telecommunication systems with larger
frequency band spectra1, and the standardization of technologies such as transmission
protocols. This boom along with falling costs of mobile handsets resulted in mobile
phones being commoditized. In 2010 more than five billion subscribers2 worldwide
were registered, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Following the recent growth of the number of mobile phone subscribers, the
mobile phone industry is now facing a problem of market saturation. This becomes
apparent when looking at the percentage numbers illustrated by the line in Figure 3.1.
1One example of a network with the new frequencies is the “D-Netz” in Germany. The term
D-Netz refers to a cellular digital mobile telecommunication system that utilizes the GSM 900 MHz
frequency band. It was introduced in 1991 and allowed for multi-service provision, i.e. voice, text
and data.
2The number of subscribers refers to all fixed-term contracts and prepaid cards by the end of the
respective years. The numbers for 2011 are predicted numbers.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Mobile Phone Users Worldwide (in billion) (EITO,
2010).
In the last five years the number of mobile phone users has almost doubled, however
the rate of growth of the number of users has declined. Looking at the situation
in more detail the following conclusion can be drawn: In Germany – the country
with the highest number of mobile phone contracts in the EU – market penetration
has reached 132%, resulting in increased competition (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010,
p. 89-90) and a consequent decline in the profit margins of telecommunication
providers. This trend is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. A study by
management consulting firm A.T. Kearney predicts an average profit margin of -7%
for all European telecommunication providers in 2012 (Hastenteufel et al., 2009).
Reasons given for this negative profit margin are a competitive pressure on
prices for mobile phone contracts, paired with high fixed costs for investments in
mobile phone infrastructure. The latter has become a necessity due to increasing
data volume being transmitted in mobile phone systems. Cisco Systems (2010)
for example, predicts an annual doubling in the data volume transmitted for the
years 2009–2014. This corresponds to an increase from 91 petabytes per month in
2009 to 3.5 exabytes in 2014. Similar growth rates are predicted by the German
Engineering Trade Association VDI (2010). AT&T, a network provider, reported
that the 3% of their customers having an Apple iPhone, accounted for 40% of their
network traffic (Reardon, 2009). Extrapolating this number with current predictions
for sales of mobile phones the resource problem becomes apparent. Cellular mobile
telecommunication systems have a limited bandwidth. The more data that is
transmitted at the same point of time, the more this bandwidth has to be divided
between the individual transmission requests. As a result the Quality of Service
(QoS)3 for each individual transmission decreases and can, at worst, cause complete
3In telecommunication networks QoS typically refers to a set of metrics and techniques to measure
and manage network resources. This includes the ability to provide different priority levels to different
applications, users, or data flows, or to guarantee a certain level of performance to a data flow. QoS
is especially important for applications with high data transmission rate such as real-time streaming
Voice over IP as these applications often require fixed bit rates and are delay sensitive.
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network breakdowns. For network providers, the resulting necessary investments
in the improvement of the network infrastructure lead to high costs that are not
necessarily counterbalanced by additional profits due to the reasons described earlier.
Currently two options are being discussed by the mobile phone industry to address
the problems just described: (i) increasing the profit by attracting new users with
the help of improved service offerings, and (ii) reducing costs by safeguarding the
resources in the system.
Lately, of these two options the first one has been looked at more closely (An-
dersson et al., 2006, chapter 2). The reason for this focus on the first option is a
result of the commercial underperformance of the current (i.e. third) generation of
mobile phones.
Looking back, when in the mid 1980’s the first generation (1G) of commercial
mobile phones was introduced, the first main service was voice and users were
separated with regard to frequency by using Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA). Since this time roughly 20 years have passed and in the mainstream
mobile phone market the transition from the second (2G) to the third generation4
(3G) is about to finish. This third generation offers a lot more than voice, ranging
from much improved data services to higher network security. Besides these new
features and being successfully introduced to users across the world, 3G was not the
commercial success that was expected by many (Capgemini Consulting, 2005). This
is partly attributed to the extent that, during the development and deployment of
the current 3G mobile communication generation, the industry particularly focused
on capabilities for enabling voice and basic data communications (Katz and Fitzek,
2006, p. 467–468) and thereby moved the users as well as the investors out of focus5.
That is why, as the next generation networks (also referred to as Fourth Generation
or 4G in short6) are being conceived and developed, a paradigm shift in wireless
communication is taking place (Katz and Fitzek, 2006). As a result of the commercial
4The third generation of mobile network systems is also known as International Mobile
Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000) networks.
5Another reason was the high prices paid for 3G spectrum licences in some markets.
6Despite several efforts by industry and academia to define 4G (see (Kim and Prasad, 2006; Khan
et al., 2009, chapter 1) for example) so far no widely accepted definition of the term exists. For the
purpose of this dissertation we define one based on its important characteristics and capabilities –
namely heterogeneity and convergence. Thus, we perceive 4G both from a vertical perspective as
linear extension to current 3G systems aiming at high data rates (100 Mbit/s wide coverage and 1
Gbit/s local area coverage) and at the same time pursue a horizontal perspective focusing on the
integrative role of 4G as a convergence platform or wireless ecosystems for multiple different wireless
networks. This convergence most importantly enables users to independently or simultaneously
access different networks with a single terminal and thus allows not only for higher QoS but also the
enhancement of existing 3G services like mobile broadband access, Multimedia Messaging Service
(MMS), video chat, mobile TV, but also new services like high-definition television (HDTV). 4G may
allow roaming with wireless local area networks, and may interact with digital video broadcasting
systems.
As far as the modulation and multiple access schemes for this kind of convergence are concerned,
multi-carrier techniques using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) (combined
with access techniques such as CDMA) and its multi-user extension Orthogonal Frequeny Division
Multiple Access (OFDMA) are the main component techniques for 4G. Current pre-4G technologies
such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) are aiming into the 4G direction, however so far they do not
fulfill the original 4G requirements of data rates of approximately up to 1 Gbit/s specified by the
International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) and are therefore not
regarded as 4G technologies.
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problems of 3G, the telecommunication industry is pursuing a different development
strategy for 4G phones and networks. Instead of the technology-centric-view of 3G, in
the fourth generation the user was placed in the center of interest (i.e. a user-centric
view) (Wrona and Ma¨ho¨nen, 2004). Mobile phone providers and network operators
are trying to determine the consumers’ problems with 3G and learn to rectify these
for 4G. So what are problems of 3G from the consumers’ point of view?
Some work has already been done to determine user preferences, and identify
future usage scenarios as well as developing new services. Several discussions con-
cerning the question of consumer requirements have taken place at the Wireless
World Research Forum (WWRF, 2011) for example. However so far these have
produced little results. One of the few studies to uncover which aspect of 3G is seen
as problematic and would stimulate consumer demand for mobile devices (including
mobile phones, PDAs and laptops) in the future if being solved, was conducted by
TNS among 15 countries in mid-2005 (TNS, 2004). This study revealed that the lack
of coverage in some areas as well as high prices for 3G in some countries have an
negative impact on consumer take-up of 3G. Furthermore rather than being attracted
by figures like high throughput numbers, consumers are more interested in useful,
convenient and enjoyable services7. In addition the study revealed that two days
of battery life during active use topped the wish list of key features in 14 of the 15
countries surveyed, indicating that insufficient battery life is a major problem for
consumers around the globe.
Thus, although new mobile phones are designed to allow their users access to
ubiquitous wireless connection and communication, as well as offering them new
services and features, the battery capacity has not risen at an adequate rate, making
the top wish a major challenge.
As batteries can only store a fixed amount of energy, they set a limit to the
operational time a user is able to use a phone within one charging cycle, i.e. the
battery life. At the same time power consumption in 4G telephones is expected to
increase due to several reasons (Katz and Fitzek, 2006, p. 479–480):
 One of the main ideas of 4G networks is that users shall have the ability to be
connected all the time. Consequently, this means that the energy stored in the
batteries is constantly drawn upon.
 One of the mayor technologies behind 4G are multi-antenna techniques. Having
multiple antennas in one device however also requires higher amounts of power
for their operation.
 4G networks allow for lower energy per bit transmission. However, as energy
per bit decreases, the transmitted power needs to be increased to maintain the
same acceptable signal-to-noise ratios.
 The spectrum allocation in 4G networks results in higher frequencies being
used. In these higher frequencies, attenuation is significantly higher. As a
result more power for transmissions using these frequencies are required.
 New services and capabilities of 4G mobile phones such as video and audio
processing, large amounts of mass memory or the utilization of localization
services using triangulation requires higher data rates as well as greater on-board
processing power. This increases power consumption significantly.
7Although these services could certainly exploit high data rate capabilities, it is the services not
the data rates that consumers are drawn to.
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In summary, with the increase of complexity of mobile phones and their transition
to smart phones offering Internet, digital photo cameras, mp3 players, access to
new services and more, the energy consumption of mobile phones has increased
significantly. This results in higher power consumption and consequently lower
stand-by times in which a user can use his mobile phones without recharging it.
Furthermore the problem arises that batteries get too hot without active cooling
(Perrucci et al., 2009).
The problem is further increased by the relatively low improvement of battery
performance, which has only increased by 80% within the last 10 years, whereas
processor performance doubles every 18 month according to Moore’s law (Andersson
et al., 2006).
To give an example of the battery consumption problems in mobile phones,
Figure 3.2 (Fitzek, 2007, p. 442) shows the power (and cooling) requirements of
different mobile phone generations, as well as the approximate power consumption -
temperature threshold of 6 Watts, above which active cooling is required for mobile
phones.
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Figure 3.2: Power Consumption of Mobile Phones (Fitzek, 2007, p. 442)
The values shown in Figure 3.2 are maximum values and none of the current
generation of mobile phones uses all the shown components to a maximum at the
same time (the current energy value for an average smartphone is approximately 5
Watts which is below the 6 Watts threshold). Nevertheless it can clearly be seen
that in the course of mobile phone development, the power consumption of 1G (i.e.
around 2 Watts (W)) phones has tripled within the last years and that the basic
communications and signal processing capabilities of the mobile phones, account
for roughly 50% of the power budget. As explained before, this is a problem with
regard to the battery life cycle. Another indirect problem of the increased power
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consumption is the battery temperature. The more power that is consumed in a
given amount of time, the more physical energy is produced. This energy is partially
transformed into heat, such that the more power is consumed the more heat is
produced. As a result, a general increase in mobile phone power consumption might
lead to active cooling being required to stop them from overheating. Active cooling
however produces noise and furthermore it consumes additional space. This would
result in size increases, which are also undesirable.
3.1.2 The Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario
3.1.2.1 A Short-Link Architecture for Wireless Mobile Grids
How might we solve the conflicting demands of more complex devices and services on
the one hand and limited battery capacity that is strained by the energy consumption
of the devices needed for future mobile services on the other hand?
Fitzek and Katz (2007b) propose one way of tackling these issues, by developing
and testing a new distributed communication infrastructure for 4G networks. They
start from the conventional cellular architecture that can be seen in Figure 3.3.
CC
Figure 3.3: The Cellular Architecture (Fitzek and Katz, 2007a)
This communication architecture is characterised by the focus on the commu-
nication between the mobile devices and a base station which is the only access
point for the mobile devices to the network services. In this architecture the mobile
devices work as terminals, as they only communicate with the base station through
a battery-intensive cellular link and all services terminate in the mobile devices. The
hard- and software solutions for this architecture are more or less static, i.e. they
do not change in response to different situations or requests. Whereas this was
sufficient in the past where the focus was mainly on voice-centric services, in 4G
networks, with their increasing number of different services, this becomes a problem
as the components of the mobile devices need to be designed for worst-case scenarios.
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Figure 3.4: The Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario (Fitzek and Katz, 2007a)
In Figure 3.3 these devices are battery, storage capacity and processing power for
example.
To overcome these energy problems, Fitzek and Katz (2007a) proposed the
concept of wireless mobile grids (WMG) as shown in Figure 3.4.
In these grids, mobile devices with potentially different capabilities are envisioned
to cooperate, in jointly trying to achieve their individual goals. The idea is that
the participants in the WMG share their limited resources (such as computational
power or bandwidth) for their own (e.g. reduced battery consumption) as well
global system-wide benefits. These benefits are especially on the side of the resource
consumption (e.g. battery) (Perrucci, 2009), but further benefits exist. Section 3.1.3
will highlight the WMG benefits in more detail.
The cooperation between the mobile devices is enabled with the help of a short
range communication link. So far, this dissertation has only talked about short
range transmission very generally, however when considering the number of existing
technologies that could be used with regard to the WMG idea. Figure 3.5 gives an
overview over the current short range options and compares them with regard to
transmission speed and transmission range.
Aiming for the optimization of both speed and range, IEEE802.11 WLAN and
Bluetooth v2.0 seem especially interesting. Furthermore, both technologies have the
advantage of already being included in modern phones. Given that Bluetooth v2.0
can be employed in two different ways, in total three different technologies for the
short range transmission need to be looked at:
 IEEE802.11 WLAN,
 Bluetooth v2.0 without broadcast, and
 Bluetooth v2.0 with broadcast.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of Short Range Architectures
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Figure 3.6 shows these three different technologies and highlights their important
differences with regard to the WMG. What is shown in the figure is that using
IEEE802.11 WLAN (left part of the figure) mobile devices can communicate directly
with each other. This is not the case for Bluetooth, which adopts a master-slave
architecture with the master functioning as a relay for the slaves. Thus, the slaves can
only communicate via their master with each other. As a result more communication
and consequently more data exchange is needed. How much data needs to be
exchanged for the WMG cooperation thereby depends on the broadcast capability
of the master. In the case that the master cannot broadcast packets to its slaves
(middle), obviously the number of transmissions is larger than for the case when
the master is able to broadcast (right). Based on these considerations as well as
measurement of the (battery) costs associated with the different technologies Perrucci
et al. (2009) showed that IEEE802.11 WLAN is the most promising one for WMGs.
That is why this dissertation we focus on the IEEE802.11 WLAN technology.
3.1.2.2 Use Cases
For the better understanding of the WMG idea we will now briefly present a scenario
that indicates how WMGs could be employed in the future.
We consider a multicast scenario in a busy financial district such as the City
of London or the Frankfurt (Main) financial district. During their work day many
individuals are likely to be interested in stock market data or financial and general
news. When a major news event takes place, if not sitting in front of a computer
with Internet access (e.g. on the way to or from work or during a lunch break), these
people might use their mobile phones in order to get the latest data or information
they want.
Currently this scenario causes severe problems for infrastructure providers. Thus,
at peak times in the City of London for example network providers experience severe
capacity problems resulting in long waiting times for requested data or even network
failures (Bingham, 2010). Hence, due to the large density of people in metropolitan
areas such as the above deployed network infrastructures are not sufficient to meet
user demands because base stations cannot cope with the amount of requests. The
reason for this is straightforward: assuming that the base station is using the normal
multiplexing technique in which the bandwidth is divided into several sub-slots
(“channels”) and each mobile phone is allocated one slot. As total bandwidth is
fixed, the more slots are allocated, the smaller the bandwidth that can be assigned
to each channel. As a result download times increase leading to both more battery
consumption and lower quality of the downloading service.
Using a cooperative approach, if mobile phone users are interested in the same
news items, users could share the task by receiving a subset of the multicast channels
over the cellular link from the base station and exchange the missing pieces over the
short range link.
3.1.2.3 The Energy-Advantage of IEEE802.11 WLAN
To understand the IEEE802.11 WLAN WMG idea and its energy implications better,
this section focuses on the technical aspects of the scenario (especially the WLAN
transmission) in more detail. First we state the basic definition of energy [E]:
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Energy = Power ∗ Time [Joules] (3.1)
Battery consumption depends on two aspects: the power [P ] consumed per
connection type and the time [t] needed for the actual transmission. The power
required for sending data differs greatly for different connection types, as does the
transmission rate (i.e data units conveyed per unit of time), which determines how
long a transmission of a sub-slot of a specific size takes and consequently indirectly
influences the time-value in the energy-definition. More specifically (assuming equal
power values), if the transmission rate is low and a transmission takes longer, more
energy is consumed for the transmission.
The total energy consumption is composed of two components: the energy
consumed over the traditional cellular 3G connection (E3G) plus the energy consumed
over the short link (i.e. WLAN) connection (EWLAN ). In case of no cooperation
the latter is 0, i.e. it is assumed that the WLAN connection is turned off and the
mobile phone user has to download the complete news information he wants alone
using the 3G connection. In case of WMG cooperation it is assumed that both
connections (WLAN and 3G) are turned on and the devices help one another in
a peer-to-peer-like fashion. Assuming xCoop cooperating agents for example, each
agent only needs to download only a part of the total news information from the
base station (i.e. 1xCoop in an ideal scenario) and exchange the missing parts with the
other xCoop − 1 cooperation partners, using the short link connection (i.e. WLAN in
our scenario). Therefore the energy consumption per device in the cooperation case
(ECoop) is comprising four parts:
1. the energy consumed for downloading from the base station using the 3G link
(E3G,rx) (plus the energy consumed while the 3G connection is idle (E3G,i)),
2. the energy consumed for receiving the remaining chunks of the news information
on the WLAN connection (EWLAN,rx),
3. the energy consumed sending the device’s own chunks to the other participants
via the WLAN connection (EWLAN,tx), and
4. the energy consumed by WLAN in idle phases (i.e. when not transmitting or
receiving anything but waiting for the next interaction) (EWLAN,i)
8:
ECoop = E3G,rx + E3G,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
3G consumption
+EWLAN,rx + EWLAN,tx + EWLAN,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
WLAN consumption
(3.2)
The individual energy costs depend on the power level of that connection type as
well as on the corresponding time it is in use. Hence the formula can be expanded to:
8Given new network coding protocols such as random linear network coding (RLNC) (Ho et al.,
2006), this kind of interaction even does not necessarily require the coordination of the different
mobile phone users on who is to download and share which chunk, resulting in possibly no energy
being used for coordination purposes Fitzek et al. (2010). Therefore any form of negotiation costs
are neglected in this dissertation.
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ECoop = t3G,rx ∗ P3G,rx + t3G,i ∗ P3G,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
3G consumption
(3.3)
+ tWLAN,rx ∗ PWLAN,rx + tWLAN,tx ∗ PWLAN,tx + tWLAN,i ∗ PWLAN,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
WLAN consumption
Representative power and time values for the transmission measurements in
different states using 3G and WLAN connection have been determined by Perrucci
et al. (2009, p. D10) for example. Their results are reproduced in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1: Power Level and Data Rate for Cellular - 100 byte
state power value [W] data rate [Mbps]
receiving 1,314 0,193
idle 0,661 -
Table 3.2: Power Level and Data Rate for WLAN Broadcast - 1000 byte
state power value [W] data rate [Mbps]
sending 1,629 5,623
receiving @ 3m 1,375 5,379
receiving @ 30 m 1,213 5,115
idle @ 3m 0,979 -
idle @ 30m 0,952 -
The numbers by Perruci et. al are based on measurements taken from a Nokia
N95. These numbers indicate that although the power needed for the WLAN and
the 3G state are about the same, the data rate for the 3G link (0.193 Mbit/s for the
receiving state) is significantly lower than that of WLAN (5.115 Mbit/s, receiving
state, 30m distance) leading to a significantly worse energy per bit ratio for the 3G
link.
As a consequence, the cooperation scenario has an energy advantage compared
to the conventional cellular communication architecture, especially if the number of
cooperating mobile phones is high and a large proportion of the data traffic can be
carried via the short-link (i.e. WLAN) connection.
3.1.3 Stakeholder-Advantages in the Wireless Mobile Grid
Scenario
After having described the WMG scenario in the previous section, this section focuses
on the question of the system’s stakeholders’ interests. This section aims to identify
the main stakeholders of a WMG as well as their relations to one another and
furthermore outline the benefits the stakeholders can draw from a WMG.
Figure 3.7 shows the major stakeholders of a WMG. These are mobile phone users,
mobile phone manufacturers, the manufacturers of infrastructure components (such
as base stations, etc.) as well as network and service providers that are subsumed as
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Figure 3.7: Stakeholders in the Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario
infrastructure providers (IPr) in this dissertation9
The infrastructure manufacturers are firms such as Alcatel-Lucent that provide
and maintain the infrastructural components of a mobile phone network. They include
the base stations and mobile services switching centers (the network element that
performs the telephony switching functions of the mobile phone network). The mobile
phone manufacturers are firms such as Nokia or Sony Ericsson that develop mobile
phones. Normally users have contracts with the infrastructure providers (e.g. Orange
in the UK or T-mobile in Germany), who sell the phones together with network
usage contracts to the users. In WMGs, users depend both on the transmission costs
resulting from the contracts with the IPr as well as on the cooperation of other users
to benefit of the WMG.
With regard to the business perspective taken in this dissertation, the obvious
question with regard to the stakeholders is what they can gain from a WMG, i.e.
why they should be interested in its success (Fitzek and Katz, 2007a, p. 56–57)?
For the user, besides energy saving, two further advantages can be identified:
potentially lower service costs and robustness.
Energy Saving: By using the short link interface instead of the cellular one, the
overall energy consumption is reduced, because as indicated in Tables 3.1 and
3.2 the energy per bit ratio is significantly better on the short link.
9For reasons of simplicity and because several examples exist in which the two roles are congruent
we refrain from viewing network providers and service providers separately. Examples of these
congruent cases are T-mobile or Telepho´nica for example.
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Low Service Costs: As only a part of the total file or service is downloaded via
the cellular link by each user, for the individual user the download-times and
consequently the costs associated with download can be reduced. This is
especially relevant for users with limited bandwidth allowances.
Robustness: As the service is provided over different paths one can furthermore
expect diversity gains. The user is not dependent on a single connection with
the base station but possibly can rely on a number of different user (and their
mobile phones) within his vicinity.
From the IPr point of view several advantages can be found, with the most
important one being the ability of offering better quality transmissions without
further investments in infrastructure components such as base stations. This quality
increase stems from increased transmission rates and reduced effects from transmission
errors.
- 0.1%
- 10%- 1%
- 10% - 10%- 10%
Figure 3.8: Comparison of the Effects of a 10% Transmission Error for Non-
Cooperation as well as Cooperation with two or three Cooperating Mobile
Phone Users
Lower Transmission Error Rates Figure 3.8 illustrates the error rate effects in
more detail, by showing the consequences of a 10% error rate for the transmission
from a base station to mobile phones (Vingelmann et al., 2010).
If no cooperation takes place and mobile phone users want to download the
same file, the base station transmits using multicast (top row). Each mobile
phone user thereby receives approximately 10% faulty chunks, or putting it
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differently, a 10% faulty file (represented by the respective missing chunks in the
figure). What is important to note is that these 10% errors are not necessarily
the same for all mobile phone users, but are statistically independent. As a
result of the faulty file, the mobile phone users requests the file or at least the
faulty chunks again. Resulting from the respective requests the base station
will resend the faulty chunks/file. This process is repeated until all mobile
phone users have all correct chunks of the file.
Looking at what happens if cooperation takes place, the effects of the error
rates drop significantly. Thus, if several mobile phone users cooperate for
example, due to the statistical independence, their individual error rates can be
multiplied to arrive at a group error rate. Hence, for two cooperating mobile
phone users the combined group error rate equals 10% ∗ 10% = 1% and in case
of three mobile phone users this rate drops down to 0.1%. As a result, from
the base-station’s (i.e. the IPr’s) point of view, less resend requests occur and
its resources are drawn upon less. This effect intensifies if higher error rates
are assumed10.
New Services and Higher Service Scalability As explained earlier, cooperat-
ive networks using IEEE802.11 WLAN have higher data rates at lower infra-
structure resource costs. As a result, IPr can offer existing services at a better
quality or even introduce new services that require high bandwidth and data
rates and are currently infeasible.
Larger Market Penetration and Increased Revenue This in turn can attract
a higher number of potential customers which can be transformed into additional
revenue. As WMGs do not require investments into the infrastructural resources,
the additional revenues are not accompanied by fixed investment costs.
From the mobile phone manufacturers’ point of view the impact of WMGs is
especially interesting with regard to battery manufacture. As outlined briefly earlier,
with regard to sales and consequently financial success currently two main problems
for manufacturers exist: the device price and the energy consumption, with the latter
being split into three sub-problems, namely: the battery life cycle and connected
operating time of mobile phones, as well as the cooling required for the batteries.
Low Costs for Energy Saving Devices To be more precise, as outlined earlier,
the higher energy consumption expected from the next generation of mobile
phones may result in the need for larger batteries if the stand-by times of
the mobile phones are to be kept at the same level. Larger batteries however
do not only pose a size issue, but may require active cooling, which would
negatively impact consumer interests. WMGs offer a way to support high
data rates through cooperation without the additional needs on the side of the
energy consumption and consequently the cooling of the device. Given that
10According to Zhang et al. (2010) this effects still hold even if new transmission technologies like
LTE are applied. Thus LTE currently multicasts 125% of the packages demanded by the mobile
phone users to reduce transmission error resend requests. As the authors show in their paper, using
cooperation the LTE overhead of 25% can be reduced by 80-94%, making the concept advantages
even if new technologies are considered.
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WMGs rely on existing technologies, the concept offers a further advantage as
development costs needed to reap these benefits, can be expected to be low.
The only stakeholder group for which no advantages can be found with regard to
the WMG idea are the infrastructure manufacturers. In contrast, they even have
to fear profit setbacks if IPrs demand fewer infrastructural components. Since the
WMG idea is especially triggered by the IPrs, on which they are dependant as sellers
of their mobile phones in combination with mobile phone contracts, their leverage
and consequently the importance of their interest is low.
3.2 The Cooperation Dilemma in Wireless Mobile
Grids
In the last section the advantages of the WMG scenario with regard to the stakeholders
were presented. Although the WMG shows advantages to its stakeholders with regard
to the resource consumption or transmission rates, it features a problem that is
very common to distributed cooperative architectures in general: it depends on the
cooperation of the users.
4 3
21
1-4
1-41-4
1-4 1-4
4 3
21
1-3
1-31-4
1-3 1-3
(a) (b)
Figure 3.9: The Free Riding Problem in Wireless Grids
The cooperation idea in the WMG is that, as shown in Figure 3.9(a) the users
voluntarily commit their resources, forming a common pool which can be used either
by all of them in order to achieve a common goal or individual ones. The utility
which users can obtain from the pooled resources is much higher than they can
obtain on their own. For example, in the financial district WMG scenario they can
download files faster and in addition reduce battery consumption.
However, the problem in this combination is that commitment comes at a cost
in the form of battery consumption for sending file chunks, i.e. EWLAN,tx. As a
consequence, (bounded) rational users would prefer to access the resources without
making any commitment to cooperate, as shown in Figure 3.9(b). Thus the user in
the top left corner(with the mask) can enjoy the full benefits from the common pool
without committing anything himself, i.e. he cheats on the three other agents.
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However, if a substantial number of users followed this selfish strategy, the network
itself would be at risk, depriving all users from the benefits (Wrona and Ma¨ho¨nen,
2006). The reason for this is straightforward: network users can have strategic
behaviour and are not necessarily obediently cooperating by making their resources
available without the prospect of rewards for their good behaviour. Unreciprocated,
there is no inherent value to cooperation to a user. A lone cooperating user draws
no benefit from its cooperation, even if the rest of the network does. Guaranteed
cost, paired with uncertainty or even lack of any resulting benefit does not induce
cooperation in a (bounded) rational, utility-maximizing user. Without any further
incentives, rational users therefore would not cooperate in such an environment and
would all be worse off than if they cooperated (Ostrom, 1999; Axelrod, 1981).
Looking at the problem from a game-theoretic point of view and considering
battery consumption only (i.e. neglecting other aspects of WMGs), the individuals
are caught in a prisoners dilemma (PD) that is shown in Figure 3.1011.
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Figure 3.10: The Free Riding Problem as cardinal PD
Figure 3.10 shows the relative payoffs for a WMG user and one of his potential
cooperation partners. The payoffs are shown in terms of energy savings for each
transaction partner in comparison to the option of a partner downloading everything
himself. Three cases can be distinguished:
1. In case of case of cooperation by all sides the energy saving potential is equivalent
to Eno coop −Ecoop (i.e. simply the energy gained by cooperating in contrast to
down everything self) for each partner12.
2. In case one partner defects, he gains an additional payoff EWLAN,tx, because he
saves energy for not sending his file chunks to his partner. The other partner
at this point as a consequence does not receive the file chunks and has to
download the remaining file chunks himself. As a result he is still downloading
11The described PD also exists when non-battery related aspects of WMGs are considered. We
chose to neglect these non-battery related aspects issues in order not to distract from the PD analysis
unnecessarily.
12The absolute size of this energy difference depends both on the size of the file to obtain as well
as on the number of cooperation partners, which is why Figure 3.10 only uses relative payoffs.
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everything himself (i.e. has no energy saving with regard to the download) and
in addition has additional energy costs for sending his file chunks.
3. The last case shows the payoffs for both partners defecting. In this case they
both have to download everything themselves leading to a payoff of 0 for both
partners.
Using these values to develop an ordinal order of preferences for both players the
PD looks as shown in Figure 3.11. For both players the ordinal order of preferences
is 1  2  3  4.
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Figure 3.11: The Free Riding Problem as ordinal PD
Hence the dominant strategy for both players is strictly not to cooperate. If the
other one cooperates, no cooperation is better because he can gain EWLAN,tx and if
the other player does not cooperate, no cooperation is still the better option as one
would not have the advantages deriving from cooperation (the chunks the other one
is sending) and still has to carry the transmission costs EWLAN,tx.
Looking at the total welfare of the interaction (i.e. the combined payoffs of both
partners) it becomes obvious that the result from the individual preferences is the
worst case, as the total welfare is 0, compared with potentially 2 ∗ (Enocoop − Ecoop)
in the case of cooperation. Hence, although an overall beneficial result is possible,
individual preferences lead to a non-beneficial state.
As pointed out before, one consequence of this non-beneficial state is that all
stakeholders are deprived of the potential benefits that can be gained of an WMG.
As a result of this risk as well as the business interests associated with the concept,
it is essential to analyse how to deal with the problem at hand well in advance, in an
early prototyping stage.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we presented a case study of one particular open distributed system
that is currently in an early prototyping stage of development, so-called WMGs.
We outlined its high relevance for the mobile phone industry by presenting current
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industry data and analysed the WMG idea (and its advantages) with regard to
the stakeholders in a WMG. One particular aspect of the WMG we focused on
in our presentation was the cooperation issues inherent in WMGs, namely that it
is advantageous for mobile phone users to take advantage of a WMG, but not to
contribute to it. These issues were discussed analytically as well as mathematically
in the form of a PD. As a result of the cooperation issues, we concluded that if these
issues are not resolved the whole WMG idea is at risk. For this reason – in the early
prototyping stage of WMGs – it is important to analyse how possible governance
decisions such as the integration of enforcement mechanisms into a WMG could
affect the system. In the remainder of this dissertation, this WMG case study will
serve as an example for the analysis of how normative framework modelling can be
applied in the early prototyping stage to analyse the impact of possible governance
decisions on a system.
Part II
Normative Modelling

Chapter 4
Normative Frameworks
At the end of Section 2.4 we briefly outlined the components of the IAD framework.
One important conclusion from the description given is that although the IAD
framework does consist of several components that are relevant for any analysis, the
central “focal unit” where all aspects are being combined or rely on is the action
arena. As a consequence, the next question that arises when wanting to analyse the
effects of governance changes in systems at an early prototyping stage is how one
can analyse this particular part of the framework. In this chapter we will present
the method this dissertation uses for modelling normative information in the action
arena, namely normative frameworks. The approach to normative frameworks in
this dissertation is strongly based on the works of Cliffe (2007) (as well as the works
leading to and resulting from his dissertation) which present a formalization of
normative frameworks in order to be able to specify and analyse them. In the later
chapters of this dissertation Cliffe’s formalization is used for representing the action
arena and analysing it with the help of computational simulations. That is why, in
the later part of this chapter (e.g. when presenting regulative aspects of normative
systems) we will comment on Cliffe’s formalization and outline some design choices
he made with regard to the representation of normative frameworks.
Before going into detail, let us start by defining what is understood by a normative
framework:
Definition 9: Normative Framework
In this dissertation we use the term Normative Framework to describe a set
of norms and the operational semantics which specify and regulate specific
interaction aspects of an (open distributed) system. A normative framework
may consist of different types of norms (Rawls, 1955; Alchourro´n and Bulygin,
1971): (i) constitutive norms that regulate the creation of normative facts and the
modification of the normative system itself as well as define how the system (and
its participants) should interpret events (Grossi, 2007), and (ii) regulative norms
that define what is perceived as normatively correct and incorrect behaviour by
means of obligations, prohibitions and permissions (Searle, 1997). Normative
frameworks also define the scope of the norms they contain, in terms of when (in
time), under which conditions, and to which participants and actions they apply.
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In the Chapter 2, we outlined the benefits resulting from the utilization of norms
for regulating systems in such a way that undesirable system states can possibly be
avoided. They may also help to reduce uncertainty in a system and thereby lower
transaction costs. Normative frameworks – being a collection of norms for a system –
have very much the same benefits. As pointed out above, this chapter focuses on the
modelling of the normative aspects of the action arena. For these reasons, in this
chapter we turn away from the utility of norms and normative frameworks and focus
on their specification and formalization instead.
4.1 Constitutive Aspects of Normative Frameworks
4.1.1 Brute Facts and Institutional Facts
To start with the specification and formalization, this dissertation first examines how
normative frameworks relate to the real world (i.e. the abstraction level on which
the actors in a system interact) and how both evolve over time.
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Figure 4.1: The Transition of the Real World and the Normative Framework
Figure 4.1 shows our view of the normative framework and the real world in
a system. Both views can represented in terms of facts (i.e. system states) at a
particular point of time. It is important to note in Figure 4.1 that both the real
world and the normative framework present different views on the action arena (that
represents the interaction in the system). Whereas the real world view is concerned
with the events physically taking place in the action arena, the normative framework
view is concerned with the normatively relevant aspects only. The difference between
the two views on a system is perhaps best illustrated by an example: the example of a
murder. In simple terms, a murder starts with an event in the real world that results
in a dead body. Whether the deceased was killed legally or was murdered is a fact
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that may only be established by a judicial process, which is a normative framework.
If someone is convicted and punished for the murder, it is the normative framework
that establishes their guilt and determines the sanctions of the convicted person.
This then serves as information for the real world, where the actual enactment of
the sanction is carried out (e.g. by the imprisonment of the murderer). What is
important to note is that despite offering different perspectives on the same events
and being displayed separately in Figure 4.1 the two views are not interdependent,
but are logically interlinked.
As a consequence of this two questions arise that need to be dealt with when
modelling normative frameworks:
Question 1: Assuming that events in the real world trigger the normative framework
events, how does this process work, i.e. how is the logical link between the
views specified and how do the normative framework events come into being?
Question 2: The second question is linked to the first. It is concerned with the real
world events that should be considered from the perspective of a normative
framework. How is it determined which real world events are relevant for
the normative framework? The case of the dead body is a simple example;
the killing event resulted in a state of a dead body which is obviously the
important event for the normative framework. Nevertheless questions arise on
what other events might be important, which events can be neglected and how
to distinguish between the two?
The second thing to notice in Figure 4.1 is the evolution of the two perspectives
on the action arena over time. Both perspectives start from an initial state (or facts)
when the system is initialised and subsequently change state as a result of events.
The facts of the normative framework view are referred to a normative facts (n facti)
whereas the real world facts are referred to as facti in Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.1
these states (facts) change to new states when respective events take place, either
normative events (n eventi) in the normative framework view or real world events
(eventi) in the real world view.
Question 3: With regard to the specification and formalization of the normative
framework, the question resulting from this evolution from one state (fact) to
another is, how can this transition best be described?
Keeping the three questions resulting from Figure 4.1 in mind, this dissertation
now turns to related work on these questions in order to answer them.
The work that is most relevant for answering the questions stated above comes
from philosophy, where in 1997 Searle published a book entitled “The Construction of
Social Reality” (Searle, 1997). In this book Searle discusses constitutive norms1 as a
mutually understood norm basis for interpreting regulatory norms and distinguishes
brute facts and normative facts with regard to them. To Searle, brute facts are facts
that follow from a common-sense understanding of the world (e.g. “the cup is empty”
1Searle speaks of constitutive/regulative “rules” rather then constitutive/regulative “norms”.
Based on our definition of both terms in Chapter 2 we use the terms “norms” and “rules” synonym-
ously. For reasons of uniformity with the dissertation’s terminology we speak of constitutive/regu-
lative norms.
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or “on average the sun has a distance of approximately 93 million miles to the earth”),
whereas institutional facts are facts that are only valid within a certain context and
depend on human opinions and interpretation. Brute facts correspond to real world
facts in Figure 4.1, whereas institutional facts are equivalent to the normative facts
in the figure. According to Searle these human opinions are shaped by the normative
setting the humans interact with, which also sets the context for the institutional
facts (and consequently defines whether and to what extent they are valid). For
this reason he calls them institutional facts (i.e. being dependant on an institution),
with his notion of an “institution” being congruent to this dissertation’s notion of
normative frameworks. Based on this distinction, Searle defines constitutive norms
as norms describing how institutional facts (i.e. facts in the normative framework)
are created. In detail, he specifies them as norms describing what, when doing an
action in one context, counts-as performing another action in a second context. If
one interprets the physical world as the first context and defines when the presence
of certain states, the execution of certain actions, or the occurrence of certain events
leads to actions in the second context (i.e. the normative framework), one can explain
the creation of institutional facts.
An extensive analysis of actions and events in the real world generating actions
and events in a second context (e.g. the normative framework) was conducted by
Goldman (1976), who distinguished four different cases of action generation: causal
generation, simple generation, conventional generation and augmentation generation2.
In respect to the normative frameworks and the counts-as principle, of these four
different cases, the third one in particular (i.e. the conventional generation) has been
attributed a high relevance (Cliffe, 2007).
Figure 4.2 shows conventional generation with regard to the normative framework,
with the gray dashed lines representing the generation of normative events (and
consequently normative facts) as result of the observation of real world events.
Goldman’s conventional generation concept describes how actions/events in a given
context generate an action/event in the normative context within the bounds of
certain conditions (i.e. he emphasizes the importance of the scope of the norms). To
give an example of this: shooting a football into is considered as scoring a goal, but
only in the context of football and if the game of football is still in progress.
What is also important for conventional generation is that real world events that
should generate normative events which lead to normative facts need to be observed,
i.e. they need to be perceived by the system participants. Returning to the football
example again, the scoring of a goal for example needs to be observed by a person
such as the referee, who has the relevant legal power to establish the normative fact
that this is indeed a goal and counts for the score of the game. If the referee does not
observe the scoring and as a consequence does not take any actions to bring about
the change in the normative state, the goal does not count and therefore does not
2The causal generation takes a real world event and generates a corresponding action in the
second context which interprets the results of the real world event. This interpretation of causal
effects is not included in the simple generation. There, a real world event simply results in an action
in the second context (possibly under the condition of a certain state of affairs in the first context).
The conventional generation extends the simple generation by adding conditions for the generation
of the action in the second context, that can be based on properties in the first and/or second
context. Finally, augmentation generation refers to generations where the generated action in the
second context elaborates on the event from which it is generated.
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Figure 4.2: Conventional Generation turns Observations into Normative
Events that lead to Normative Facts
have any normative effect. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.2 that refers to observed
events (eventObs) in the real world and where event2 that is not observed does not
bring about a normative event.
Another aspect worth noting in Figure 4.2 is that the conventional generation of
one observed event in the real world can result in more than one normative fact in
the normative framework. With regard to the football match example, one player
kicking another player can result in both a foul being indicated as well as a card being
given. Hence as a result of the first observed real world event, several normative
facts (i.e. n fact′1, n fact′2 and n fact′3) could be generated. As pointed out before,
in the normative framework the transition from one state to the next state (which is
based on the normative events generated) is defined with the help of constitutive
norms. These norms include specifications of which normative facts result from which
normative events in which context. Hence, they specify which of the normative facts
are generated and initiated and terminated.
4.1.2 Normative Power and Permission
In Section 2.1 we outlined the difference between physical and legal power (with
the latter also being referred to as normative power in the context of the normative
framework) and distinguished the concept of power from permission. Applying these
concepts to Goldman’s conventional generation and Searle’s counts-as principle the
following relation can be established. Legal power acts as a constraint on conventional
generation by specifying who has the legal capability to bring about action in the
normative context. This legal power might be attributed to single persons only, or
persons acting in a particular role, for example. Coming back to the football example:
the game is finished by the final whistle. However, this whistle only ends the game
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(i.e. changing its normative state) when the referee blows it. Otherwise blowing the
final whistle is considered an invalid action with regard to the normative framework
and does not have any effect there (i.e. the game does not end). In contrast, the
permission is independent of power and does not have an effect on the convention
generation. The referee might for example not have the permission to blow the final
whistle before 90 minutes are over. However if he does so, the game still ends (i.e. he
triggers a valid action in the normative framework), he might however be punished
by the board of referees afterwards because of it.
This notion of legal power was formalized by Jones and Sergot (1996) who use it
to model conventional generations with the help of the logic expression ExA⇒s ExF .
This expression allows for the association of a person (x) whose real world actions
Ex bring about a change in the state of the real world to state A. According to the
expression, these actions might also bring about a change of state on the normative
level (F ) if the conditional statements (⇒) hold with regard to the normative
framework s.
4.1.3 Events
In the preceding two sections we reviewed the notion of counts-as as well as that of
conventional generation in order to answer the questions posed at the beginning of
this chapter. The idea of conventional generation implied that an normative event
can be generated in two ways: as a result of the interpretation of an event in the
real world that acts as stimulus to the normative event, or as a result of a normative
framework internal interpretation of rules. As a result, two types of events need to
be distinguished for normative frameworks: normative events (i.e. events internal to
the normative framework context) and external events (i.e. events from a context
external to the normative framework, such as the real world). We further partition
normative events into normative actions, that denote changes in normative state,
and violation events, that signal the occurrence of violations. Violations may arise
either from explicit generation, from the occurrence of a non-permitted event (e.g.
the blowing of the final whistle in football before the 90 minutes of game time are
over), or from the failure to fulfil an obligation.
4.2 Regulative Aspects of Normative Frameworks
The preceding sections dealt with different aspects of constitutive norms which are
associated with the semantics of the normative framework. Although participants
in the system might observe the resulting normative facts from their action, with
constitutive norms alone the participants cannot determine which situations and
actions a normative framework considers to be good or bad and therefore cannot
account for that in their behaviour. That is why regulative norms that define what
is perceived as normatively correct and incorrect behaviour by means of obligations,
prohibitions and permissions are required.
4.2.1 Prohibition and Permission
The first aspect of regulative norms that this dissertation will consider are prohibitions
and permissions. The latter indicate that actions are considered acceptable or
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desirable, whereas the former can be seen as their counterpart, because they indicate
which actions are not permitted.
Although in legal theory permissions and prohibitions are not considered as
being exact counterparts, in formal logic approaches this point of view is often taken
(i.e. one is defined as the absence of the other). For the sake of simplicity in this
dissertation we observe this simplification, allowing us to express one in terms of the
other. Thus, this dissertation focuses on permissions only and defines prohibition as
an absence of permission. This leads to a further simplification, namely that actions
that are not permitted (including action about which no information is given about
at all) are forbidden.
Having explained how the distinction between acceptable and not acceptable
actions is made in a normative framework, another question that needs to be
addressed is the question of the subject(s) of permissions. In the literature, two kinds
of foci of permission can be found: permissions on normative facts and permissions
on normative actions and events. Cliffe (2007), whose formalization of normative
frameworks is used as foundation for this dissertation, focuses on the latter of the
two. The reason for this decision was that the focus on events and actions allowed
for an easier reasoning about violations. To illustrate this point, we observe that a
focus on normative facts would only allow to determine that a violation had occurred.
Reasoning about permission of actions and events allows for the determination of
how the violations were brought about, which is helpful in trying to find ways to
reduce violations.
4.2.2 Obligations
In contrast to permissions and prohibitions which serve as source of information about
what actions/events are allowed/not allowed at a specific point in time, obligations
are designed to trigger actions by a specific point of time.
As in the case of permission and prohibitions they can focus on normative facts
that someone is supposed to bring about by a given time, or on actions someone
needs to perform before a deadline or before another action/event. Using the same
reasoning as with regard to permissions/prohibitions, in his formalization Cliffe
prioritized the action/event view.
A further question that needs to be addressed it at whom an obligation is directed.
Obligations can for example be simply associated with participants in the system
or they can be associated with particular types of events which internally might
be associated with specific participants or groups of participants. The former (i.e.
specifying that a particular person X ought to perform an action A) is probably the
more intuitive approach in contrast to the undirected obligation (i.e. X ought to be
performed). However when groups of participants are involved (e.g. any member of
the group can fulfill the obligation), it results in modelling problems. The reason for
this being that the obligation then needs to be expressed for each member of the
group and needs to include conditional statements on all group members’ actions.
To avoid these problems, Cliffe’s formalization opts to associate obligations with
particular type of events which in turn might be caused by any of several participants.
The final issue related to obligations is the treatment of pairs or even groups of
obligations. As pointed out in Chapter 2, one important question with regard to
normative frameworks is the consistency of the norms they include. What happens
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if pairs (or groups) of obligations are inconsistent? A common approach is just to
eliminate one of the obligations by overriding it (Fasli, 2001). The problem with
this approach is that it can lead to oversimplifications. In real world situations,
normative conflicts are common and the decision makers need to choose between
conflicting alternatives. Transferring the problem of normative conflicts to normative
frameworks therefore seems a logical step. This does not necessarily mean that all
conflicts need to be accepted, but allowing for conflicts provides the opportunity
to analyse them and use the knowledge gained to refine the relevant obligations
in order to arrive at a consistent normative framework in the long run. For the
purpose of this dissertation it is assumed that normative frameworks are internally
consistent, i.e. the process of analysis and adjustment has already taken place and the
norms contained in the normative framework are not self-contradictory or mutually
defeating. That does not mean that one cannot model inconsistent norms, but the
models we present are internally consistent for ease of analysis. This assumption of
internal consistency results in the requirement that the properties of the normative
framework are verifiable at design-time.
4.2.3 Non-Compliance
By representing norms and giving the participants in the action arena a chance to
learn and reason about them, one further question that needs to be asked is how to
react if the actors do not comply with the norms (e.g. by performing non-permitted
actions or by not fulfilling obligations). We have already discussed potential forms of
enforcement in Section 2.3 and therefore will not go into detail about the different
enforcement options at this point. Nevertheless we would like to point out two
aspects that are of relevance for the implementation of normative frameworks.
The first is the practical consideration that if actors in the system are supposed
to ensure norm compliance (e.g. by administrating a sanction) then they must be
able to successfully perform the relevant actions. With regard to the normative
frameworks this implies the requirement that legal power and permission to enforce
compliance need to be ensured.
The second aspect is the question of whether or not the enforcement should be
considered separate from the norms it aims to guarantee compliance with. One paper
that considers the enforcement actions as distinct from the norms that were not
complied with was presented by Va´zquez-Salceda et al. (2005). The general problem
of this approach, that is common to all stand-alone solutions, is that it requires a
special treatment of the enforcement-related actions (and possibly a special way of
expressing these enforcement actions). Furthermore it is more difficult to express the
enforcement action in normative terms (e.g. as permissions or obligations) and link a
possible decision on whether or not and to what extent to enforce sanctions as a result
of the violation event. Finally, if the enforcement action is treated separately, cases
where the enforcement actions are not executed despite a corresponding obligation
(i.e. when a non-compliance to an enforcement obligation occurs) cannot be analysed
in respect of the initial non-compliance which led to the enforcement obligation. This
makes it harder to reason about the dependencies and events that were decisive for
the problem. As a consequence of these limitations of the “stand-alone” approach
we consider the enforcement action as part of the norms which they enforce and aim
to express them in the same language as the norms themselves.
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4.3 Further Aspects of Normative Frameworks
4.3.1 The Initiation and Termination of a Normative Framework
As pointed out in Definition 2, one important aspect of norms is their contextuality.
Time, i.e. the temporal scope of a norm, is one such aspect. It defines when a norm
or even the complete normative framework is in effect.
From a specification point of view it is therefore a requirement to define when
a normative framework has an effect and when it does not. This can be done by
specifying when, how and possibly with which parameters a normative framework is
created and when and how it is destroyed. The time between those two points in
time is the time-span where the normative framework is in effect, whereas for the
remainder of the time, it is not.
4.3.2 Time
This leads us to the last important aspect to consider when trying to specify normative
frameworks, namely how to deal with the problem of representing time in general.
Allen (1991) presented a number of ways to represent time, ranging from explicit
dating over intervals to temporal logics. Given the focus on events and states (and
facts) of the normative frameworks, we pursue a similar approach with regard to
time and focus on an event-driven specification. We assume time to consist of a
number of ordered time instances and make no assumptions about the duration of
time between these instances. At each of the time instances, one real world event
occurs. This allows for a chronological analysis of events and of chains of events.
4.4 A Formal Definition of Normative Frameworks
Having presented the general idea of normative frameworks and their role in governing
open distributed systems, as well as described considerations that need to be taken
into account when modelling normative frameworks, the formal model for such
frameworks to be used in this dissertation will now be presented. As noted before,
the formal model is based on the work of Cliffe (2007), where the full specifications
of the framework as well as the mathematical proofs for the internal correctness of
the formalization are provided. To make this dissertation self-contained, based on
the explanations given in this chapter we will outline the formal description of the
normative framework components relevant to the questions of this dissertation.
Recalling the preceding sections, the essential elements of a normative framework
are:
1. events e that are elements of the set of events E (e ∈ E), and that bring about
changes in state, and
2. a set of fluents F , that characterize the state of a system at a given instant.
The function of the framework is to define the interplay between these concepts
over time, in order to capture the evolution of a particular normative framework
through the interaction of its participants. We distinguish two kinds of sets of
events: normative events (Einst) that are the events defined by the framework and
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exogenous (Eex), that take place outside the context of the normative framework
but whose occurrence triggers normative events in a direct reflection of the “counts-
as” principle discussed earlier, with E = Einst ∪ Eex and Einst ∩ Eex = ∅. Eex is
sometimes also referred to as observed event, because in order to have an effect in
the normative framework, the events first of all need to be observed and considered
relevant. We use the terms observed event(s) and exogenous event(s) synonymously
in this dissertation. We further partition normative events into normative actions
(Eact) that denote changes in normative state and violation events (Eviol), that signal
the occurrence of violations (Einst = Eact ∪ Eviol, Eact ∩ Eviol = ∅). As mentioned
before, violations may arise either from explicit generation, from the occurrence of a
non-permitted event, or from the failure to fulfil an obligation. In addition to the
events just mentioned we also define a set of creation events E+ ⊆ Eex, that account
for the creation of the normative framework and a set of dissolution events E− ⊆ Eact
that account for its termination.
As we distinguish two main types of events, we also distinguish two main kinds
of fluents: normative fluents that denote normative properties of the state such as
permissions P , powers W and obligations O, and domain fluents D that correspond
to properties specific to the normative framework itself. The set of all fluents is
denoted as F (F = P ∪W ∪O ∪D and P ∩W ∩O ∩D = ∅). Looking at these sets
of normative fluents in more detail the following definitions hold:
 W is composed of power fluents of the form pow(e) : e ∈ Eact. The power
proposition denotes the capability to bring about an action e in the normative
framework.
 P is composed of permission fluents of the form perm(e) : e ∈ Eact∪Eviol. Each
permission proposition denotes the permission to bring about an action e in
the normative framework.
 O is composed of obligation fluents of the form obl(e, d, v) : e, d, v ∈ E , which
specifies that an event e should be brought about before an event d to avoid a
violation v.
A normative state is represented by the fluents that hold true in this state. Similar
to the assumption made on missing permissions, fluents that are not presented are
considered to be false. Conditions on a state are therefore expressed by a set of
fluents that should be true or false. The set of possible conditions is referred to as
X = 2F∪¬F .
In Section 4.1 we explained how changes in state are achieved through the
definition of two relations: (i) the generation relation, which implements counts-as by
specifying how the occurrence of one (exogenous or normative) event generates another
(normative) event, subject to the empowerment of the actor and the conditions on the
state, and (ii) the consequence relation. This specifies the initiation and termination
of fluents subject to the performance of some action in a state matching some
expression. The fluents to be initiated as a result of an event E are denoted as
C↑(φ, E) while the ones to be terminated are denoted as C↓(φ, E). Formally, the
generation relation can be expressed as G : X ×E → 2Einst . Similarly the consequence
relation can be described as follows: C : X × E → 2F × 2F .
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The semantics of our normative framework is defined over a sequence, called a
trace, of exogenous events Eex. Starting from the initial state, each exogenous event
is responsible for a state change, through initiation and termination of fluents. This
is achieved by a three-step process:
1. the transitive closure of G with respect to a given exogenous event determines
all the generated (normative) events,
2. to this all violations from events not permitted and obligations not fulfilled are
added, giving the set of all events whose consequences determine the new state,
3. the application of C to this set of events identifies all fluents that are initiated
and terminated with respect to the current state so giving the next state.
So for each trace, a sequence of states is obtained constituting the model of the
normative framework. Summing up, following Cliffe (2007) we formally define a
normative framework as follows:
Definition 10: Normative Framework (formal)
A Normative Framework is a 5-tuple N := 〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉 consisting of a set of
events E , a set of fluents F , a set of causal rules C, as set of generation rules G
and an initial state ∆, where the respective sets have the following properties
and relations between them:
1. F =W ∪P ∪O ∪D
2. G : X × E → 2Einst
3. C : X × E → 2F × 2F where C(X, e) = (C↑(φ, e), C↓(φ, e)) where
(i) C↑(φ, e) initiates a fluent
(ii) C↓(φ, e) terminates a fluent
4. E = Eex ∪ Einst with Einst = Eact ∪ Eviol
5. State Formula: X = 2F∪¬F
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented our view as well as the corresponding formal description
of normative frameworks. We use normative frameworks to capture the relevant
normative events in the action arena. Summarizing our normative framework repres-
ents both constitutive and regulative aspects of norms, as well as incorporating power
and permission as well as obligations. It is furthermore able to track the evolution of
normative frameworks by representing its consecutive states in form of traces. The
normative framework consists of two abstraction layers: the normative layer as well
as the real world layer. The general mechanism of our framework works as follows:
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observed events from the real world layer generate normative events on the basis of
the count-as principle, and result in changes of the normative state.
Having presented our normative framework model, the next chapter will deal with
information required to apply the model, by designing a normative framework for
our WMG case study presented in Chapter 3. In this dissertation we use simulation
as means of analysis. That is why, for being applicable in a simulation, our formal
description of the normative frameworks needs to be realized as a computational
model, which we present in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Designing and Testing the
Rules-in-Use
Section 4.4 presented the formal model of the normative framework underpinning
this dissertation. We explained how it can help to address and analyse the effects of
norms and the interaction with them by system participants. Although the formal
framework has its merits (e.g. formally underpinning the concept of normative
frameworks and thereby allowing us to reason about them), for being applicable
in a simulation it needs to be realized as a computational model. Looking at the
current literature on normative systems, a number of frameworks exist that present
themselves as candidates for realizing the computational model. This chapter starts
with an overview of the existing approaches for implementing the computational
model of normative frameworks. As a result of the number of approaches presented
for specifying computational models of normative frameworks in literature, we do
not give a complete overview of all existing specification. Instead we have limited
ourselves to only presenting a (in our view representative) selection of approaches
that are of most interest to the presented normative framework definition and that
are still supported and advanced by their authors.
5.1 Approaches for Specifying a Computational Model
of Normative Frameworks
5.1.1 The e-Institutions Framework
The e-Institutions framework was first described in Esteva et al. (2000). The frame-
work consists of three components: (i) a formal specification of a normative system
(called institution by the authors (Esteva et al., 2001, 2002)), (ii) the ISLANDER
tool for editing the specifications (Esteva et al., 2002), and (iii) AMELI, a run-time
environment for executing the system, based on the specifications (Esteva et al.,
2004).
In regards to the normative framework defined in Chapter 4 (page 69) the e-
Institutions are able to define a large part of it and translate it into a computational
model. To be more precise, the framework includes a formal semantics for the notion of
a normative system and its components (abstract and concrete norms, empowerment
of agents, roles) and defines a formal relation between normative systems and
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organizational structures. Despite these clear advantages, the implementation of
the framework poses a big problem, which renders it unsuitable for the normative
systems as envisioned in this dissertation. This problem is shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: The Governor Function in the e-Institutions (Esteva et al., 2004)
In the e-Institution framework all actions are triggered with the help of messages.
These messages trigger actions by the individual system participants are observed
by so-called governors (that are control entities which are implemented in the
middleware of the system). The governors check every message and do not forward
it further in case it violates a norm. This way norm deviation is impossible for
the system participants. This rigorous regimentation approach contradicts the
underlying assumptions of the normative framework presented in Chapter 4, making
the e-Institutions framework unsuitable for realizing the computational model.
5.1.2 OperA/OperettA
In contrast to e-Institutions, the OperA framework does account from non-
regimentation and legitimizes the concept of autonomy between the goals of the
system participants and society requirements (Dignum, 2003). The framework makes
use of contracts that predefine the norms and their corresponding sanctions in case of
violations. These contracts are implemented using the language LCR (Logic for Con-
tract Representation) which is an extension of the temporal logic CTL* and includes
deontic properties and a mechanism for reasoning about actions from the system’s
participants point of view (Dignum et al., 2003). Looking at the specifications of her
framework, Dignum’s work matches the idea of the normative frameworks presented
in Chapter 4 to a large extent. Thus, Dignum’s framework allows for a high degree
of generality, both in the specification and enforcement of interactions, as well as
in the composition and enactment of interactions. Dignum specifically focuses on
roles for the latter purpose, distinguishing her work from the suggestion made in
this dissertation. With regard to the implementation of a computational model,
despite recent work on OperettA – a graphical environment for the specification and
analysis of OperA models (see Aldewereld and Dignum (2010) for example) – so
far no sufficient information exists. Although the formalization of the contract uses
temporal logics that result in semantics which can be interpreted in a computational
model of the running system, no specifications are given on how such a system
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should be build or how contracts can be enforced in it. That is the reason why
Opera/OperettA is not suitable for building our computational model.
5.1.3 The MOISE-Family
The MOISE-family, consisting of MOISE (Hannoun et al., 2000), MOISE+
(Hu¨bner et al., 2007), its extension MOISEInst (Gaˆteau et al., 2005) as well as
S −MOISE+ and its extension SY NAI1 (Boissier and Gaˆteau, 2007), is another set
of frameworks that represent normative systems and provides a computational model
for them. MOISE+ has the advantage that is not only has detailed specifications
on normative concepts, but it has been linked to the simulation tool Jason (Hu¨bner
et al., 2009) and thus offers an existing well supported and tested computational
implementation. MOISEInst is the component of the family that concentrates on
norms. It offers definitions and implementations for permissions, obligations and
prohibitions and deals with the questions of power and permission by assigning the
actors in a system to roles and gives power/permission for certain actions to specific
roles only. Despite this difference with respect to the focus of power and permission,
by defining a large number of roles (possibly for every single agent) one would be able
to useMOISEInst for the specifications given in Section 4.4 (page 77). Nevertheless,
MOISE offers one problem similar to e-Institutions which renders it unsuitable
for our purposes. It employs generic supervisor agents, aiming at controlling and
enforcing the rights and duties of autonomous system entities operating under the
normative framework. Whereas supervisor agents are dedicated to the control of
the system at the normative and punishing level, the system entities implement the
functionalities of the application level. As a consequence, the system entities can
violate norms, but MOISE uses a rather harsh enforcement mechanisms that is
able to detect and punish all events in the system. This kind of total observation is
unsuitable for our model and does not conform to the ideas presented in Chapter 4.
5.1.4 Artikis et al.
One approach that focuses on the description of a computational model for normative
frameworks was presented by Artikis (2003) and Artikis et al. (2007). The authors
take a formal perspective based on the works of Sergot (2001) and Jones and Sergot
(1996). Using event calculus (Kowalski and Sergot, 1986) in combination with the
action language C+ (Giunchiglia et al., 2004), Artikis gives examples on how the
concepts of normative power, obligation, permissions and roles can be formalized
as a computational model and how this computational model can be executed and
analysed. Artikis et al. also consider observable real world events as the starting point
of their framework. However, despite the notion of normative power, they do not
include conventional generation in their framework. Instead they assume that every
normative actions and observed event have a 1:1-mapping, i.e. that every normative
action corresponds to exactly one real-world action which is constrained through
normative power. This lack of the possibility to express conventional generation,
rules out using Artikis et al. as base for the computational model of our normative
framework.
1For reasons of simplicity we refer to MOISE when talking about the complete family.
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5.2 Using Answer Set Programming for Design-Time
Reasoning in the Action Arena
Having given a brief review of the most common existing frameworks and approaches
that can be used to implement a computation model of normative frameworks and
explained their weaknesses with regard to our definition given in Section 4, in this
section we present the approach that is suitable for our purposes. It is based on
Answer Set Programming (ASP). ASP is a declarative programming paradigm with
a semantics known as the answer set semantics (Baral, 2003). The semantics is a
model based semantics for normal logic programs. The declarative nature of ASP
allows a programmer to only specify ’what’ needs to be achieved instead of having
to specify ’how’ something should be achieve. Instead in ASP, the solution of the
program corresponds to the ’how’-question. ASP therefore lends itself naturally
to (normative) reasoning applications. AnsProlog is a logical language that forms
the basis of ASP if being interpreted using the answer set semantics (Gelfond and
Lifschitz, 1988). Cliffe et al. (2006) show that the formal model of a normative
framework can be translated to an AnsProlog program such that the solution(s) of
the program (the so-called answer sets of the program) correspond to the traces of
the framework.
Based on the works by Cliffe et al. (see Cliffe et al. (2007a); Cliffe (2007); Cliffe
et al. (2009)) this dissertation opts for ASP as the tool for representing normative
frameworks in the form of a computational model.
In the next section we will therefore present the foundations of AnsProlog – the
logic language underlying ASP – and describe how one can determine the answer
sets from an AnsProlog program. Afterwards we outline how to specify normative
frameworks using AnsProlog.
Cliffe et al. (2007b) provides a layer of abstraction on top of AnsProlog by
introducing the domain-specific action language InstAL. The goal of this additional
abstraction layer was to make AnsProlog programs accessible to users without a
background in logic programming. As this dissertation is oriented at such an audience,
we use the action language InstAL for the presentation of the normative specifications.
We briefly describe InstAL and its link to AnsProlog. Afterwards we present the
formalization of the WMGs normative framework in InstAL. The chapter ends with
an analysis and a discussion of the results of this normative WMG model.
5.2.1 AnsProlog
AnsProlog is the short form of “Programming in log ic with Answer sets” (Baral,
2003, p. 3). It is a declarative programming language mainly used for knowledge
representation. It allows the programmer to describe a problem and the requirements
that must be fulfilled by the solutions to this problem in an intuitive way, rather than
the algorithm to find the solutions to the problem. The so-called answer sets of an
AnsProlog program are the corresponding solutions of the problem. They are defined
through (a variant or extension of) the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz,
1988). The answer sets are computed using answer set solvers such as clasp (Gebser
et al., 2007) or smodels (Niemela¨ and Simons, 1997). AnsProlog is non-monotonic,
i.e. it allows for conclusions to be retracted in the light of new knowledge. In contrast
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to standard monotonic logics this means that a set of conclusions drawn on the basis
of a given knowledge base, given as a set of premises, does not necessarily increase
if information is added to the knowledge base, but may actually shrink (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). In contrast to related techniques like the event
calculus (Kowalski and Sadri, 1997) and C+ (Giunchiglia et al., 2004), AnsProlog
has the advantage to allow for the specification of the problem as well as the query
for the answer set as an executable program. It therefore eliminates the gap between
specification and verification language. In addition, as both the problem and the
query are specified in the same language, a more straightforward verification and
validation is possible.
Let us now look at the semantics and the syntax of AnsProlog. The basic
components of the AnsProlog language are atoms (i.e. elements that can be assigned
a truth value, i.e. either true or false). Atoms can be negated. A literal is an atom
or its negation. We will only use one type of negation, namely negation-as-failure
(denoted as not). This is different from classical negation (¬a), where falsity needs to
be proved2. Negation-as-failure indicates that something is considered false when it
cannot proven to be true. Therefore not a (the negation-as-failure) can be different
to the logical negation ¬a.
Definition 11: AnsProlog program
An AnsProlog program is a pair {σ,Π}, with σ being the signature and Π a finite
set of statements (called rules) about σ (Gelfond, 2008). In this dissertation we
will denote programs of AnsProlog by their second element Π. The corresponding
signature will be denoted by σ(Π). If σ(Π) is not given explicitly we assume that
it consists of symbols occurring in the program.
Each of these rules in an AnsProlog program is comprised of a conjunct of
literals (the body) giving the conditions for the rules to be applicable and a
single literal (the head) giving the consequences of the rule. For example:
a : − not b.
b : − not a.
c : − b.
c : − a.
d : − c, not b.
The head of an AnsProlog program is typically denoted H(r) as a head and a
body B(r). They have the following form: H : − ⊥, B, not C with H, ⊥, B and C
being sets of atoms and ⊥ always having the truth value false. In a rule, the head can
also be empty. This is called a constraint. For the AnsProlog program to be true,
the constraints of this program need to be not true. A rule with an empty body is
called a fact. Facts are often written as H(r). for simplification purposes. The truth
value of a fact must be true. The body can be divided into two parts, namely the
set of all (not negated) atoms – denoted B+(r) – and the set of atoms that appear
2Classical negation can be simulated by AnsProlog by the introduction of the atom not a and a
constraint that a and not a cannot be true at the same point of time.
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negated, denoted B−(r). Recalling the interpretation of negation-as-failure, a rule in
an AnsProlog program can be read the following way: “if we know B+(r) and we
do not know B−(r), then we can assume the head of the rule.”
In AnsProlog it is possible to refer to a collections of rules that follow the same
pattern, and also to abbreviate collections of atoms within the same rule. This is
done using variables, which are indicated by capitalization. When an AnsProlog
program is executed, the variables are replaced by all – according to the program
– possible constants that suit the variable construct. This replacement of variables
with constants is called grounding.
Definition 12: Ground
Terms, literals, and rules of program Π with signature σ are called ground if they
contain no variables and no symbols for arithmetic functions. A program is called
ground if all its rules are ground (Gelfond, 2008). It is denote as ground(Π).
For instance the following AnsProlog program
Π =

p(a).
p(b).
q(X) : − p(X).
has the same meaning as
Π =

p(a).
p(b).
q(a) : − p(a).
q(b) : − p(b).
As noted before, the goal of an AnsProlog program is to find the answer sets
to the program, i.e. to answer ’how’ the state for which the program has given
specification can be achieved. If an AnsProlog program Π does not contain any
negation-as-failure statements, its answer set is the minimal set of rules S, which
satisfies the set of rules in Π in a consistent fashion. To give an example for this, let
us have a look at the following AnsProlog program:
Π =

a.
b.
c : − d, a.
d : − a.
e : − f.
Deductive closure is a widely accepted concept in the domain of logic of knowledge3
It states that knowledge is preserved over known entailment. This mean that if S
knows that p, and knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. Using deductive
closure, one can determine the answer sets of an AnsProlog program.
3For a discussion of the concept and its acceptance see White (1991).
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Definition 13: Deductive Closure for Positive AnsProlog Programs
The general deductive closure to arrive at an answer set for a positive AnsProlog
program (an AnsProlog program is said to be positive if Π does not contain
any negation-as-failure statements) is defined as: (i) take all rules of which the
bodies are true (ii) assume the heads to be true (iii) continue until you reach a
fixpoint. This fixpoint is the unique answer set, lm(Π) of the program.
Using this deductive closure on the example, the following can be concluded: a
and b are facts and therefore true. From the third rule it can be concluded that d
is also true. If d and a are true the third rule specifies that c is also true. At this
point we have reached a fixpoint, with lm(Π) = {a, b, c, d} being the answer set of
the example AnsProlog program.
If negation-of-failure is part of the AnsProlog program the search for answer
sets gets more complex, as negation-as-failure gives no guarantee that something is
indeed false and that information derived from it is actually correct.
The following example shall help to illustrate this problem:
Π =
{
a : − not b.
b : − not a.
Using the deductive closure for positive AnsProlog programs, one reaches a
dead end. The answer set to this program is found using the Gelfond-Lifschitz
transformation or reduct (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991) on a set of ground literals.
Definition 14: Gelfond-Lifschitz Transformation
Starting from an interpretation (which is an assumption on what might be an
answer set), one proceeds step-wise and tries to verify that the interpretation is
correct. This is done by reducing the original program to a simpler version without
negation-of-failure. In order to arrive at the reduce program the interpretation
is taken as a starting point and all rules that are considered not x that are
considered false are removed while the remaining rules only retain their positive
body elements. If the answer set obtained from that reduced program equals the
interpretation the process was started with, the answer set is an answer set to
the original AnsProlog program.
Looking at the example one arrives at two answer sets (i.e. lm(Π) = {a}, {b})
that are both acceptable solutions for the problem modelled.
Having explained AnsProlog as well as the determination of their solutions (i.e.
answer sets), in the next section we will explain how it can be used to specify the
normative frameworks presented in Chapter 4.
5.2.2 Representing Normative Frameworks in AnsProlog
In the last section we introduced AnsProlog and pointed out that if a normative
framework is presented as an AnsProlog program then the answer sets to this
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program correspond to the traces of the normative framework. This statement will
be explained in more detail in this section by using the translations presented in
Cliffe (2007) and Cliffe et al. (2007a).
In order to achieve the goal of representing our normative framework definition
in AnsProlog we need to map the formal definition presented in Section 4.4 (i.e.
N := 〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉) and all its components into an AnsProlog program such that
the program described by this translation models the semantics of the normative
framework to be represented. This mapping consists of three parts that together
generate the AnsProlog program ΠN . These parts are:
1. a base component Πbase which is independent of the framework being modelled,
2. a time component Πn, and
3. a framework specific component Π∗N .
Πbase consists of general rules that are true for any normative framework. These
rules deal with the occurrence of observed events, inertia of the fluents (i.e. the
transition of the states) and the generation of violation events resulting from not
permitted actions and unsatisfied obligations. The time model Πn defines the
predicates for time and is responsible for generating a single observed event at every
time instance. Π∗N specifies all the components that are specific to the normative
framework being modelled.
In general the mapping of the normative framework to AnsProlog uses the
following atoms: ifluent(P) to identify fluents, evtype(E, T) to describe the type
of an event, event(E) to denote the events, instant(I) for time instances, final(I)
for the last time instance, next(I1, I2) to establish time ordering, occurred(E, I)
to indicate that the event happened at time I, observed(E, I) that the event was
observed at that time, holdsat(P, I) to state that the normative fluent P holds at I,
and finally initiated(P, I) and terminated(P, I) for fluents that are initiated and
terminated at I (Cliffe et al., 2007a). Starting with Πn and then continuing with
Πbase and Π∗N , we now present these atoms in more detail by explaining their role
and usage.
As described in Section 4.3.2, the general notion of time in a normative framework
is based on the assumption that time consists of a number of ordered time instants,
with no assumption about the duration of time between two of these instants being
made. As a result we need to be able to model the semantics of a normative framework
over a sequence of time instants of length n, such that ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Based on our
definition of time, time instants represent the state of a normative framework at a
given time, in such a way that each time instant corresponds to one possible state.
Events are considered to occur between the time instants. For reasons of simplicity
we do not explicitly specify any interval over which an event occurs, but refer to
the time instance at the start of the interval when the event takes place. Figure 5.2
shows the AnsProlog definition of time.
Line (1) provides the definition for all time instants that need to be available in
the normative framework. Line (2) specifies the transition between two time instants.
This is required to go from one state to another. As it is impossible to have an
observable event at the end of the last time instant, we also need to define a fact
that represents the final state. This is done in line (3).
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0 < k < n : instant(ik). (1)
0 < k < n− 1 : next(ik, ik+1). (2)
final(in). (3)
Figure 5.2: The Time Translation Rules
Having presented the interpretation of time, we now consider Πbase, which deals
with the occurrence of observed events, inertia of the fluents, and the generation
of violation events resulting from not permitted actions and unsatisfied obligations.
The translation rules for Πbase are shown in Figure 5.3.
occurred(E, I) :- observed(E, I). (4)
holdsat(P, I2) :- holdsat(P, I1),
not terminated(P, I1),
next(I1, I2), instant(I1, I2),
ifluent(P).
(5)
holdsat(P, I2) :- initiated(P, I1), next(I1, I2),
instant(I1, I2), ifluent(P).
(6)
occured(viol(E), I) :- occurred(E, I),
not holdsat(perm(E), I),
event(E), event(viol(E)),
instant(I).
(7)
occurred(V, I) :- holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I),
occurred(D, I), event(E, D, V),
instant(I).
(8)
terminated(obl(E, D, V), I) :- occurred(E, I),
holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I),
event(E, D, V), instant(I).
(9)
terminated(obl(E, D, V), I) :- occurred(D, I),
holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I),
event(E, D, V), instant(I).
(10)
Figure 5.3: The Πbase Translation
The first rule (i.e. rule (4)) refers to an observed exogenous event (i.e. Eex).
It ensures that each observed exogenous event (observed(E, I)) will be marked as
occurred, as all observed events are valid events4. The next two rules (i.e. (5) and
(6)) deal with standard inertia. Rule (5) specifies that fluents which are valid in
the current state (holdsat(P, I1)) and which will not be terminated in the state
(not terminated(P, I1)) are still valid in the next state holdsat(P, I2). next(I1, I2)
and instant(I1, I2) denote the transition of time and its grounding as explained
above. Rule (6) focuses on the initiation of rules. It specifies that a fluent that
is being initiated in a state (initiated(P, I1)) becomes valid in the next state.
4Validity in this context only refers to the fact that any Eex can take place as a result of
the autonomy of the actors in the normative framework. It does not specify anything about the
permission involved, or whether this event might otherwise trigger a violation event.
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Rule (7) deals with Eex that are missing a permission. It specifies that for any
occurrence (occurred(E, I)) of a non-permitted event (not holdsat(perm(E), I))
a violation (event(viol(E))) is generated. Finally, rules (8) – (10) cover the
handling of obligations. Rule (8) deals with the case that not fulfilling an ob-
ligation holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I) before the deadline event occurred(D, I) results
in the generation of a violation event occurred(V, I)5. An occurrence of an ob-
ligation deadline (occurred(D, I)) also leads to the termination of the obligation
(terminated(obl(E, D, V), I)) (rule 10). Besides the expiration of the deadline, the
fulfillment of an obligation can also result in its termination. The rule for this
positive case of obligation-termination is encoded in rule (9). It specifies that the
obligation is terminated (terminated(obl(E, D, V), I)) if the obliged event occurs
(occurred(E, I)).
{observed(E, I)} :- evtype(E, obs), event(E),
instant(I), not final(I).
(11)
ev(E, I) :- observed(E, I), event(E),
instant(I).
(12)
:- not ev(I), instant(I),
not final(I)
(13)
:- observed(E1, I), observed(E2, I),
E1! = E2, instant(I), event(E1),
event(E2).
(14)
Figure 5.4: The AnsProlog Rules for ensuring Observable Traces
In Chapter 4 we described the semantics of the normative framework as a set
of states that change as a result of a sequence of exogenous (real world) events
(Eex) taking place and triggering normative events (Einst). When representing a
normative framework in AnsProlog each of the sequences of Eex corresponds to
a single possible model for the interpretation of the normative framework. As a
result, when specifying the computational model of a normative system, we are
only interested in models that include trace information, i.e. that have had any
Eex taking place. For this reason we need to add rules to Πbase that constrain the
answer set to those containing observable traces. Therefore we add the rules shown
in Figure 5.4 to Πbase. Looking at these rules in more detail, rule (11) is used for the
creation of observed(E, I) atoms. It does so for each combination of event event(E)
of type evtype(E, obs) (i.e. observable) that is not final not final(I) at time instant
instant(I). {observed(E, I)} is a choice rule. A choice rule states that if every
positive atom in the body of the rule is applied, and every negated atom is not
applicable then any subset of the head of the rule is applicable and can be chosen
from. For each choice, an event ev(E, I) is generated using rule (12). This event is
then used by the restriction rule (13), which specifies that only answer sets that have
Eex at each time step are valid. Finally, rule (14) ensures that only answer sets that
have one Eex per time instant are valid.
So far, we have discussed the translation rules for Πn and Πbase. The last missing
component in the translation is Π∗N . This component will now be presented.
5The atoms of rules (8) – (10) that were not described are required for grounding purposes.
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To start, we look at the condition statements that are modelled with the help of
the auxiliary function EX. For a given expression φ ∈ X that is used at time instant
ti, Cliffe et al. (2009) suggest to use the term EX(φ, ti) to denote the translation of
φ into a set of AnsProlog atoms as shown in Figure 5.5:
EX(x1 ∧ x2 ∧ . . . xn, ti) def≡ EX(x1, ti), EX(x2, ti),
. . .EX(xn, ti)
(15)
EX(¬f, ti) def≡ not EX(f, ti) (16)
EX(f, ti)
def≡ holdsat(f, ti) (17)
Figure 5.5: The Condition Statement Translation
Using this translation the condition ¬a, b, c at time instant ti would for example
be translated into the following sequence of extended literals in AnsProlog:
not holdsat(a, ti), holdsat(b, ti), holdsat(c, ti).
Keeping these translations in mind, we can look at the final translation components
of Π∗N shown in Figure 5.6.
p ∈ F ⇔ ifluent(p). (18)
e ∈ E ⇔ event(e). (19)
e ∈ Eex ⇔ evtype(e, obs). (20)
e ∈ Eact ⇔ evtype(e, act). (21)
e ∈ Eviol ⇔ evtype(e, viol). (22)
C↑(φ, e) = P ⇔ ∀p ∈ P · initiated(p, I) :-
occurred(e, I),EX(X, I).
(23)
C↓(φ, e) = P ⇔ ∀p ∈ P · terminated(p, I) :-
occurred(e, I),EX(X, I).
(24)
G(φ, e) = E ⇔ ∀g ∈ E · occurred(g, I) :-
occurred(e, I),
holdsat(pow(e), I), EX(X, I).
(25)
p ∈ ∆ ⇔ holdsat(p, i0). (26)
Figure 5.6: The Π∗N Translation
The first two rules in Figure 5.6, i.e. rule (18) and (19) deal with fluents and
events respectively. Fluents are encoded as facts ifluent(p). Each event e ∈ E
is translated with the help of a corresponding term e. This term is applied to a
number of facts that record the type of event evtype(e, X) e belongs to, such that
X ∈ obs, act, viol (rules (20) – (22)). Rules (23) and (24) are concerned with the
consequence relation. They specify that whenever a fluent needs to be initiated
or terminated a respective rule is generated. This rule has the event responsible
for initiating/terminating the fluent occurred(e, I) together with conditional rules
EX(X, I) in the body and the respective initiation/termination atom in the head
(initiated(p, I)/terminated(p, I)). Rule (25) deals with the event generation.
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Similar to before, in the body of the rule the event responsible for generation of the
event occurred(e, I) together with conditional rules EX(X, I) is used. In addition
the power (holdsat(pow(e), I)) to execute the trigger event e is added. The head of
the rule consists of the generated event (occurred(g, I)). Finally, the last rule (i.e.
rule (26)) refers to the initial state ∆ of the normative framework. It specifies that
each fluent p ∈ ∆ is translated into a fact holdsat(p, i0)6.
In this section we presented the translations for Π∗N , Π
base and Πn, the three
components that together compose ΠN (i.e. the corresponding AnsProlog program
to N := 〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉). Using this translation, for any normative framework
in accordance with the definition given in Section 4.4 we are able to generate a
corresponding AnsProlog program that is able to provide ordered traces of length n
in form of lm(ΠN ). Having such a translation, if required, we can add additional
rules to the program that allow us to restrict the answer sets to a set which fulfills
certain properties.
5.3 The Action Language InstAL
In the last section we outlined how normative frameworks can be specified as
computational model using AnsProlog. In order to make AnsProlog programs
accessible to users with little or no experience in the AnsProlog formalization and
syntax, Cliffe et al. (2006) provided a layer of abstraction on top of AnsProlog by
introducing the domain-specific action language InstAL. InstAL uses semi-natural
language to describe the various components of the normative framework.
An InstAL programme generally consists of two components: the normative
specification which is specified in the so-called ial-file as well as the domain information
specified in the domain file that is used for grounding purposes. Figure 5.7 gives an
overview of the components.
The domain file consists of general statements of the form type : type− value,
such as Handset : alice bob (Figure 5.9, line 1 on page 98), which specifies that
the Handset variable of the underlying AnsProlog program can be grounded with
the values alice and bob. A domain file should always be complete, i.e. contain
information for each type value that is to be grounded, but should never have more
information than required either.
The normative specifications in the ial-file consist of four parts: template declara-
tion, template rules, template initiation and concretisation. The template declaration
part contains the general declaration of the normative framework, including the
event and fluents as well as the name of the normative framework. In terms of the
template declaration part, this means that events are defined by typeOfEvent event
nameOfEvent; with typeOfEvent being one of exogenous, create, violation or inst,
while fluents are defined by fluent nameofFluent (ParameterType, ...);.
The template rules part contains the actual rules of what follows from which
actions, i.e. the description of how events cause the state of the normative framework
to evolve. The generation of normative events from exogenous events is specified
using the generates statement—in effect, adding a rule to the G relation – while
6It should be noted that Π∗N is grounded except for the time instants. The grounding variables
for these instants are provided by Πn.
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Figure 5.7: Normative Specification Components in InstAL
initiates and terminates define the two parts (C↑ and C↓) of the consequence
relation. Conditions on the state are expressed using if.
The two next parts of the normative specifications (i.e. template initiation and
concretisation) contain information for the initial state of the normative framework
with the help of an initially statement. This initially statement serves to specify
the set of fluents that characterize the initial state after the normative framework is
created. initially statements that are the same for each instance of the normative
framework are part of the template initiation, whereas initially statements that
might updated at run-time of the normative framework are part of the concretisation.
To explain in more detail how this looks in InstAL, this dissertation now explains
the language features of InstAL by looking at the InstAL fragments that will be used
later when modelling the case study:
 institution name declares the name of the normative framework, such as
institution grid in line 1 of Figure 5.10, page 99.
 type identifier declares a type, such as type Handset (line 3 in Figure 5.10).
Type declarations establish a disjoint set of monomorphic types7. The types
are specified in a domain file providing the acceptable values for each declared
type. An example of a domain file is given in Figure 5.9 on page 98. The
types in the domain file are specified type-identifier: type-value(s) with
the values being separated by spaces. An example of such a specification of
grounding values in the domain file is Handset: alice bob (Figure 5.9, line 1).
InstAL will then substitute those values (e.g. alice and bob) whenever the
respective type (e.g. Handset) is specified for the events and fluents.
 create event event-name(type+) declares a new creation event, such as create
event creategrid in line 14 in Figure 5.10.
7Monomorphic types are types having parts that exist in only one form.
94 Designing and Testing the Rules-in-Use
 dest event event-name(type+) declares a new destruction event. In our model,
we do not use a destruction event. If being used an example of such an event
would be dest event destroygrid.
 exogenous event event-name(type+) declares a new physical world event and
the types of its parameters, such as exogenous event download(Handset,
Chunk, Channel) (line 9 in Figure 5.10).
 inst event event-name(type+) declares a new normative event and the types
of its parameters, such as inst event intDownload(Handset, Chunk, Channel)
in line 17 in Figure 5.10.
 violation event event-name(type+) declares a new violation event, such as
violation event misuse(Handset) in line 24 in Figure 5.10.
 fluent fluent-name(type+) declares a new normative fact—that is, an object
that can be an element of the normative framework state, such as fluent
downloadChunk(Handset, Chunk) in line 27 in Figure 5.10.
 noninertial fluent fluent-name(type+) declares a fluent that is non-inertial,
i.e. is not automatically persistent between states without termination. An
example could be noninertial fluent busyHSending(Handset) in line 39 in
Figure 5.10.
 event-name generates normative-event+ [condition] adds a new pair to the
generation relation with domain event (exogenous or normative framework)
and rangeinstitutional world event, subject to an optional condition. For
example: send (A, X) generates intSend(A) if hasChunk(A, X), . . . ; (Figure
5.14, line 99), where the condition is the presence of the fluent hasChunk,
with the corresponding A and X (these variables are unified) in the normative
framework state.
 event-name initiates institutional-fluent+ [condition] adds a new pair to the
consequence (addition) relation, with domain event (physical or institutional)
and range fluent. Thus, intDownload(A, X, C) initiates hasChunk(A, X) in
Figure 5.13 line 74 adds the corresponding fluent to the normative framework
state.
 event-name terminates institutional-fluent+ [condition] adds a new pair
to the consequence (deletion) relation, with domain event (physical or
institutional) and range fluent. Thus, intDownload(A, X, C) terminates
pow(intDownload(A, X1, C1) (Figure 5.13 line 80) deletes the corresponding
fluent from the normative framework state.
 non-inertial-fluent-name when [condition] adds the conditions in which a non-
inertial fluent should be true in a given state, like for example busyHReceiv-
ing(Handset) when areceive(Handset,Time) in line 52 (Figure 5.11).
 perm(event) is a special fluent whose presence indicates that the event is
permitted, such as perm(intDownload(A, B, C)), and is typically the subject of
an initiates or terminates rule (e.g. in line 139, Figure 5.15).
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 pow(event) is a special fluent whose presence indicates that the event is em-
powered, such as pow(intDownload(A, X1, C1)) (as above), and is typically the
subject of an initiates or terminates rule.
 obl(event, event, event) is a special fluent whose presence indicates the existence
of an obligation, such as obl(send(A, x1), intDeadline, misuse(A)) (Figure
5.15, lines 154–154). This fluent can be terminated by the occurrence of the
first specified event – that is the obligation that needs to be satisfied. If not,
and the second event (typically a deadline) occurs, then the third event is
triggered, which is typically a violation event, leading to the addition of a
violation fluent to the normative framwork state.
InstAL can be translated into an equivalent AnsProlog program as the framework
specific part of the formal model. This process is shown in Figure 5.8.
Using the normative framework definition (i.e. the normative specification) which
is specified in InstAL as well as grounding information derived from a domain file
as input, a translator generates a set of answer set programs which describe the
semantics of the input normative framework. The grounding information in the
domain file consists of values for all the variables that are present in the AnsProlog
program. This includes the variables for the time instants. The translator used in
the research of this dissertation is called instal2asp and was developed by Nicholas
Robert Jones as part of his Bachelor’s thesis at the University of Bath (Jones, 2011).
These resulting normative framework programs are then grounded along with a
trace program which defines which set of traces should be analysed and a query
program which describes the desired properties that should be validated by the
InstAL reasoning tool8. The derived grounded problem description is then used as
input for an answer set solver. In this dissertation we use CLINGO, developed by
the University of Potsdam (Gebser et al., 2008) for both the grounding as well as
the answer set solving. The result of this process can be zero or more answer sets, of
which each corresponds to a possible model of the described normative framework
for the given trace and query specified.
8The trace program and the query can be empty except for the specification of the time steps
the program should reason about. These time steps are specified in the trace program.
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Figure 5.8: Overview of the InstAL Translation Process (Cliffe, 2007)
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5.4 Formalizing the Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario
Now that we have described the WMG scenario in some detail from the technological
and stakeholder perspective (Chapter 3, page 49) as well as our approach for modelling
normative frameworks (Sections 5.2–5.3) we combine these two threads and present
our (computational) normative model of the WMG Scenario.
Based on the three groups of underlying factors distinguished in the IAD frame-
work we distinguish three perspectives to present our normative model of the WMG:
 The technological components including the quantification of battery costs for
a given action as well as the technical sending restriction both by the mobile
phones and the base-station (in the biophysical characteristics perspective),
 the users that populate the normative frameworks and choose which action
to take, based on utility considerations (in the attributes of the community
perspective), and
 the actions that users may take, as prescribed by the normative framework (in
the rules-in-use perspective).
In this section, we focus on the (normative) actions and hence we present the
implementation of the normative framework in InstAL. The purpose of this model
is to provide a means for a first design-time analysis of the system and to serve
as a reference point for the run-time simulation model – that is, the integration of
utility consideration through the autonomous users that participate in the normative
framework. Implementing a simulation environment is a complex and time-consuming
task. Before starting the process it is best to verify that the protocol is indeed suitable
for the task at hand. The normative model provides the protocol designer with a tool
to verify, from the theoretical perspective, that the protocol is correct and the methods
of enforcing collaboration between the users will indeed benefit all participants in
terms of reduced communication costs and that none of the participants can take
unfair advantage without risking sanction.
The model is intentionally limited in that it focuses on the essential interactions
and the communication costs that arise from those interactions. Although a more
elaborate model may be desirable for the sake of greater realism, we believe that
more details would also distract and unnecessarily complicate the model.
The features of the prototypical scenario are:
 1 × base-station: B,
 m × users with handsets: A = {a1, . . . , am},
 1 × digital good: G divided into,
 n × chunks: {g1, . . . , gn}.
We further assume that n|m, which is to say the number of chunks, is a multiple
of the number of users.
In the design-time model, we focus on the actual interaction between participants,
neglecting the preceding phase of searching for cooperation partners. We identify
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three phases to the interactions for handset to base-station and handset to handset9.
These phases are the negotiation phase between the handsets on who is to download
which chunk, the download of the chunks from the base-station and the sharing
phase afterward where the handsets can decide on whether to cooperate and send
chunks to its collaborators or not. Expressing this in more formal terms, the three
phases are as follows:
 Negotiation: assign gi to aj s.t. f : G→ A and
f−1 : A→ G where f−1(ai) = {gj , . . .} and f(gj) = ai
 Downloading: handset ai receives chunks f
−1(ai) from base-station B
 Sharing: handset ai sends chunks f
−1(ai) to and receives chunks G \ f−1(ai)
from other handsets.
While these three phases are independent, they need not be sequential. Of course,
the negotiation phase has to precede both the downloading and sending/receiving
phases. Sharing a chunk is possible as soon as its downloading has commenced; thus
the two can be interleaved. In the following paragraphs we discuss each phase in
more detail and how each is encoded in InstAL.
Each InstAL specification starts with the name given to the normative framework,
followed by the different types of variables it uses. This together composes the
template declaration component of the normative specifications. The values of the
variables are supplied by the domain specifications in the separate domain file.
Our scenario, which is kept simple for illustration purposes, consists of two
handsets, alice and bob, four chunks, x1 to x4, one base-station with two channels,
c1 and c2. Furthermore, we have a type time to represent transmission times. The
complete domain file of the design time model is displayed in figure 5.9.
1 Handset: alice bob
2 Chunk: x1 x2 x3 x4
3 Channel: c1 c2
4 Time: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Figure 5.9: The Domain File of the Design Time WMG Model
After the types are specified the InstAL specification continues with the description
of the fluents and events it recognises using the defined types. The full definition
of the template declaration can be seen in Figure 5.10. The meaning of the various
elements of the specification should become clear as we discuss the different phases.
5.4.1 Negotiation Phase
Given this dissertation’s focus on enforcement, we are not particularly concerned
with the technicalities of the negotiation phase. We assumed that any off-the-shelf
protocol could be employed as long as the post-condition is satisfied: that each
9As far as the model is concerned, users and their mobile phones are a single entity and there is
no need to make a distinction between the two. For convenience in the InstAL model we use the
term “handset” to refer to this user/mobile-phone entity.
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1 institution grid;
2
3 type Handset;
4 type Chunk;
5 type Channel;
6 type Time;
7
8 %% exogenous events %%
9 exogenous event download(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
10 exogenous event send(Handset,Chunk);
11 exogenous event clock;
12
13 %% creation event %%
14 create event creategrid;
15
16 %% normative events %%
17 inst event intDownload(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
18 inst event intSend(Handset,Chunk);
19 inst event intReceive(Handset,Chunk);
20 inst event transition;
21 inst event intDeadline;
22
23 %% violation event %%
24 violation event misuse(Handset);
25
26 %% fluents %%
27 fluent downloadChunk(Handset,Chunk);
28 fluent hasChunk(Handset,Chunk);
29 fluent areceive(Handset,Time); % receiving from handset
30 fluent asend(Handset,Time); % sending by handset
31 fluent creceive(Handset,Time); % receiving from basestation
32 fluent transmit(Channel,Time); % sending by basestation
33
34 %% fluents for time-related aspects %%
35 fluent previous(Time,Time);
36 fluent countdown(Time);
37
38 %% non-inertial fluents %%
39 fluent busyHSending(Handset);
40 % indicates that the handset is sending to a peer
41 fluent busyHReceiving(Handset);
42 % indicates that the handset is receiving from a peer
43 fluent busyBReceiving(Handset);
44 % indicates that the handset is receiving from the base
45 fluent busyChannel(Channel);
46 % indicates that the channel is busy
Figure 5.10: Declaration of Types and Events in the Design Time WMG
Model
48 %------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 % noninertial rules
50 %------------------------------------------------------------------------
51
52 busyHSending(Handset) when asend(Handset,Time);
53 busyHReceiving(Handset) when areceive(Handset,Time);
54 busyBReceiving(Handset) when creceive(Handset,Time);
55 busyChannel(Channel) when transmit(Channel,Time);
Figure 5.11: Specification of the Noninertial Rules in the Design Time WMG
Model
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57 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
58 % countdown rules
59 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
60
61 transition initiates countdown(T2) if countdown(T1), previous(T1,T2);
62 transition generates intDeadline if countdown(1);
63 misuse(A) terminates pow(intReceive(A,X));
64 misuse(A) terminates perm(intReceive(A,X));
Figure 5.12: Generation and Consequence Relations for Deadline-Countdown
in the Design Time WMG Model
66 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
67 % rules for downloading
68 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
69
70 % handset A requests a block from the base station on channel C
71 download(A,X,C) generates intDownload(A,X,C) if not hasChunk(A,X),
72 not busyChannel(C), not busyBReceiving(A);
73
74 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
75 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates perm(send(A,X));
76 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates creceive(A,4), transmit(C,4);
77 % handset and channel are busy for 4 time-units when a chunk
78 % is downloaded from the base station
79
80 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates pow(intDownload(A,X1,C1));
81 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates pow(intDownload(B,X1,C));
82 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates downloadChunk(A,X);
83 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates perm(download(A,X,C1));
84
85 download(A,X,C) generates transition;
86 clock generates transition;
87
88 transition initiates transmit(C,T2) if transmit(C,T1), previous(T1,T2);
89 transition initiates creceive(A,T2) if creceive(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
90 transition initiates pow(intDownload(A,X,C)) if creceive(A,1);
91
92 transition terminates creceive(A,Time);
93 transition terminates transmit(C,Time);
Figure 5.13: Generation and Consequence Relations for Downloading in the
Design Time WMG Model
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95 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
96 % rules for sharing
97 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
98
99 send(A,X) generates intSend(A,X) if hasChunk(A,X), not busyHSending(A),
100 not busyHReceiving(A);
101
102 send(A,X) generates intReceive(B,X) if not hasChunk(B,X),
103 not busyHSending(B), not busyHReceiving(B), hasChunk(A,X),
104 not busyHSending(A), not busyHReceiving(A);
105
106 intSend(A,X) initiates asend(A,2);
107 intSend(A,X) terminates pow(intSend(A,X));
108 intSend(A,X) terminates perm(intSend(A,X));
109
110 intReceive(A,X) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
111 intReceive(A,X) initiates areceive(A,2);
112 intReceive(A,X) terminates pow(intReceive(A,X));
113 intReceive(A,X) terminates perm(intReceive(A,X));
114
115 send(A,X) generates transition;
116 clock generates transition;
117
118 transition initiates asend(A,T2) if asend(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
119 transition initiates areceive(A,T2) if areceive(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
120 transition initiates pow(intReceive(A,X)) if areceive(A,1);
121 transition initiates pow(intSend(A,X)) if asend(A,1);
122
123 transition terminates asend(A,Time);
124 transition terminates areceive(A,Time);
Figure 5.14: Generation and Consequence Relations for Sharing in the Design
Time WMG Model
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126 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
127 % countdown
128 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
129
130 initially countdown(20), pow(transition), perm(transition),
131 perm(clock), pow(intDeadline), perm(intDeadline);
132
133
134 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
135 % downloading
136 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
137
138 initially pow(transition), perm(transition), perm(clock),
139 pow(intDownload(A,B,C)), perm(intDownload(A,B,C)),
140 perm(download(alice,x1,C)), perm(download(alice,x3,C)),
141 perm(download(bob,x2,C)), perm(download(bob,x4,C)),
142 downloadChunk(alice,x1), downloadChunk(alice,x3),
143 downloadChunk(bob,x2), downloadChunk(bob,x4);
144
145 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
146 % sharing
147 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
148
149 initially pow(transition), perm(transition),
150 perm(clock), pow(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
151 perm(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
152 pow(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
153 perm(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
154 obl(send(alice,x1), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
155 obl(send(alice,x3), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
156 obl(send(bob,x2), intDeadline, misuse(bob)),
157 obl(send(bob,x4), intDeadline, misuse(bob));
158
159 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
160 % time
161 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
162
163 initially previous(20,19);
164 initially previous(19,18);
165 initially previous(18,17);
166 initially previous(17,16);
167 initially previous(16,15);
168 initially previous(15,14);
169 initially previous(14,13);
170 initially previous(13,12);
171 initially previous(12,11);
172 initially previous(11,10);
173 initially previous(10,9);
174 initially previous(9,8);
175 initially previous(8,7);
176 initially previous(7,6);
177 initially previous(6,5);
178 initially previous(5,4);
179 initially previous(4,3);
180 initially previous(3,2);
181 initially previous(2,1);
Figure 5.15: Initial State of the Design Time WMG Model, Post-Negotiation
Phase
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chunk is assigned to exactly one handset and that each handset is assigned the same
number of chunks. These conditions can readily be relaxed at the cost of a lengthier
specification10.
Once the download tasks are allocated to the handsets based on the above-
mentioned conditions, the allocation needs to be translated for the normative model.
This is done by modelling the allocation as part of the initial state of the model (see
Figure 5.15, lines 142–143) via the downloadChunk fluents indicating which handsets
are tasked with downloading these specific chunks from the base-station. Together
with their chunk assignment the handsets receive the necessary permission download
(lines 140–141).
5.4.2 Downloading Phase
In the download phase each handset downloads its assigned chunks from the base-
station. This process should result in each handset holding n|m distinct chunks.
Because the base-station uses several different frequencies (frequency division multi-
plexing), many users may download chunks simultaneously. We refer to a frequency
division in the model as a channel. Of course, there is a physical limit to the number
of frequency divisions and hence the number of simultaneous user connections but
we view this as a feature for future incorporation, rather than an essential property
to model. So we only work with two channels (c1 and c2) in the example.
The full specification of this phase can be seen in Figure 5.13. Each handset can
only obtain one chunk at a time from the base station, while each channel can only
be used to download a single chunk. This is modelled by the non-inertial fluents
busyBReceiving and busyChannel (lines 43–46) which are implied on the basis of the
handset downloading and the base-station transmitting (lines 54–55).
The first InstAL rule (lines 70–72) indicates that a request to download a chunk
is granted (intDownload) whenever the handset does not have the requested chunk
already, there is an available channel and the handset is not currently receiving from
the base-station. When a chunk is downloaded, the handset and the channel are
busy for a fixed amount of time — 4 time steps in this case (line 76). In the case of
a successful interaction with the base-station (the normative event intDownload was
generated), the handset is considered to have downloaded the chunk, so it can be
shared (line 74). As soon as a channel and a handset are engaged, the framework
(i) removes the power from the handset (line 80) and from the channel (line 81) to
engage in any other interactions11, (ii) stops the handset from needing the chunk
(line 82) and (iii) cancels the permission to download the chunk again later on (lines
83).
As this example presents the code for a design time analysis of the WMG and
its energy consumption, we need a mechanism to mark the transition of time. This
is done with the help of the exogenous clock event (Figure 5.10, line 11) and the
10In Section 5.5 we will discuss the issue of less restrictive approaches with regard to the negotiation
as well as resilience issues.
11The code in line 81 in detail specifies that intDownload terminates the power of any handset
other then the one engaged in the interaction to download any chunk from the channel, that has is
involved in the download. Together with line 80 which removed the permission from the downloading
handset to download any other chunk from any channel, this blocks both the involved channel and
the involved handset from any further download interaction until this restriction is removed.
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normative transition event (line 20). Each exogenous event generates a transition
to mark the passing of time (lines 85–86). The clock event indicates that no handset
was interacting with the normative framework. The transition event reduces the
duration of the interaction between the channel and handset (line 88–89) using
the initial (predecessor,successor)-time information specified in Figure 5.15 in lines
163–181. When the interaction comes to an end, transition restores the power for
handsets to download chunks via the channel and for the handset to download more
chunks (line 90). The event also terminates any busy fluents that are no longer
needed (line 92–93) which in turn results in satisfying of the not busyBreiceiving(A)
condition for downloading in line 72. Consequently afterwards the handset fulfills
the requirements to download again (with his newly restored power and permission).
5.4.3 Sharing Phase
Once the handsets possess the chunks they are supposed to share, the sharing phase
can commence. In this phase each handset needs to send chunks to or receive chunks
from other handsets, with the goal that at the end of the process, each handset has
a complete set of the chunks, which is the entire digital good. The full specification
can be found in Figure 5.14. The idea behind the model is more or less the same as
with downloading chunks from the base-station, only that we build in a very basic
mechanism to encourage handsets to share their chunks with others rather than just
downloading them.
Just like for downloading we introduce two non-inertial fluents busyHReceiving
and busyHSending that keep track of the activity between handsets (lines 39–41 in
Figure 5.10). These fluents are true whenever a handset is sending or receiving
(Figure 5.11, lines 52–53).
A handset sharing a chunk can possibly trigger two normative events, intSending
and intReceiving, depending on the availability of the handsets and whether they
have possession of the chunk or not (lines 99–104). The duration for sending or
receiving a chunk is set to 2 time steps (lines 106 and 111 respectively)12.
The initial sharing assignment is modelled with the help of obligations (Figure
5.15, lines 154–157) which specify which handset has to share which chunk before
the a specific deadline13. The deadline chosen in the example is a temporal deadline
which comes into effect after 20 time-steps (line 130)14. An non-fulfillment of the
obligation (i.e. not sending the chunk before the deadline) results in a violation
event named misuse (represented by the third event in the respective obligation
specifications). The simple penalty we chose to implement in our model is that
the violating handset permanently loses the power and permission to intReceiving
(Figure 5.12, lines 63–64) which they were initially given (Figure 5.15 lines 150 and
12The time steps chosen for downloading and sending/receiving have been chosen arbitrarily to
demonstrate the difference between the two communication mechanisms. They were kept relatively
small to reduce the length of the traces while still showing possible simultaneous receiving and
downloading.
13The chunks the handsets are obliged to share are the ones they were asked to download
beforehand, i.e. by the point of the sharing phase the handsets should be in possession of the chunks
they should share.
14The time is again counted down using the transition system and the previous operator
(Figure 5.12, lines 61–62).
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151). The result of this sanction is that for all intents and purposes the punished
handset has been expelled from the collaboration group.
5.4.4 Trace and Query
Figures 5.9 to 5.15 give the complete specification (and domain information) of our
WMG scenario. As explained earlier, when these two components are translated to
AnsProlog and combined with the framework-independent program components, we
obtain all the possible traces over a specified number of time instants. A successful
trace makes sure that at the end all handsets have all chunks and are no longer
engaged.
This success criteria can be expressed in AnsProlog as shown in Figure 5.16.
From the traces we are only interested in the observed events that have taken place,
violations and the state of the non-inertial fluents busyHSending, busyHReceiving and
busyBReceiving to monitor communication costs. Figure 5.17 shows how this can be
requested.
1 busy :- holdsat(transmit(C,T),F),final(F).
2 busy :- holdsat(creceive(A,T),F),final(F).
3 busy :- holdsat(asend(A,T),F),final(F).
4 busy :- holdsat(areceive(A,T),F),final(F).
5
6 % success criteria
7 success :- holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x1),F),
8 holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x2),F),
9 holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x3),F),
10 holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x4),F),
11 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x1),F),
12 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x2),F),
13 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x3),F),
14 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x4),F),
15 not busy, final(F).
Figure 5.16: The Success Criteria for the Design Time WMG Model
27 busyHReceiving(A,I) :- holdsat(busyHReceiving(A),I).
28 busyHSending(A,I) :- holdsat(busyHSending(A),I).
29 busyChannel(C,I) :- holdsat(busyChannel(C),I).
30 busyBReceiving(A,I) :- holdsat(busyBReceiving(A),I).
31
32 violSh :- occured(viol(X),I).
33
34 #hide.
35
36 #show observed(E,I).
37
38 #show busyHReceiving(A,I).
39 #show busyHSending(A,I).
40 #show busyChannel(C,I).
41 #show busyBReceiving(A,I).
Figure 5.17: Defining the Trace Output of the Design Time WMG Model
Figure 5.18 contains the output of a successful trace for a scenario with two
handsets (bob and alice), four chunks (x1, x2, x3 and x4) and a base-station with
two channels (c1 and c2). Figure 5.19 shows the graphical representation of this
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trace. The small circles indicate the time steps. A light grey circle means the
handset is busyBReceiving (or for the channel busyChannel) while darker grey indicates
busyHReceiving and black indicates busyHSending. Circles with two colours indicate
that the handset is both receiving from the base-station and another handset. The
arrows indicate which chunk goes to which handset. The left-hand side labels indicate
the exogenous event and the current distribution of chunks. The observed events
clock and transition are not displayed to avoid cluttering the diagram.
observed(creategrid,i00) observed(download(alice,x1,c1),i01) observed(download(bob,x2,c2),i02) observed(transition,i03)
observed(transition,i04) observed(transition,i05) observed(send(alice,x1),i06) observed(download(bob,x4,c1),i07)
observed(transition,i08) observed(download(alice,x3,c2),i09) observed(transition,i10) observed(transition,i11)
observed(send(bob,x2),i12) observed(transition,i13) observed(transition,i14) observed(send(alice,x3),i15)
observed(transition,i16) observed(transition,i17) observed(send(bob,x4),i18) observed(transition,i19)
observed(transition,i20) observed(clock,i21) observed(transition,i20) busyHReceiving(alice,i14) busyHReceiving(alice,i19)
busyHReceiving(alice,i20) busyHReceiving(bob,i16) busyHReceiving(bob,i17) busyHReceiving(alice,i13) busyHReceiving(bob,i07)
busyHReceiving(bob,i08) busyHSending(alice,i16) busyHSending(alice,i17) busyHSending(bob,i14) busyHSending(bob,i19)
busyHSending(bob,i20) busyHSending(alice,i07) busyHSending(alice,i08) busyHSending(bob,i13) busyChannel(c1,i02)
busyChannel(c1,i03) busyChannel(c1,i04) busyChannel(c1,i05) busyChannel(c1,i08) busyChannel(c1,i09) busyChannel(c1,i10)
busyChannel(c1,i11) busyChannel(c2,i03) busyChannel(c2,i04) busyChannel(c2,i05) busyChannel(c2,i06) busyChannel(c2,i10)
busyChannel(c2,i11) busyChannel(c2,i12) busyChannel(c2,i13) busyBReceiving(alice,i02) busyBReceiving(alice,i03)
busyBReceiving(alice,i04) busyBReceiving(alice,i05) busyBReceiving(alice,i10) busyBReceiving(alice,i11)
busyBReceiving(alice,i12) busyBReceiving(alice,i13) busyBReceiving(bob,i03) busyBReceiving(bob,i04) busyBReceiving(bob,i05)
busyBReceiving(bob,i06) busyBReceiving(bob,i08) busyBReceiving(bob,i09) busyBReceiving(bob,i10) busyBReceiving(bob,i11)
Figure 5.18: Ouput of a Successful Trace
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C1 C2 Alice Bob
x1observed(download(alice,x1,c1),i01)
alice={},bob={}
x2observed(download(bob,x2,c2),i02)
alice={x1},bob={}
alice={x1},bob={x2}
alice={x1},bob={x2}
alice={x1},bob={x2}
x1observed(send(alice,x1),i06)
alice={x1},bob={x2}
x4observed(download(bob,x4,c1),i07)
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2}
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2,x4}
x3observed(download(alice,x3,c2),i09)
alice={x1},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
x2observed(send(bob,x2),i12)
alice={x1,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
x3observed(send(alice,x3),i15)
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
x4observed(send(bob,x4),i18)
alice={x1,x2,x3},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
alice={x1,x2,x3,x4},bob={x1,x2,x3,x4}
Figure 5.19: One Trace of the Interaction between Alice, Bob and the
Channels of the Base-station
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5.5 Discussion of the Results of the Design-Time
Model
Now that we have set out the normative framework and presented the energy data
to quantify communication costs for the particular situation of a 3G structured
network and an WMG (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), we can use the model to examine the
traces for expected, but also unexpected behaviour. For our immediate goal, simply
by counting the number of busyBReceiving, busyHReceiving and busyHSending in
the trace for each handset and afterwards connecting them to the energy values
determined by Perrucci et al. (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), we can obtain an estimate for
communication cost under different circumstances. When we investigate the traces,
it is straightforward to notice that the traces in which handsets collaborate as much
as possible result in better outcomes than those traces where handsets resort to the
more expensive 3G links to obtain all the chunks if no free-riding occurred in an
interaction.
The model is at this stage a design time tool and generates all possible trace
for the encoded normative framework. As mentioned earlier, when analysing the
traces, we focused in particular on the ones that that lead to success (i.e. resulted in
all handsets having the complete set of chunks after a successful interaction). The
specifications for this success-query, which furthermore specifies that no traces are
shown in which exogenous event do not lead to an normative event, are shown in
Figure 5.20.
19 good :- occured(creategrid,i00).
20 good(T) :- occured(download(A,X,C),T),occured(intDownload(A,X,C),T).
21 good(T) :- occured(send(A,X),T), occured(intSend(A,X),T).
22 good(T) :- final(T).
23
24 :- not good.
25 :- not good(T), instant(T).
Figure 5.20: The Success Criteria for our Design Time WMG Model
Even with this restriction the model still results in an enormous number of
acceptable traces. When examining these traces more closely, we notice that the
likelihood of a high proportion of these traces occurring in practice depends on
the relative intelligence and (bounded) rationality of the handset participating in
the normative framework. Our design-time model purposely avoids modelling the
reasoning of the handsets. The reason for this is our objective to design the space in
which the handsets interact and to verify that when the handsets follow the norms
the entire community benefits, i.e. to verify the possible gains achievable in ideal
WMG situations. One further interesting aspect is that enforcement for norms that
are breached at the end of the trace will no longer have an effect in the particular
interaction and could possibly only be applied on the respective next encounters.
In conclusion, the design-time model is relatively easy to construct and allows for
an easy first assessment of the impact of norms on WMGs in an early prototyping
stage. It can be used to determine whether a particular state of affairs is reachable
or not from a given set of initial conditions and as such it is an effective tool to
design and verify properties of protocols and the effectiveness of sanctions. In our
WMG example, the design-time model was used as a prototype to demonstrate
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that normative reasoning can be applied to the domain and to evaluate whether
cooperation between the handsets is beneficial to the individual agents.
However, despite the usefulness of the model for quick assessment purposes in an
early prototyping stage of the development process, it has several limitations which
need to be addressed:
Autonomy Restrictions The design-time model is an abstraction of a possible
running system and cannot take into account participants’ reasoning capabilities
as some of the participants might not be norm-aware or even be irrational.
In the design-time model, it was explicitly specified that a handset was only
allowed to download a chunk if it did not own this chunk already. In a real
running system, keeping track of such information should not be necessary and
may not be possible. Furthermore, as described in Chapter 2.3.1 it is impossible
to regiment actors in open distributed systems in such a way. This restriction
of the autonomy of the system participants is therefore one limitation of the
design-time model.
Artificial Artifacts The design-time model also does not have access to information
available in a running system. As a consequence it needs to manufacture some
information for itself. In the WMG example this means that the design-time
model has to keep track of which channels are in use at any given time in order
to prevent simultaneous downloads on the channel. This also implies it has to
monitor the duration of the download. The same is true for the sending and
receiving of the chunks. In a running system this is taken care of by the system
and its components (such as the base-stations) or the physical limitations of
the devices. The modelling of such system artifacts in the design-time model
forces the designer to be very precise about his or her intentions, and results in
a possible impairment of significance of the acquired results.
Enforcement The enforcement mechanism employed in the design-time model is
very rudimentary and part of the normative system, as discussed in Chapter
4. In general, norm enforcement in a running system is the responsibility
of the participants rather than the normative model. The only exception is
the granting or removal of permissions to actions (the exogenous events) of
the people which is part of the normative specification. In a running system,
participants’ actions can have side effects, limiting the removal of power from
normative events, limiting these in the design-time model might be sensible
or useful in that context but cannot be enforced in a running system. An
example of this is removing the power of participants to receive chunks in the
design-time model when they violate the sharing norm. In the running system
this impossible because the data is broadcasted and asking a participant to
penalise himself is hardly sensible. For a more realistic model more advanced
enforcement concepts need to be analysed.
5.6 Summary
The design-time model is a useful, easy and fast to implement and therefore financially
cheap way of generating a first assessment of the possible impact of norm changes
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in open distributed systems at an early prototyping stage. In the particular WMG
example we modelled it showed that energy advantages that can be achieved of
norms to ensure cooperation are in place and followed by the system participants.
Assured by the results of the design-time model, we use it as a foundation to develop
a run-time model that addresses the issues mentioned above. The general concept of
this run-time model is shown in Figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.21: The General Run-Time Model Design
The right hand side of Figure 5.21 shows the design-time model in InstAL /
AnsProlog. It covers both the formal description of the normative framework as
well as the system level (i.e. what is referred to as real-world in Figure 4.1). For a
given normative system, both the design-time and run-time model should have the
same normative intentions, making the design-time model a good starting point for
the development of the run-time one. For this reason, the normative basis from the
design-time model is transferred to the run-time model with some modifications that
will be explained in detail in Section 6.1.
This design-time model can be understood in terms of a labelled transition system
where all possible traces and the transitions between them are determined by the
answer sets. In contrast to the design-time model, where all possible events and the
resulting transitions are determined – no matter whether the traces are sensible or
not – in the run-time model the real world events are not generated by solving the
logic program, but with the help of a social simulation. This approach is illustrated
by the left hand side of Figure 5.21. As a result, in contrast to the design-time model,
the complete possible transition system is not generated. By generating events the
social simulation determines which paths are taken through the transition system
and allows for a statistical analysis of the paths chosen as well as the normative
results of the chosen paths.
Part III
Analysing Enforcement in
Wireless Mobile Grids using
Normative Multi-Agent System
Simulations

Chapter 6
Simulation Design
6.1 Multi-Agent Systems Simulations for Analysing
the Action Arena
In the last Chapter we presented a design-time model of our WMG case study. This
model is very useful for quickly assessing the possible energy advantages of the
WMG concept. Despite its merits, due to its focus, it has some limitations (e.g.
the restriction of the autonomy of users) which were outlined in Section 5.5. As a
consequence of these restrictions with design-time reasoning, this dissertation uses
the design-time model as foundation to develop a run-time model. The run-time
model is derived from the design-time model by stripping the design-time model of
everything that results in unrealistic restrictions on autonomy as well as artificial
artifacts, so that after this process it will only contain normative information and
domain facts. Furthermore and most importantly we will change the creation of the
exogenous events. Thus, the normative information is still encoded using answer
set semantics, however on the real world level, the events that trigger normative
events are created using a particular kind of simulation that is called a Multi-Agent
System (MAS) Simulation. This chapter focuses on the method of simulation for
generating exogenous events for the normative framework1. In the following we will
briefly outline the general idea of simulations – as well as the specific concept of
MAS simulations – and explain which features make them particularly suitable for
the research conducted in this dissertation. Afterwards we will outline the general
simulation research process and then explain the general design of the simulation
experiments of this dissertation.
Definition 15: Simulation
A simulation is the representation of the behaviour or key characteristics of a
physical or abstract system through the use of another system.
In the context of this dissertation, the latter system is an abstract and simplified
computational representation of the real system (the future WMG), with the purpose
1This chapter focuses on simulations only. A detailed description on how the simulation is linked
to the normative framework components follows in section 7.2.
114 Simulation Design
of analysing a particular problem of the real system (the effect of enforcement
mechanisms). By abstracting from the real system, simulations reduce complexity of
the problem being analysed and allow for problem-oriented experimentation, which
might otherwise not be possible in the real system (e.g. due to time or – such as in
the case of WMGs – financial constraints in the early prototyping phase). The goal
of the simulation process is to transfer the results from these experiments back to
the real system. The advantages of simulation are manifold (Shannon, 1998):
 The simulator can test new potential problem solutions / designs, etc. and
analyse consequence relationships (i.e. to answer “what if” questions) without
having to commit resources to the implementation of the real system. With
regard to the WMG idea one can test cooperation concepts and their impact
on the stakeholders of the WMG at an early design stage without having to
invest in the financially risky implementation and deployment beforehand.
 Simulations allow possible bottlenecks in the real system to be identified.
 They allow hypotheses about whether, why and how the represented system
behaves in certain circumstances to be tested and also may lead to theory
discovery. According to Axelrod (1997) simulations takes a model, composed of
a structure and rules that govern that structure and produce output (observed
behavior) in form of data and behaviour of the model. By comparing different
outputs obtained via different structures and governing rules, researchers can
predict what might happen in the real situation if such changes in input
parameters were to occur. As for theory discovery, unexpected emergent
phenomena may occur in a simulation, leading to new theories about the
interplay of the simulation units (as well as the entities they represent) (Dooley,
2002).
 Simulations grant insight into how a represented system works and thus con-
tribute to the understanding of the respective system. By doing so they may
indicate the parameters that are likely to be most important with regard to
the performance of the represented system.
 Simulations allow the control of time, either by speeding up processes which
in reality might have taken several months or even years; or by slowing down
phenomena for in-depth analysis.
Looking at simulations more closely a large number of different simulation methods
can be found, hence one needs to decide which of these to employ for a particular
problem. The simulation methods found in literature according to Davidsson (2001)
and Siebers and Aickelin (2007) can broadly be classified into three categories:
Discrete Event Simulation (DES), System Dynamics (SYD) and MAS.
DES models a system as a set of entities being processed and evolving over
time according to the availability of resources and the triggering of events (Dooley,
2002). The simulator maintains an ordered queue of events. DES is widely used for
decision support in manufacturing (batch and process) and service industries. SYD
are models in which key system variables and their interactions with one another are
explicitly (mathematically) defined as differential equations. They follow a top-down
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modelling approach and thus require a good knowledge by the system designer about
how the state variables and the system interact with one another. As a result neither
DES or SYD are seen as an appropriate paradigm for representing systems where
behaviour is best defined through the actions of the constituent entities, as it is the
case in collaborative situations like in WMGs. Instead, in settings with cooperation
situations like in the WMG, MAS are the favoured simulation method.
Definition 16: Multi-Agent System (MAS)
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is the representation of a system as a collection
of autonomous self-directed decision-making entities – so-called agents. These
agents engage in complex, often non-linear interactions. They act locally and
individually towards their own goal, based on their assessment of their current
situation with the help of a basic set of agent-individual rules.
By using MAS as computational experiments, one may test in a systematic way
different hypotheses related to attributes of the agents, their behavioural rules, and
the types of interactions, and their effect on macro level stylized facts of the system.
Simulations based on MAS are often also referred to as Agent-based simulations,
complex agent systems simulations or agent-based model simulations (Gulya´s, 2005)
– all referring to the same idea just described. This dissertation uses the term MAS
simulation.
To understand better what is understood by the term agent and as a consequence
by MAS, we will now look more closely at the definition of the term agent in the
computer science context. In this context agents are referred to as reactive systems
(e.g. pieces of software) that exhibit some degree of autonomy in the sense that if
being delegated a task or goal, the system determines how to achieve this goal. An
important difference to other modelling approaches is that, rather than being given
low-level detail on how to fulfill the task, the agents pursue the goals actively and
decide themselves how best to accomplish their goals with the (possibly limited)
amount of resources they possess. When looking at the properties of agents, as
shown in Figure 6.1 agents are systems that are considered to be situated in some
environment.
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Figure 6.1: Agent and Environment
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Agents are capable of sensing their environment via sensors and have a number
of possible actions that, based on their internal reasoning and decision making (with
regard to their multiple and possible conflicting goal(s)), that they can decide to
perform in order to affect the environment. This environment the agents populate
and interact with can be physical (e.g. robots that inhabit a physical world) or a
software environment such as a computer simulation.
Besides being situated in and interacting with an environment, further properties
are attributed to agents (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995) that are advantageous
with regard to representing the cooperation problem in WMGs:
Autonomy As mentioned earlier, agents operate independently in order to achieve
goals being delegated to them by their principals. Thereby, they make inde-
pendent decisions on how to achieve these delegated goals.
Proactiveness Proactiveness is very closely linked to goal delegation. It implies
that agents exhibit goal-directed behaviour. Hence, given a goal, an agent is
expected to actively work to achieve this goal.
Reactivity Agents respond to changes in the environment. This also implies that if
conditions on which they based their earlier decision change, they can adapt to
these changes and change their plans for how to achieve their goals accordingly.
Social Ability This refers to the property of agents to be able to cooperate and
coordinate activities with other agents (including a communication at knowledge
level where agents are able to communicate their goals, beliefs and plans).
Keeping these properties of agents in mind, one can clearly see that they exhibit
properties that make them suitable for representing mobile users together with their
mobile phones2. Users with their phones act in the environment and interact with
other users, each being driven by their own objectives (file download and energy
saving) as well as being constrained by resource limitations (battery capacity). The
actions that the users perform are on the one hand based on their perception of
their environment, (e.g. of the other users and their actions), and on the other hand
on their resources (e.g. files they have and need) as well as utility considerations
(battery costs for different actions).
So far in this chapter we have mainly discussed single agents and their properties.
However, what makes agents and MAS particularly relevant for this dissertation is
their social ability, which allows us to analyse situations in which agents interact with
each other. As shown in Figure 6.2 an MAS describes a system from the bottom-up,
i.e. from the perspective of its constituent (possibly heterogeneous) units. The
macro result on the global systems level is perceived as a result of the interaction of
the constituent entities on the micro level. The overall aim is to observe emergent
global system behaviour resulting from the sum of the individual actions of the units
(Holland, 1992).
This property of MAS is of particular interest for the research conducted in this
dissertation, because the WMG case study has certain features that make MAS
simulations especially suitable for analysing the problems described in Chapter 3.
2We see a user with his mobile phone as one entity and model them as such.
6.1 MAS Systems Simulations for Analysing the Action Arena 117
Macro situation
results in
Emerging
Properties
Problems/
Constraints
entails
Micro situations
Figure 6.2: The actions of agents situated on the micro level of a system
produce macro situations which in turn generate constraints on the micro level
(Ferber, 1999)
Concerning the initial problem description of cooperation in WMGs, the main feature
of a WMG is that humans interact with one another with the help of their mobile
phones. This is important, as in contrast to the assumptions made when modelling
their behaviour with analytical approaches, humans (and their behaviour) exhibit
certain features that are difficult or even impossible to express (Bonabeau, 2002):
 Human behaviour tends to be complex and non-linear. For example, it exhibits
memory effects, forms of learning and adaption, path dependence, temporal
correlations and non-Markovian components. As a result, for modelling pur-
poses it is difficult to capture human behaviour in a purely analytical form. Of
course, almost everything can be defined with the help of some form of equation,
in principle, however the complexity of the required differential equations or –
as seen before – logic programs increases exponentially as the complexity of
behaviour increases. Thus, one would either have to make restrictive assump-
tions such as in the design-time ASP-model described in section 5.43, or face
the problem that describing human behaviour with analytical means becomes
intractable and difficult to compute.
 Human behaviour is characterised by stochasticity. In contrast to analytical
approaches where, typically, a “noise term” is added more or less arbitrarily to
an aggregate equation, MAS simulations allow to add sources of randomness
at very specific and appropriate points in the agent’s reasoning process.
 Humans tend to act and base decisions on local information and their limited
knowledge. Analytical solutions very often assume global knowledge, whereas
3A detailed discussion of these restrictive assumptions is presented in section 5.5.
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MAS can represent this local focus easily.
 Finally, humans and their interactions are heterogeneous. The heterogeneous
interaction can generate network effects that may deviate a lot from predicted
aggregate behaviour, based on the emergent network topology of the individuals
interacting. Representing a system from the agent’s perspective takes this into
account. In contrast, purely mathematical systems typically assume global
homogeneous mixing which mainly portrays aggregate behaviour and does not
account for any network topology, etc.
In addition to these advantages, when trying to represent humans and their
decision making process, MAS simulations offer further advantages with regard to
the flexibility of the analysis. In a MAS simulation it is easy to add more (or take
away) agents, i.e. scaling the system up (or down) as required. But not only is the
number of agents easy to scale, the complexity of the agents (e.g. their degree of
rationality or their ability to learn and evolve) as well as the level of description and
aggregation of the system are also flexible. Thus, one can easily analyse a system
with certain groups of agents or single agents, and work with different facets of the
system description. This is particularly useful if – as in the questions being asked in
this dissertation – the appropriate level of description or complexity are not known
beforehand.
One final research approach that has been overlooked so far and will not be
used in this dissertation, is empirical research. Despite being very valuable when
analysing humans and their behaviour, empirical research seems inappropriate for
the kind of research explored here. The reason for this – as pointed out before – is
that this dissertation focuses on an early prototyping stage. WMGs are still very
much a conceptual idea. Although a first series of mobile phones that are capable of
performing WMG tasks are already being designed and developed, no large scale
testing has been performed and no empirical data about mobile user behaviour in the
WMG context exist so far. This is particularly due to the time and costs involved in
such studies, making them only applicable with difficulty for testing business ideas at
an early stage. As a consequence simulation seems the best approach for analysing
the cooperation problems in WMGs before their deployment.
6.2 The Simulation Research Process
It is important to keep in mind when using the scientific method of simulations that
simulations are gross simplifications of reality because they include only a few of
the real-world factors, and as a consequence are only as good as their underlying
assumptions, i.e. the problem-specific model of the real system. Amid all the
improvements of computer hardware and software, one thing has not changed: the
need to develop sensible models. It is important that models are fit for purpose.
This means, in most cases, that they support someone’s understanding or improve
the system being simulated. This in turn implies that the models must correctly
represent the features of the simulated system that are relevant to the problem being
studied. They furthermore should be developed in an appropriate timescale and have
a form that makes analysis as straightforward as possible (Pidd, 2008; Siebers et al.,
2010).
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In order to give a guidance on how to derive good simulation models Gilbert and
Troitzsch (2005) have proposed a generic simulation process similar to the one shown
in Figure 6.3. They suggest that this process should be followed to avoid the design
problems mentioned above. Their process was largely used in the development of the
MAS simulation for this dissertation and therefore will now be explained in more
detail.
Model Design
Model Implementation
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Multi-Agent System Simulation
Transfer
Research
Question
Figure 6.3: The Simulation Research Process
The start of each simulation experiment is the observation of a problem / question
whose answer is not known and which it will be the aim of the simulation to solve.
Typically these are problems / questions derived from existing phenomena in the real
world which cannot be answered reasonably with the help of analytical or empirical
methods. In the case of WMGs or for example nuclear power plant stress test
simulations (see Hsueh and Mosleh (1996) for example) – the problems / questions
can also focus on future problems that the researcher wants to analyse before their
occurrence. Resulting from the questions / problems to analyse, the next step is the
representation of the target, which the simulation should help to reason about in form
of a model. This stage is referred to as model design. For reasons already outlined in
the earlier section, every model will necessarily be a simplification of the target being
modelled. As a result one essential and very important step in designing the model
is to decide which simplifications can be made in the model and which ones are not
allowed because they might distort the results of the simulation experiments with
respect to their relevance for solving the initial question / problem. Thus, the more
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simplifications are made in the simulation model, the greater the conceptual leap
required between the conclusions drawn from the simulation experiments and their
interpretation with respect to the target. However, the more factors are included
in the simulation model, the more precisely parameters for the factors have to be
measured or assumed and the more complex the simulation gets, as each of the
factors can have an impact on the validity of the conclusions obtained. Unfortunately
no general guidelines on how to arrive at a good model exist, but a rigour and and a
focus on relevance are needed when developing the simulation. In this dissertation,
we aim to pursue both and point out, as well as explain, the design choices made at
each step of the conceptualization of the simulation.
Once the simulation model has been conceptualized the next step that follows
is the implementation of the simulation model, i.e. encoding of the simulation as a
computational program. In general two approaches for this step can be distinguished:
the utilization of existing toolkits and simulation environments, or the development
of the simulation from scratch. Toolkits have the advantage that they offer a wide
range of predefined and frequently required components, such as visualization tools
or data handlers. Furthermore, if the toolkits are widely used, most of the bugs in
the code of packages will have been found by the developers and subsequent users,
and communities that can provide advice and support often exist. Developing a
simulation from scratch, in contrast, often allows for greater flexibility , as toolkit-
based restrictions can be avoided. For this dissertation we opt for a middle-way
between the two described approaches. The main agent-reasoning component of the
simulation is developed with the help of the Jason MAS simulation environment but
we have extented it to allow for interaction with our normative framework. Looking
at the simulation literature a large number of MAS simulation environments exist.
Gilbert (2008); Railsback et al. (2006) give an overview of existing MAS simulation
environments and discuss advantages and disadvantages of each. We have opted for
the Jason simulation environment for the following reasons:
 Jason was designed with cooperation in mind (Bordini et al., 2007, p. xiii).
It comes with predefined components that enable agents to communicate and
coordinate with one another in a high-level way, i.e. focusing on knowledge level
communication rather than the technicalities of the communication transmission.
This is particularly suitable when economic issues – such as the cooperation
in WMGs – are the focus of the simulation experiment and not technical
protocols. In addition, the predefined communication components of Jason
include single- and broadcast message transmission protocols that are typical
to the telecommunication domain and therefore make it well suited for the
WMG case study.
 Jason uses AgentSpeak as the programming language for the agents and their
reasoning. AgentSpeak is an agent-oriented programming language. It was
inspired by and based on a model of human behaviour that was developed
by philosophers, the so-called Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model (Rao and
Georgeff, 1995; Rao, 1996). This allows for the reasoning of agents in a human-
like fashion based on goals and responses to the environment they interact
in. AgentSpeak also has the advantages of having an easy-to-read syntax
(Machado and Bordini, 2001), making it accessible for a non-technical audience
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and facilitating the publication of the specifications and results of the Jason
simulations to a wider community.
 Besides the usage of AgentSpeak for programming the agents and their reas-
oning, Jason employs the Java language to code the agents’ environment in
the simulation. This usage of Java allows for an easy customization of the
simulation (e.g. the inclusion of the normative framework components in the
simulation with the help of Java system calls) and thereby makes it very flexible.
 The execution of a Jason simulation is event-driven. This focus on events goes
hand-in-hand with the event-focused definition of normative frameworks given
in Chapter 4 and facilitates an holistic analysis of the agent interactions and
the normative framework.
 Finally, Jason has extensive related literature, simulation experiment examples
and an active user community, which provides advice and support and help to
reduce bugs as well as programming errors.
Once the simulation has been implemented, the next step in the simulation
process is to check that it is behaving as expected (Balci, 1994). This is done by
verifying as well as validating it. Validation is ensuring that the model, within
its domain of applicability, behaves with satisfactory accuracy consistent with the
studied target. Verification, in contrast, is substantiating that the computational
software implementation correctly represents the model, and is in effect the debugging
step of the simulation implementation (Ormerod and Rosewell, 2009). The MAS
simulation presented in this dissertation was verified by including a large number
of output diagnostics in the implementation phase, by observing the simulation
step-by-step with the built-in Jason debugging tool, by adding assertions to the
simulation, by using unit tests for separate parts of the simulation, as well as by
testing the simulation with edge cases.
Besides the verification of the simulation model, it is obvious that its validity
needs to be checked, i.e. whether the model portrays the target to be represented.
This is a difficult process in MAS simulations, for several reasons: (i) The big
advantage of MAS, i.e. the ability to describe micro level behavior and observe the
macro level result (i.e. a directly encoded missing link between the two), can also
present significant difficulty in verifying their validity. Not only are direct cause-effect
mappings not always obvious, but this often tends to be the motivation for the use
of simulation experiments. (ii) Other aspects that cause difficulties in the validation
of MAS simulations are the inherent non-linearity and the resulting brittleness of
outcomes, as well as the mere number of simulated entities (MAS can incorporate
several thousands of agents). (iii) Finally, because of the early prototyping stage of
WMG’s the lack of appropriate data hinders statistical validation (Klu¨gl, 2008).
To validate the model used in this dissertation, we present and justify all the
assumptions made concerning the model and the structure of the simulation and
discuss them with domain experts such as Frank Fitzek. Furthermore we make an
immersive assessment. This is composed of analysing the simulation through the
eyes of single agents (the Jason debugging mode offers this possibility) and checking
that what the agent perceives and how it reacts, is a valid representation.
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Having verified and validated the correctness of the simulation model, the actual
execution of the simulation (i.e. the running of the simulation) experiments follows.
We execute the simulation experiments in a multi-threaded fashion as this allows
for the simulation of a larger number of agents4. A detailed description of the
design of the simulation experiments is given in Section 6.4. Once the simulation
experiments have been carried out, the final step is the analysis of the results as well
as their interpretation with regard to the research formulated at the beginning of
the simulation process.
6.3 Result Evaluation in the Context of Multiple
Stakeholders
Recalling the description of the WMG case study in Section 3.1.3 we identified four
main stakeholders with different interests in the system. These are the mobile phone
users, mobile phone manufacturers, the manufacturers of infrastructure components
(such as base stations, etc.) as well as network and service providers that are
subsumed as infrastructure providers (iPr) in this dissertation. This is important
when aiming to evaluate the simulation experiment results with respect to the initial
research question(s) asked. The reason for this is that depending on the stakeholders
the analysis focuses on, it can yield different results.
Action
Arena
Patterns of
Interaction
Outcomes
Evaluation 
Criteria
Figure 6.4: Outcomes in the IAD context
Figure 6.4 recalls this problem in the light of the IAD framework, by showing
the outcomes components of the framework5. As a result of the interaction in the
action arena and consequently as a result of our simulation experiments we obtain
so-called patterns of interaction, which are some form of emergent macro behaviour.
These patterns of interaction are different to outcomes but can be turned into them
by evaluating the patterns with the help of evaluation criteria. Depending on the
4A detailed explanation of this choice as well as the description of the experiments results to
ensure that single- and multi-threading experiments yield the same results can be found in Appendix
D.
5The full framework is shown in Figure 2.3, on page 41.
6.3 Result Evaluation in the Context of Multiple Stakeholders 123
evaluation criteria chosen, consequently the outcomes (i.e. the evaluated patterns
of interaction) can be different. Therefore choosing appropriate evaluation criteria
is highly significant. In this dissertation what should be measured is the success
of governance decisions in an early prototyping stage of development of business
ideas for open distributed systems, to enhance cooperation in these systems. Success,
unfortunately is a very wide term that can be interpreted in a number of ways
according to the domain and context the evaluation is done in. In business terms
success is often judged by the going concern principle, i.e. to what extent the business
can function without the threat of liquidation in the foreseeable future (which typically
at least covers a period of one year). For evaluating new business ideas in business
ventures, the contribution of the venture to the parent company’s going concern as
well as the overall monetary success of the product or service being developed are
often chosen as criteria. As such, these metrics appear to be appropriate to select
for this dissertation. In the WMG case study setting, the driving entities behind the
WMG idea are the iPr together with the mobile phone manufacturers. One major
problem in determining the monetary success of WMGs for them is that this success
depends on the adoption of the WMG by other stakeholders such as the mobile
phone users. These stakeholders, however, are not interested in the monetary success
of the WMG, but have other priorities by which they judge the success of a WMG
(and decide about its adoption) such as the saved battery capacity, or the fairness of
the system. Focusing on the monetary success only and neglecting the interests of
the users therefore might result in a distortion of the evaluation, which in the worst
case can be completely inappropriate. If the users do not adopt a WMG because it
does not offer any benefits to them, then predictions of financial are obsolete. As a
result, with regard to the evaluation criteria in the IAD framework, one needs to
incorporate these inter-dependencies and account for criteria that reflect the interests
of the various stakeholders.
In order to reflect this issue in this dissertation, in the next paragraphs of this
section we will present evaluation criteria for the two stakeholder groups, namely
the iPr and the users and outline the relevance as well as the dependencies of these
criteria. Afterwards we will present the models from literature that deal with the
issue of multi-criteria decision situations and discuss which model best suits our
purposes. In Chapters 7–9 we use these criteria to evaluate the patterns of interaction
resulting from the simulation experiments. It is important to note that – despite
reviewing possible models for multi-criteria analysis – this dissertation will not do any
complete analysis, but evaluate the criteria separately. The reason for this decision is
that for the presented analysis various assumptions need to be made. These include
assumptions concerning the values of the dependencies of different criteria as well
as assumption which importance the stakeholders assign to the different criteria.
Given the current early prototyping stage of WMGs, information about values
for these assumptions are not available. They would need to be determined with
the help of quantitative or qualitative empirical surveys. Without these empirical
surveys, scientific rigour is at risk. These studies however go beyond the scope
of this dissertation. For this reason we cannot conduct any multi-criteria analysis
without endangering scientific rigour. For this reason, we do not perform any full
multi-criteria analysis, but instead focus on the energy consumption only when
presenting the simulation results. In Chapter 10.1 we outline what impact different
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evaluation criteria could have for the simulation results. As mentioned above, we
will only focus on evaluation criteria for two stakeholder groups – the iPr and the
mobile phone users – and neglect the infrastructure and phone manufacturers. The
reason for this decision is that both manufacturer groups are typically contracted
by the iPr to execute the iPr’s hardware and software requirements and are not
active themselves in the WMG. They are only involved indirectly through their
contractual relation with the iPr, and can be swapped by the iPr, if they do not
fulfill their contractual responsibilities. As a consequence their criteria for the WMG
success count for little in terms of the overall WMG success criteria and are therefore
neglected in this evaluation criteria analysis.
Looking at the evaluation criteria that can be found in literature, generally
speaking four different groups of evaluation criteria can be distinguished: technical,
economic/financial, social and legal criteria (McKnight et al., 2007). We exclude
the last because of current vagueness of the legal status of WMGs (especially in
cross-national scenarios) and focus on the first three groups only.
We start by looking at the technical components, which are important to the iPr,
as they measure the general suitability and technical functioning of an enforcement
mechanism. This suitability/functioning is important, as in case of a non-functioning
enforcement mechanism – as explained in Section 3.2 – the whole WMG idea would
be at risk. With regard to evaluating enforcement mechanisms the following criteria
can be found in the literature:
Scalability The first technical criterion concerns the scalability of the enforcement
mechanism. Scalability refers to the fact, that in a WMG any number of mobile
phone users [2,∞] can participate. The enforcement mechanism therefore
should be able to cope with any number of WMG participants.
Robustness This criterion measures to what extent an enforcement mechanism can
cope with malicious participants. Malicious participants are those whose aim
is to sabotage the enforcement mechanism, even at personal cost. They can be
compared to malicious nodes in relay routing (see Section 2.4.4.1). Robustness
indicates with which number or percentage of malicious participants (of the
total number of system participants) a mechanism can cope.
Looking next at the economic/financial criteria, we mention above that monetary
success is of high relevance to the iPr. This monetary success is often determined by
calculating the profitability of an investment or a technology, etc. A typical metric
for measuring profitability in business contexts is the so-called EBIT.
Definition 17: EBIT
EBIT is an approximate measure for a company’s financial performance that
excludes interest and income tax expenses. It is calculated as revenue minus the
expenses before the deduction of tax, interest (Weber and Scha¨ffer, 2005).
Infrastructural Costs Savings For the iPr one aspect of the EBIT is of particular
interests with respect to the WMG. This aspect is related to the expenses.
Thus, as pointed out in Section 3.1.3, one huge advantage of the WMG for
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iPr is its lower transmission error rates and the resulting reduced exposure of
the network infrastructure. This in turn could result in reduced investments
in the infrastructure required for mobile communications and consequently
increase the EBIT of the iPr. Buck (2010) determined that approximately
31.11% of the costs per user for an iPr are related to infrastructural costs.
According to Gruber (2005) base stations account for more than 50% of these
infrastructural costs. Any saving on base station infrastructure expenses as
a result of a transfer of the transmission from the base stations to the WMG
is a big incentive for iPr. In order to get an idea about these savings we
compare the amount of data downloaded in the WMG case to the amount of
data downloaded that would be required without a WMG. With regard to
the WMG enforcement mechanisms it is therefore interesting to determine to
what extent they foster WMG cooperation (and to what extent they reduce
the downloaded data from the base station) and at what costs.
Enforcement Costs and their Stakeholder Group Distribution Assuming
that enforcement does not come for free, but has associated costs, another
important financial aspect is the level of these costs (as well as their distribution
between the stakeholder groups). In the simulation we therefore determine
whether the enforcement mechanisms produce any direct costs (e.g. in form
of additional infrastructure needed) and also look at indirect costs such as
the communication overhead caused by the enforcement mechanism, as well
as which stakeholder group has to carry these enforcement costs. In fact the
iPr and the users have conflicting interests in this respect, as neither of them
wants to carry the enforcement costs.
Finally, looking at the social criteria, distribution aspects as well as false positive
and false negative information are of particular relevance:
Cost and Benefit Distribution between Users As well as measuring which
stakeholder group has to carry the costs of enforcement, for the individual users
it is also of considerable relevance how much of the user group share they each
have to carry, as well as what share of the overall benefits of the system they
receive. The relevance of these criteria for the iPr directly follows from their
relevance to the users, as a high user satisfaction is in the interest of the iPr. A
measure typically employed for determining the inequality of a distribution is
the so-called Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912). The Gini coefficient can take values
between 0 and 1 and is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income or
wealth. It can however be used for more general measurements of the equality
of distributions.
The Gini coefficient is usually defined mathematically as ratio of the areas of the
Lorenz curve diagram, as shown in Figure 6.5. The Lorenz curve is a graphical
representation of the cumulative distribution function showing the distribution
of an independent variable such as population against dependent variables
such as income or saved battery capacity. In a perfectly equal distribution
of the dependant variable, the Lorenz curve is a straight 45 ◦ line, whereas
unequal distributions will yield the curve. The Gini coefficient is calculated
as the quotient of the area between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality
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Figure 6.5: The Gini Coefficient as Ratio of the Areas of the Lorenz Curve
Diagram
line (labelled A in Figure 6.5) and the complete area under the equality line
(i.e. A + B). The closer the Gini coefficient (i.e. AA+B ) gets to 0, the more
equally distributed the dependant variable is. In the WMG case study the
independent variable is the group of mobile phone users in the system, whereas
the dependent variables are the energy consumption, the cost of enforcement
or the energy gains per user.
False Positive and False Negative Rates False positive and false negative rates
refer to misdetections in the system. Whereas a false negative specifies how
often defective actions have not been detected and sanctions not applied, the
false positive rate refers to events where sanctions are applied despite no
violation having taken place. The false negative rate thus determines the
ability of an enforcement mechanism to detect non-cooperative behaviour in
terms of detected non-cooperation events over total non-cooperation events.
It is especially important for the iPr, because the fundamental purpose of the
simulation is to investigate whether a WMG has a general chance of success
or whether the idea is at risk of failure because of the cooperation problems
outlined in Section 3.2. The false positive rate is equally important for both the
iPr as well as the users. Users who receive sanctions despite having cooperated
might consider the system to be “unfair” and abstain from using it in the
future. This in turn affects the success of the WMG and consequently directly
the iPr. It is therefore in the interest of the users as well as the iPr to keep
both the false positive and the false negative rate low.
Looking at possible indicators for determining the success of a governance decision,
it is apparent that a number of indicators can be considered. These indicators might
be viewed differently by the different stakeholder groups and therefore this multi-
criteria and multi-stakeholder perspective needs to be accounted for by any mechanism
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determining the overall success of an enforcement mechanism.
In the decision theory literature, a number of mechanisms to evaluate decision
alternatives / different mechanisms in multi-criteria settings exist. Multi-attributive
settings are settings where one decision maker (or one group of decision makers
with homogeneous preferences) has to evaluate alternatives whose utility / success is
determined by two or more possibly conflicting attributes / decision criteria. The
most prominent of these multi-attribute decision mechanisms are Multiple Criteria
Decision Making (MCDM) (Buchanan and Daellenbach, 1987), the Multiattribute
Utility Theory (MAUT) (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) and the Analytic Hierarchy Pro-
cess (AHP) (Saaty, 1977). All of these mechanisms allow for decision making under
uncertainty, both for multiple criteria discrete alternative problems and multiple
criteria optimization problems6. They are all supported by computational algorithms
and tools that help to apply the mechanisms. To some extent they allow for depend-
encies between the different parameters / decision criteria. Despite these features
fitting well with the evaluation problem in the WMG scenario, all three mechanisms
(i.e. MAUT, MCDM and AHP) have the same limitation: they do not account
for multiple stakeholders with different interests but assume one decision maker or
one group of decision makers with homogeneous preferences. As a consequence the
classical multi-attribute decision mechanisms do not fit the case study invesitgated
in this dissertation.
Unfortunately, so far the literature on mechanisms accounting for multi-
stakeholder situations is scarce with only a few papers attempting to advance the
multi-attribute decision mechanisms to incorporate multiple stakeholders. Looking
at the papers addressing the issue (see Bertsch and Geldermann (2008); Malczewski
et al. (1997); Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2004); Schneck et al. (2004); Merino et al. (2003); Andre´
et al. (2007) for example) two aspects can be noted. The first one is that most of
these papers deal with practical decision-making situations (typically in the ecological
domain) and the second aspect is that most of the works base their calculations
on some form of the so-called Compromise Programming or its extension the so-
called Composite Programming (CP) (Bardossy et al., 1985). The CP method uses
functional groups (with each group for example representing a stakeholder group)
and establishes a hierarchical set of decision criteria for each of the groups. In this
process single decision criteria are not limited to one functional group only, but can
appear in multiple functional groups. In the next step, for each functional group
separately the decision criteria are weighted according to their relevance for the
respective functional group. The final aggregation of the results of the individual
functional groups to a global system-wide decision parameter is done with the help of
compensation factors, which determine to which extent the particular decision criteria
within a functional group affect decision criteria within other functional groups. The
literature (see Schneck et al. (2004) for example) suggest that the compensation
factors for the CP are best determined with the help of empirical studies. In the case
of WMGs these empirical studies problematic due to the WMG’s early prototyping
6Multiple criteria discrete alternative problems are decision problems such as the planning of
a new airport location where the sets of alternatives that one has to compare and decide between
is typically modestly-sized. In contrast, in multiple criteria optimization problems, feasible sets of
alternatives usually consist of a extremely large or even an infinite number of alternatives which
are defined by equation and inequality systems that identify the bounds for the decision variables
(Wallenius et al., 2008).
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stage of development and go beyond the scope of this dissertation. That is why
currently most compensation factors would have to be guessed or derived from other
studies and literature and thereby endanger the rigour of any analysis based on them.
For this reason, in the following chapters presenting the simulation experiments of
dissertation, we do not attempt to conduct any full CP analysis or establish a CP
decision structure with functional groups. Instead we focus on the analysis of the
above derived single decision criteria only. A short general analysis of the impact
the multi-stakeholder scenario on the results found in the simulation experiments is
reported in the evaluation part of this dissertation (Section 10.1).
6.4 Experimental Design
Having presented the general idea and process of MAS simulation as a research tool,
this section presents the experimental design that has been used to test the different
hypotheses in this dissertation by means of simulation experiments. The reason for
dedicating this section to the description of the general experimental design, is to
make the chapters in which the actual experiments are described (i) more focused on
the experiments, (ii) less repetitive and thus (iii) more readable. This section serves
as a reference for the reader remembering how the general experimental design is set
up and how the experiments were conducted in general.
In general the dissertation is structured in such a way that we start with a simple
simulation model of the WMG concept and its inherent cooperation problems in
Chapter 7 and then extent this model incrementally in the following two chapters,
first with enforcement mechanisms (Chapter 8) and then movement patterns (Chapter
9), conducting experiments at each stage.
The experiments consist of MAS simulations of the models defined in Chapters
7–9. All the models described in these chapters have several variables each, which
can take many possible values. Nonetheless – depending on the hypotheses – each
experiment deals with different ranges of these variables. Table 6.1 gives an overview
of the types as well as ranges of the main variables used in this dissertation. These will
be explained in detail in Section 6.4.2. These variables are taken as input parameters
for the executions of the simulation experiments. The goal of the simulation is to
record measurements during and at the end of the simulation experiments to allow
analysis of the recorded data afterwards. The general assumption behind this process
is that the input parameters and the data extracted are correlated. As a result the
extracted data for different input parameter settings are compared and analysed in
order to support or discard the dissertation’s hypotheses.
As a result of the high number of variables in each simulation model, factorial
experiments are the best way to test the dissertation hypotheses. They are especially
well suited when – as in the case of this dissertation – the experiments focus on two
or more factors (i.e. important variables) that are analysed with regard to their
impact on simulations and the underlying hypotheses (Freedman et al., 2007). For
factorial experiments a subset of the discrete set of input variables available for each
factor is selected. The general idea of factorial experiments is to run simulations
with all possible combinations of the values of the subsets of chosen input variables
across all factors. Factorial experiments allow the user to study the effect of each
factor on the simulation output data, as well as the effects of interactions between
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factors, while cancelling out influences of other factors on a particular setting.
6.4.1 Simulation Parametrisation and Statistical Analysis
The MAS simulation was implemented using the MAS simulation tool Jason (Bordini
et al., 2007) in combination with a variation of the AnsProlog-based normative
systems specifications introduced in Chapter 57. The Jason components were specified
in AgentSpeak (Rao, 1996; Machado and Bordini, 2001) and Java and the simulation
was run in a multi-threaded fashion8. The simulation was parameterised using
comma-separated values from a text file that were passed to the simulation with
the help of command line arguments at its initialization. The usage of Jason as the
simulation tool resulted in some random effects – such as the order of interaction or
the randomization of some agent parameters. We do not consider these as part of the
experimental factors, in order to keep the number of experimental factors low. To
avoid the impact of these random effects on the simulation results and the analysis
thereof, as well as to be able to apply mean comparison methods, for each set of
input variables 50 simulation runs were conducted (Field, 2009).
After running all simulation experiments and gathering the output data, the
statistical analysis of the data was conducted. For this purpose we used the analysis
of variance (ANOVA) (Fisher, 1918) to test whether specific input parameters (or
parameter combinations) have effects on the output measurements. In order to
be able to apply the ANOVA test effectively, its underlying assumptions about
the experiment need to be fulfilled. These assumptions are independence, normal
distribution and homoscedasticity of the input parameters as well as any combination
of them (Scariano and Davenport, 1987). Independence refers to the concept that
values of one factor do not influence the probabilities of the values of another factor.
Normal distribution means that the graph of the associated probability density
function of each variable is “bell”-shaped and follows the function f(x) = 1√
2pi
e−
(x)2
2 .
Finally, homoscedasticity assumes that the residuals at each level of the input
parameters have similar variances. ANOVA tends to be robust to non-normality
as well as non-homoscedasticity to a certain extent (Lindman, 1974). Nonetheless
we run the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) through which we test the
experimental data for normality as well as Levene’s test (Levene, 1960) which verifies
homoscedasticity. The independence of the variables is ensured through rigorous
experimental design and simulation modelling.
In addition the general analysis resulting of the ANOVA tests, for the experiments
where we want to evaluate the specific effects that input variables had on the specific
output data, we run a Tukey’s test and – if only two means are to be compared – the
two-sample t-test for the respective significant factors. Tukey’s test is a single-step
multiple comparison procedure and statistical test that is used to find means that
are significantly different from one another. It can be used to compare the means
for the different input values of the given factor that is being checked. The test
determines which input values have significantly smaller or larger output measures
7The nature of the changes in the normative systems specifications will be explained in section
7.2.
8Detailed information on the execution of the simulation in a multi-threading mode, the suitability
of this execution mode as well as the resulting impact of the mode choice are given in Appendix D.
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than the standard error predicts. The t-test is used to compare two sample means,
in order to determine whether these are significantly different from each other.
All the statistical analysis tests in this dissertation were conducted using MATLAB
software9.
6.4.2 Input Factors
After having outlined the general experimental design used for all simulation ex-
periments described in chapters 7–9, this section focuses on the input factors that
are used in the simulations. As pointed out in the previous section, the simulation
models can be parameterised with a large number of different input parameters that
need to be taken into account for the statistical analysis. In this section we describe
the main factors of the simulation experiments, and explain how they are used in
the simulations.
Table 6.1: The Main Simulation Input Factors
Name Type/Range
Number of Agents [2,∞]
Agent Types as % of | A | Utility-Maximizing Agents as % of
| A |, Honest Agents as % of | A |,
Malicious Agents as % of | A |
Number of Interactions per Agent [1,∞]
Partner Search Interval (0, 0.5]
Enforcement Mechanism None, Normative Empowered Agents,
Image Information, Reputation
Movement Pattern Simple/Parameterised Boundless
Random Waypoint, Reference Point
(Nomadic) Group, Sedentary Movement
Average Neighbourhood Density
(ρneighbourhood)
[0, | A |)
An overview of these main factors is given in Table 6.1. The main variables are
the number of agents, the relative number and ratio of the type of agents represented
in the simulation, the number of interactions, the partner search interval and the
enforcement model as well as the movement pattern employed.
The number of agents is a natural number that must be at least 2. It defines
the total number of agents that are represented in the simulation. In order to test
different values for this variable we use numbers from the following power distribution:
100× 21, 100× 22, 100× 23,. . . 10. Within this set of the total number of agents, we
distinguish three general groups of agents: utility maximizing agents that – as the
name indicates – try to maximize their own utility in the transaction, honest agents
that try to cooperate in their transactions as well as malicious agents that try to
sabotage the system by not contributing at all (even if the utility of cooperation is
9More information on MATLAB can be found on the following website: http://www.mathworks.
com/products/matlab/.
10Smaller numbers than 100× 21 have not been considered as real world WMG are expected to
have large number of participants.
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higher than the utility of defection). In the simulation experiments we will analyse
the effects of different proportion sizes of these groups (in respect to the total number
of agents and in terms of ratios to one another) have on the simulation results.
The number of interactions refers to the number of transactions each agent is
participating in. This, together with the number of agents determines the length of
the simulation runs. It is a natural number larger than or equal to 1.
As outlined earlier (see Section 3.2 for example), we assume bounded rationality
of the actors. As explained in Section 2.5.1, one of the results of this assumption
is that the actors in the system cannot perceive the whole system, but only their
local neighbourhood (e.g. every other handheld that is in the radius of their WLAN
reception range). The search interval size specifies the size of this local neighbourhood,
i.e. how far an agent can perceive other agents. It is specified as a real number
between 0 and 0.5. For cooperation to take place, an agent must be in the proximity
of other agents (i.e. they must be in their local neighbourhood). As we will explain
in Section 7.1.3.3, an accurate Cartesian model of location is not actually necessary,
so in the simulation experiments we represent an agent’s location one-dimensionally
as a number between 0 and 1 and proximity is determined by the visibility radius
[location− x, location+ x] with x being the radius in which the agents can perceive
other agents. It can be thought of as the WLAN signal radius, which limits the
number of other mobile phones the agents can detect. We refer to the number of
other agents an agent can on average perceive as a result of them being within its
proximity as neighbourhood density (denoted as ρneighbourhood)
11.
One factor which determines the location of the agents (which however is inde-
pendent of the proximity) is the movement pattern of each agent. One obvious, but
important aspect of mobile phones is that they and their users are mobile. As real
world movement traces of mobile phone users are not available, in the simulation
experiments we need to model the movement of mobile phone users and analyse
whether different movement patterns result in different simulation outputs. In the
experiments, we analyse different movement patterns for the agents, including a
simple boundless random waypoint pattern, a parameterised boundless random way-
point pattern, a reference point (nomadic) group movement pattern and a sedentary
movement pattern. All these patterns will be explained in detail in Section 9.
Given this dissertation’s focus on the reciprocity issues inherent in open dis-
tributed systems, the final main factor used in the simulation experiments is the
enforcement concept employed. We start the simulation experiments with no en-
forcement mechanism and then consecutively include three different enforcement
mechanisms, namely normative empowered agents, image information and then
finally a reputation mechanism. These mechanisms will be explained in detail in
Chapter 8.
6.4.3 Measurements
During, as well as at the end of, each simulation experiment we take measurements
of the simulation output. By default the measurements are taken at every event
that corresponds to an exogenous event (Eex) of the normative framework and then
11A more detailed explanation of the location related aspects in the MAS simulation is given in
Chapter 7 on page 139.
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aggregated per interaction round. With regard to the interaction “rounds” it should
be noted that the simulation experiments do not use synchronized rounds, but
instead the simulation uses asynchronous events. Thus, an agent x might perform
two interactions (e.g. acx1 and acx2) whilst another agent Y only performs one
interaction (e.g. acy1). A “round” aggregates the respective n-th interaction per
agent, e.g. all agents’ first interaction events, or all agents’ second interaction events
by all agents, etc. For each agent the total number of interactions is fixed and the
same. This ensures that in each round, one interaction for each agent is analysed.
Table 6.2: The Main Simulation Measurements
Name Type
Round N
Number of Defection Actions N
Number of Detected Defection Actions N
Number of Punished Actions N
Number of Correctly Punished Malicious Actions N
Download-related Data Transferred per Agent per Interaction [R,R, . . .]
Sending-related Data Transferred per Agent per Interaction [R,R, . . .]
Reception-related Data Transferred per Agent per Interaction [R,R, . . .]
Communication-related Data Transferred per Agent per Interaction [R,R, . . .]
Table 6.2 gives an overview of the different main output measurements taken
for the different simulation experiments. These are measurements that cannot be
directly derived from other metrics. All derived metrics will be explained in detail in
the respective experiment section.
In each interaction round12 the agents can decide to obtain the required files
themselves, or to cooperate with other agents. In the latter case they can furthermore
decide to contribute to the WMG by sending their chunk / share or to defect. For the
simulation experiments the total number of defection actions (i.e. not contributing to
the common interaction pool) is determined. As every agent performs one interaction
per round, based on the input parameters the total number of interactions can be
determined. This number, in combination with the number of defection actions, can
be used to determine the number of norm-compliant actions. The number of punished
actions specifies the number of times agents were punished for their behaviour. This
does not automatically imply that all of these actions where correct or justified, as
false positive or false negative punishment situations can arise. By determining the
correctly punished defection actions (i.e. the instances where a sanction was correctly
performed as a result of a defection action by the punished agent), we are able to
determine other economic parameters such as the false positive and false negative
rates. Comparing the number of defection actions with the number of detections we
are also able to calculate the detection rates of defective behaviour in the simulation
experiments.
The next four measurements concern the battery consumption and the amount
of data transmitted per interaction round. By measuring the data transmitted as for
12When speaking of interaction rounds, we refer to situations in which the agent is involved in an
interaction situation. Agents also do have the option of doing nothing, these situations are however
not considered as interaction rounds.
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each interaction protocol (i.e. E3G,rx, EWLAN,rx and EWLAN,tx) and using Tables
3.1 and 3.2, we are able to determine the relative energy per bit consumption rates
in each round. With regard to these values we distinguish the battery consumption /
bits transmitted for downloading, sending and receiving chunks as well as for the
additional communication involved in the interactions.
6.4.4 Experimental Design and Results
In the sections where experiments are presented, a table is given to represent the
experimental setup. An example of such a table in shown in form of Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Example of an Experimental Setup Description Table
Input Factors Values
Agents 200, 400, 800
Number of Interactions per Agent 5, 25, 50
Utility Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 100
Malicious Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 100
Honest Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 100
Measurements Type
Number of Defection Actions N
Number of Detected Defection Actions N
Download-related Data transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Integrity Constraints Formula
Full Partitioning Utility Agents % + Honest Agents % +
Malicious Agents % = 100
This table consists of three parts: the first part contains the input factors of
the simulations with the values for the simulation experiments, the second one the
measurements taken throughout the experiments and the third one specifies the
integrity constraints required for the input factor values, i.e. constraints that concern
the coherence of the input factors. It is important to note that as a result of the
integrity constraints, not all input factors of the first part can be used as variables
for the ANOVA. The percentage of honest agents for example results from the
percentages of utility maximizing as well as malicious agents in the system. The
same applies for determining the percentage of utility maximizing agents from the
percentages of honest malicious agents. As a result of this possibility of deriving one
percentage from the other percentages, only the ones used for deriving the third are
considered in the ANOVA.
After the execution of the experiments, the results are presented in the respective
sections.
Table 6.4 gives an example of how the results are summarized in this dissertation.
In this table, each row in the table represents an potential cause-effect relationship.
This relationship is specified with reference to information that is arranged into four
columns. The first column gives the input factor that can possibly have an effect, the
second column provides the measured output variables that the input factor might
exhibit an effect on. The third column shows the significance value for the respective
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Table 6.4: Example of an Experimental Results Description Table
Input Factors Measurement α Relationship
% Malicious
Agents
Defection
Actions
0.98 A higher percentage of malicious
agents results in a higher number
of defection actions.
% Honest
Agents
Energy
Consumption
0.95 A higher percentage of honest agents
results in an overall decrease in en-
ergy consumption.
relationship. If this value is 95% or higher, a significant correlation between the
input factor and the measurement exists. The last column gives specifics on the
correlation if any was found.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have presented the simulation design that we employ to answer
the research questions posed in Chapter 1. For reasons given in Section 6.1 we have
opted for MAS simulation experiments. The general research process of simulations
was described in Section 6.2. Following this description as well as the illustration
of particular challenges in the process (as well as answering how this dissertation
addresses the challenges), we presented the general experimental design of this
dissertation in order to give the reader a reference to the experimental design set up
and explain how the experiments are conducted. Having presented the simulation
design, we move on to present the actual simulation experiments used to analyse
compliance in WMG. For this purpose, we start by presenting the WMG without
enforcement in Chapter 7, extent the simulation with enforcement mechanisms
(Chapter 8) and then analyse the effects of movement patterns on the enforcement
mechanisms in Chapter 9.
Chapter 7
The Basic Wireless Mobile Grid
Scenario
In parts two and three of this dissertation we presented the motivation, foundations,
and the related work of our research and introduced the idea of combining normative
frameworks and MAS simulations to reason about the run-time interaction of actors
in a system. Chapters 7–9 present the simulation experiments conducted as part of
the dissertation research. Chapter 7 deals with the basic WMG scenario without
any enforcement mechanisms. It presents the basic WMG setting and explains the
general representation of mobile phone users and their actions in a MAS simulation.
Furthermore, the results of the simulation experiments without any enforcement
mechanism serve as “worst case” reference point for the later experiments where
different enforcement mechanisms are used. Worst case implies that with an enforce-
ment mechanism, the WMG should not perform worse than without any mechanism.
In addition – in comparison to the simulation experiments without any enforcement
– all cooperation gained and battery savings as a result of the utilization of an en-
forcement mechanism needs to be evaluated against the additional costs due to the
enforcement mechanism. The simulation experiments with enforcement mechanisms
are presented in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 repeats the experiments conducted
in Chapter 8, but changes the movement pattern of the agents in the simulation in
order to investigate the effects of different movement behaviours of mobile phone
users on the results of the enforcement mechanisms from Chapter 8.
7.1 Representing the Basic Wireless Mobile Grid
Scenario as MAS Simulation
7.1.1 General Formalizations
In Section 6.1, we explained that we will use a MAS simulation in order to represent
the simulated world view of the interactions that are taking place in the action
arena. After giving a abstract definition of MAS in Definition 16 (page 115), we now
present the formal definition. This definition links the normative frameworks with
the idea of MAS and is used to underpin our simulation experiments. The definition
is based on the works of Centeno et al. (2009) who developed a formal framework
for combining MAS and norms which suits the ideas presented in this dissertation
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very well. Throughout the formalisation as well as the following Chapters presenting
the simulation and its results, the following types of symbols will be used: Latin
calligraphic capital letters refer to sets (e.g. A), lower case Latin letters refer to
elements of sets (e.g. a ∈ A) and lower case Greek letters refer to functions (e.g. γ).
Definition 18: Multi-Agent System (formal)
A MAS is a tuple 〈A,S, γ, κ, s0, ϑ〉 where:
 A is a set of agents where | A | is the size of the population;
 S is the state space of the system that is being modelled (in the normative
frameworks this system corresponds to the real world state);
 γ : S × AcA × S → [0, 1] is the MAS transition probability distribution,
describing how the system evolves as a result of agents’ actions (Ac). Thus,
as in the normative frameworks, we assume time to be discrete. At each
time step the agents in the MAS perform one action (this includes a “wait”-
action of doing nothing). The new state of the system is determined as a
result of the joint actions of all agents.
 κ : S × AcA → Eex is the MAS event function, associating an external
event to a change in the system’s state as a result of agent’s actions, i.e. it
specifies under which conditions Eex for the normative framework are being
generated;
 s0 ∈ S stands for the initial state of the MAS; and
 ϑ : A × Ac × X → 0, 1 is the agents’ capability function describing the
actions agents are able to perform in a given state of the environment.
ϑ(a, ac, s) = 1 (= 0) means that agent a is able (not able) to perform action
ac in the state s.
Within this context, in formal terms, an agent is defined as follows:
Definition 19: Agent (formal)
An agent is a tuple 〈I,Ac,O, ν, ξ, τ, s0, η〉 where:
 I is the set of internal states of the agent;
 Ac is a possibly infinite action space that includes all possible actions that
can be performed by an agent. Ac includes an action acwait; the action of
doing nothing.
 Ob is the observation space of the agent; i.e. the set of possible observations
the agent is able to perceive from the MAS;
 ν : Ob× I → I is the agent’s state transition function;
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Definition 19: Agent (formal) (cont.)
 ξ : I → Ac is the agent’s decision function describing the action it will
choose given an internal state. It follows the principle of maximizing the
expected utility.
 τ : S → Ob is a perception function assigning an observation to an
environmental state;
 s0 is the agent’s initial internal state;
 η : I → R is an utility function that assigns a value to each possible internal
state of the agent.
Keeping these definitions in mind, we now turn to the explanation of the simulation
components. Using the IAD framework as the underlying concept of our analysis
of the impact of governance decisions, we have structured the following sections
according to the underlying factors of the IAD framework (i.e. the biophysical
characteristics, the attributes of the community as well as the rules-in-use) and then
turn our focus to additional relevant aspects.
7.1.2 The Biophysical Characteristics
The first part of the underlying factors we discuss are the biophysical characteristics.
In the WMG scenario, these biophysical characteristics are given by the underlying
communication network and technologies. The design of the communication network
and technologies in the simulation experiments of this dissertation is based on a
assumptions that are commonly known as the Flat Earth model (Kotz et al., 2004).
Definition 20: Flat Earth Model
The Flat Earth Model is a simplified model of real world mobile phone com-
munication systems often used in mobile phone simulations, which is based on
Cartesian X−Y proximity. In detail, the model makes the following assumptions
/ simplifications:
 The world is flat.
 A mobile phone’s or base station’s transmission area is circular.
 The communication is based on a Cartesian X−Y proximity, that is, nodes
a1 and a2 communicate if and only if node a1 is within some horizontal
distance of node a2.
 All mobile phones have equal range.
 If node a1 can hear node a2, a2 can hear a1 (symmetry).
 If node a1 can hear node a2 at all, it can hear it perfectly.
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Definition 20: Flat Earth Model (cont.)
 Signal strength is a simple function of distance.
 There is no external interference.
 There are no obstacles.
Besides following the Flat Earth model assumptions, for reasons of simplicity we
furthermore assume that all WMG-capable mobile phones have the same specific-
ations, i.e. that they will have equal battery consumption rates for equal actions
performed. For the simulation the consumption rates used are taken from a Nokia
N95 mobile phone, for which detailed measurements exist (Perrucci et al., 2009). In
detail, the power [in W] and data rate [in Mbps] values given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
are being used for determining the respective energy consumptions1, i.e.: (i) 1.314
W and 0.193 Mbps for receiving data via the cellular link, (ii) 1.629 W and 5.623
Mbps for sending data via a IEEE802.11 WLAN broadcast/multicast, and (iii) 1.213
W and 5.115 Mbps for receiving data via the IEEE802.11 WLAN connection (at a
distance of 30m between the devices).
Based on this data (especially the assumed fixed transmission speed for each
transmission type), the energy consumption required for the sending and receiving
of data, as well as communicating in the WMG simulation is determined by the size
of the transmitted data packages (the data packages are referred to as chunks in
the simulation). Hence, checking which data packages have been sent / received in
which transmission mode allows us to determine the overall energy consumption.
For the transmission themselves we distinguish between transmission between base
stations and mobile phones (cellular link) as well as an IEEE802.11 WLAN trans-
mission between phones. We model the IEEE802.11 WLAN sending as a multicast
transmission. This means that a single message by one mobile phone can be sent
simultaneously to a group of recipients in a single transmission action. If this group
of recipients corresponds to all handsets in the transmission range of the sender,
multicasting equals the broadcast idea, whereas if it is sent to only one recipient, it
is equal to the unicast transmission.
The base stations in the WMG infrastructure are modelled with the help of
special base station agents. In a real WMG, base stations are stationary. To reflect
this, we model the base station agents as having a fixed location in the simulation
and serve as download points for the agents representing the mobile phone users. In
the simulation they are located in such a way that full coverage is ensured. This
means that mobile phone agents have access to a base station from any location in
the simulation area. One particular feature of the base station agents is that they
have a limited capacity for providing downloads. This limited capacity corresponds
to the channel (i.e. frequency division multiplexing) restrictions described in Sections
5.4.2. When mobile phone users with their handsets want to download a chunk from
the base station, they have to check that this base station still has a channel available.
1The energy consumption is determined by the power used over time. The time is a result of the
data rate and the amount of data being processed.
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For this purpose, the base station agent keeps track of its own capacity and can be
queried with questions on its availability.
As stated above, we use the Flat Earth Model assumptions in our WMG simulation
model. The location of the mobile phones (and hence their distance between each
other), determines which can interact. As a consequence, for our simulation, the
proximity of the different mobile phones is highly relevant. In order to keep the
simulation model as simple as possible without losing any relevant information – as
already mentioned in Section 6.4.2 – we model a location as a number l ∈ R from
the interval [0, 1]. The proximity of two agents in two locations is determined with
the help of a visibility radius (rv ∈ (0, 0.5]). This visibility radius corresponds to
the transmission radius of a mobile phone IEEE802.11 WLAN adapter. Using the
transmission radius as well as the location of a mobile phone, the area in which
a mobile phone user can find transaction partners is determined by the interval
[l − rv, l + rv]. As we assume that all mobile phones in the simulation have the
same technical specifications, we can conclude that the visibility radius for all mobile
phones is the same. As a result, if one mobile phone A is in the visibility radius of
another mobile phone B, then B is also in A’s visibility radius. This also corresponds
to the assumptions of the Flat Earth Model. Concerning the border areas of our
location interval [0, 1], we assume a continuous space (or ring form) of our simulation
area. This means leaving the location interval at one border automatically results in
entering it at the other border. To give an example of this: if an mobile phone user
at location 0.9 and moves a distance of 0.2 in direction of the 1 border2 it arrives
at location 0.1. Using the visibility radius we are able to determine the so-called
average neighbourhood density ρNeighbourhood in the simulation, i.e. the number of
mobile phone users (i.e. agents) an agent can perceive in its transmission range3, by
multiplying rv with 2 and | A |, i.e. ρNeighbourhood = rv×2× | A |4. In the simulation
experiments we use ρneighbourhood as one input parameter and analyse the effects it
has in different WMG settings with and without enforcement.
7.1.3 Representing the Community
Having presented the biophysical characteristics of our WMG case study and explained
how we intend to model them in the MAS simulations, this section turns its focus to
the next component of the underlying factors of the IAD framework – the attributes
of the community, i.e. the modelling of the actors in the system.
As in the case of the base station, we model the actors in the system using agents.
The simulation itself is constructed in such a way that at each internal individual
reasoning step, agents receive an observation from the environment, change their
internal state and take an action – which may be doing nothing – that is finally
executed. The internal state of an agent possibly encodes its history of actions
and observations, its beliefs about the state of the environment, as well as its
2Mobile phone users can make moves of sizes [0, 1]. The direction of the move is indicated by
attributing a +/− indicator to the move. The − indicator thereby refers to a move in the direction
of the 0 border, whereas the + indicator is used for moves in the direction of the 1 border.
3This number includes the agent itself.
4The multiplication with 2 is required, because rv is a radius. The mobile phone transmission we
model however is circular and not directed into one direction only. Therefore we need to use the
diameter (i.e. 2× rv) when calculating ρneighbourhood.
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own preferences. The internal state evolves by integrating observations from its
environment. The agent’s decision function reflects its behaviour or policy and
determines which action it will take in the next step. Using κ, the actions the agents
perform can generate Eex for the normative framework.
As indicated earlier, one of the most important feature of MAS is that agents
act locally, but their actions result in a global system behaviour. For this reason, in
order to explain the simulation in more detail, we first look at the actions an agent
can perform.
In the simulation, for reasons of simplicity, we have limited the agents’ actions to
the actions relevant for analysing the cooperation problem described earlier. This
is why, in the simulation, Ac includes the following main actions for interaction
purposes:
 acdownload: downloading chunks of a file from a base station;
 acsearch: searching for cooperation partners;
 acreceive: receiving chunks of a file via the IEEE802.11 WLAN link;
 acsend: sending file chunks via the IEEE802.11 WLAN link;
 accheat: not sending chunks of a file via the IEEE802.11 WLAN link, despite
having promised cooperation partners to do so5;
 acmove: changing the location of the agent within the environment;
 acenter: entering the WMG (this includes entering a WMG by switching the
mobile phone on);
 acleave: leaving the WMG (this includes switching off the mobile phone); and
 acwait: doing nothing.
What is important with regard to these actions is that we explicitly allow for
cheating by the agents, i.e. leave it as an action option to them. What kind of
actions an agent chooses to perform in an interaction depends on its type, i.e. its
attitude to cooperation and particular utility considerations.
7.1.3.1 User Types
To represent the possible variety in utility considerations by mobile phone users,
we opted to model three different kinds of agents representing mobile phone users
in our simulation. These modeled types were chosen to model a broad range of
agent behaviour, without increasing complexity unnecessarily. For all three agent
types presented in this section we assume the agents to have bounded rationality
(see Section 2.5.1) and only able to interact as well as directly communicate with
agents that are within their visibility radius. The three agent types we model in this
dissertation are:
5The lack of performing the sending action is modelled as action, because the agent makes a
conscious decision not to send their chunks.
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Utility Maximizing Agent In an interaction a utility maximizing agent (or utility
agent for short) will try to maximize its utility in terms of saving as much
battery as possible. Hence a utility agent tends to cheat if it does expect
the costs of a potential sanction to be lower than the gains from cheating
and will cooperate if it perceives the situation to be the opposite way around
(i.e. the possible punishment cost higher then the cheating gains). Given
their characteristics, the agents are based on the typical homo economicus
considerations in economics.
Honest Agents In contrast to the utility agents, honest agents prefer to cooperate
and always send their chunks.
Malicious Agents The last agent type we model are malicious agents which are
based on the malicious/faulty node idea in relay routing (see Section 2.4.4.1,
page 37). Malicious agents behave in the opposite way to honest agents and
pursue the goal to harm the system to the greatest extent possible (e.g. because
the want to demonstrate the vulnerability of the system, or because they favour
ideas that are competitive to the WMG one). This means they will always
defect, even if the costs of a possible punishment are higher then the gains
from defection.
7.1.3.2 The Basic Agent Decision Process
Having presented the different agent types and explained their behaviour in coopera-
tion situations, this section serves to illustrate the general agent decision process in
the simulation. The general process is visualized in the activity diagram in Figure
7.1; we explain it here in more detail. For easier reference, we have numbered the
decision nodes in Figure 7.1 from 1 to 6 and will refer to these node numbers when
discussing the respective decision situations.
Throughout the simulation experiments, the agents are given the task of obtaining
different files. Once an agent has been given such a task and wants to download a
file, it sequentially goes through the nodes 1 to 6 and every time decides how to act
in the respective decision situation.
Node 1: Wanting to download a file, the agent starts in node 1 and considers the
opportunity costs of the download. These are the battery costs accumulating
from searching for and negotiating with potential cooperation partners. In
case these costs are higher than the gain from a cooperative download (i.e.
higher than the saved energy if the cooperation is successful), the agent will
download the file itself. Since the energy saving from a cooperative download
is dependant on file size, we compare this information (and the resulting
minimum energy gains in case of a successful cooperation) against the
minimum energy needed for sending 1 cooperation request and 1 negotiation
message. Hence, if the file is large enough for the cooperative download
energy saving to outweigh the opportunity costs, the agent will move to
node 2 (otherwise it will simply download the file itself).
Node 2: Being at node 2, the next consideration for the agent is whether it has any
neighbours (i.e. other agents in its visibility radius) that it could possibly
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Figure 7.1: Activity Diagram of Agent Download Considerations
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cooperate with (action acsearch). If this number is too low (e.g. if it cannot
find many other agents in its vicinity) then sending a cooperation request
has little point, since it only reduces the battery life and will not result
in enough responses; so the agent downloads the file itself. If the number
of neighbours is high enough, it sends out a collaboration request to its
neighbours via an IEEE802.11 WLAN broadcast message and waits for
responses6. To encourage interaction we have set the threshold of “enough
neighbours” to one agent. However, the simulation can be modified to give
each agent a separate threshold.
Node 3: Decision node 3 is similar to node 2. However, instead of checking whether
enough neighbours are in its vicinity, the agent checks whether it has received
enough positive responses to its collaboration request. If this is not the case,
it will download the file itself.
Node 4: Having received enough responses in decision step 3, the agent checks who
has responded and decides whether it wants to collaborate with these agents.
TIn reality a user might get a response from someone who has betrayed
him before or who for other reasons does not seem trustworthy in his eyes
and therefore could decide not to cooperate with this user. If agents decide
to collaborate and form a group this group elects a group leader (we set
the agent initially sending out the cooperation request to be the leader of
the group). This leader then initialises a protocol that assigns the chunks
the group members should download and share equally to all agents in the
group. This protocol furthermore determines a communication key for the
interaction between the group members. In our simulation experiments
we do not focus on this interaction, but assume the protocol assigning the
chunks to be functioning. For reasons of simplicity in the simulation we
assign one chunk to each agent of the group, with all chunks assigned having
the same size. Our simulation can be extended to incorporate several chunks,
adding a method to account for chunk numbers in order to identify specific
chunks per agent. Once the agents have been assigned their chunk, in a
next step they have to download the assigned chunk from the base station
(action acdownload) in order to be able to send it to other agents afterwards
7.
Node 5: Having agreed to join or initialise a cooperation group and having down-
loaded the chunk(s) it is supposed to contribute, finally, in decision step
5, the agent has to decide whether to cooperate (i.e. send its share to its
cooperation partners) or to defect (i.e. not send its share). This decision is
based on the agent types described earlier. In case of the utility agents the
decision depends on the assumed costs of sending and punishment by the
agents.
6To reduce the number of messages and increase cooperation, agents will only send out requests
for collaboration if they have not received matching requests themselves and have agreed to join a
group.
7In the simulation the assumption is being made that all group members initially do not have
any chunks of the file they want to obtain. That is why every agent has to perform the download
action at least once.
144 The Basic WMG Scenario
Node 6: The last node in Figure 7.1 does not refer to an actual decision situation
for the agents, but instead focuses on a control situation. When arriving
at this node, the agents have made their sending decision (in the case they
decided to send their share to the group, the sending has taken place). They
now need to consider whether they have received the chunks from the other
group members. In the case an agent has received chunks from all other
group members, it will have obtained the complete file it needed. In the
case it did not receive all missing chunks from its interaction partners it will
have to obtain these chunks another way, i.e. by downloading the missing
chunks itself or by searching for other collaboration partners.
Earlier in this dissertation we emphasised the aspect of movement and location
in the WMG scenario. In the next section, we will therefore outline the movement
pattern used in the basic WMG simulation experiments.
7.1.3.3 The Basic Movement Pattern
Despite its importance to various applications (e.g. urban planning, traffic forecasting
as well as the spread of biological or software viruses), so far no models that represent
human motion in a realistic way exist. The main reasons for this are a lack of tools
and legal problems for monitoring time-resolved movement of individuals (Gonza´lez
et al., 2008). This lack of large scale real movement traces results in the necessity
to use abstract models for determining the movement of the mobile phone users.
In the literature, a number of models to represent movement patterns of humans
have been proposed. Camp et al. (2002) give an overview of the most common
movement models used in ad-hoc scenarios similar to the WMG one8. We start these
experiments by using an adaptation of one of the most basic models, which is used
widely in literature: the random waypoint movement model9.
The random waypoint movement model is a so-called entity movement model,
meaning it assumes the movements of the entities in the system to be independent
of each other10. In this model, the entities (i.e. in the MAS simulation the agents
representing the human users with their mobile phones) choose random locations
every time they move and pause in between two movement steps. In our simulation
this means that the agents choose a random location in our boundless [0, 1]-space every
time they move. They find this new location by choosing a random movement distance
rd ∈ [−1, 1] (with the numbers in the interval being uniformly distributed11)12 and
8A detailed discussion of the different movement models is given in Chapter 9 when the effects of
different movement models on the simulation results are discussed.
9Our adjustments to the classical random waypoint movement model are made as a result of our
notion of location. Thus, we view location as a one-dimensional value only (l ∈ R and l ∈ [0, 1]),
whereas the classical random waypoint movement model assumes two dimensional movement. We
therefore adjust the model to reflect one-dimension movement.
10The second kind of movement models are group movement models. Both kinds of models will
be explained in more detail in Chapter 9.
11We use the Java random number generator as well as the random number generator implemented
in Jason for our simulation experiments. These algorithmic random number generators are not truly
random, they are algorithms that generate a fixed but random-looking sequence of numbers. As
a consequence in the simulation experiments the random numbers generated will not be perfectly
uniformly distributed. For reasons of analysis whenever using the two random number generators,
we assume the algorithms to work perfectly and generating a perfectly uniform distribution.
12The absolute value | rd | of the movement distance is referred to as step length. The step length
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changing the current location by rd. If rd is negative the agents move | rd | into
the 0-direction, otherwise they move | rd | into the 1-direction. As a result of
the boundless movement area, if rd ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, the agent will stay in its current
position. We assume the agents to move at infinite speed between two locations.
When having arrived at a new location agents the agents pause their movement and
can choose to perform several actions. These actions include acsearch, i.e. searching
for cooperation partners if wanting to download a file, as well as acmove i.e. moving
again immediately. Figure 7.2 shows the frequency by with which agents have chosen
locations in the boundless [0, 1]-space in the experiments conducted with the basic
WMG simulations. As expected from a random movement pattern, the locations are
uniformly distributed13.
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of the Locations chosen by Agents in the Basic
WMG Experiments
Having explained how the simulation is designed with regard to the first two
underlying factors of the IAD framework, namely the biophysical characteristics and
the attributes of the community, we now turn our attention to the final underlying
factor, i.e. the rules-in-use.
7.1.4 Rules-in-Use
In the earlier chapters of this dissertation we explained that the rules-in-use are the
central element of our analysis, as one main goal of this dissertation is to analyse
how governance decisions can effect a future system that is currently still in an early
development stage. Governance decisions are understood as decisions on the changes
of the rules-in-use. Using the simulation experiments we analyse several governance
in a movement model will be of importance in Section 9.1.2.
13The locations in the figure are rounded to the fifth decimal place.
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decisions (i.e. the integration of different enforcement mechanisms) in future WMGs.
In particular, we focus on three particular enforcement mechanisms in the simulation
experiments and analyse the possible impact they have on the predicted cooperation
problems in WMGs.
Concerning the rules-in-use, in the basic WMG scenario, we start with simulation
experiments that do not include any rules-in-use, to have a “worst case” reference
point for the enforcement experiments. In Chapter 8 this assumption is lifted and
specific rules-in-use are employed (in the form of different enforcement mechanisms).
7.1.5 Implementing the Basic MAS Simulation of the Wireless
Mobile Grid Scenario
The implementation of our MAS simulation experiments was realised using the
Jason Simulation Platform (Bordini et al., 2007). Jason uses an extension of the
AgentSpeak agent-oriented programming language (Rao, 1996) to program the
behaviour of individual agents (including S,Ob, ξ and τ) and thereby follows the
Belief – Desire – Intention (BDI) model of agency (Rao and Georgeff, 1995).
BDI architectures originated in the work of the Rational Agency project at
Stanford Research Institute in the mid-1980s. The main idea of BDI is that computer
programs (i.e. the agents in the simulation) are viewed as if they have a “mental
state”. Thus, when programming the agents, computational analogues of beliefs,
desires and intentions are used, enabling a form of reasoning by agents about their
goals and the different options to achieve them.
Beliefs are information the agent has about the world. This information could
possibly be out of date or inaccurate, however it represents the agent’s view of the
world. Desires are all the possible states of affairs that the agent might like to
accomplish. Having a desire, however, does not imply that an agent acts upon it:
they only potentially influence an agent’s actions. Finally, intentions are the states
of affairs that the agent has decided to work towards. Intentions may be goals that
are delegated to the agent, or may result from considering options: we think of an
agent looking at its options and choosing between them. Options that are selected
in this way become intentions. Therefore, one can imagine an agent starting with
some delegated goal, and then considering the possible options that are compatible
with this delegated goal; the options that it chooses are then intentions, to which
the agent is committed (Bordini et al., 2007). Jason makes use of the BDI concept
by repeatedly executing the following control loop:
Step 1: the individual agents look at the world, perceive their environment and other
agents, and update their individual beliefs on this basis (it is important to
note that not all agents perceive the same, but have individual percepts that
can be different between all agents);
Step 2: as a result, they deliberate to decide which intention to achieve;
Step 3: and use means-ends reasoning to find a plan (a sequence of actions) to achieve
this intention;
Step 4: in the last step the agents then execute the plan in order to fulfill the
intention.
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Whereas the agent reasoning in Jason is written in AgentSpeak, Jason itself is
developed in Java and allows the customisation of most aspects of an agent or the
MAS (Bordini et al., 2005). One of the customisations we made is the inclusion
of a normative framework component. This inclusion will be explained in detail in
Chapter 7.2. Besides the normative framework connection, in our simulation all
environmental related aspects as well as the mathematical calculation of utilities by
the individual agents and the logging of the simulation data (except for the normative
states, which are recorded in the normative framework) are programmed in Java.
To not distract from the main reasoning of this dissertation, we do not include
the details of the implementation at this point, but refer the interested reader to
Appendices A and B. Appendix A contains the complete code of all Jason agents
(including the code of the agents of the later experiments). In Appendix B we give a
detailed explanation of the basic WMG agent code.
Having presented the agent reasoning, we now turn our attention to the question
of how the Jason agents and the normative framework described earlier can be
connected in order to allow for normative reasoning by the agents at the run time of
the simulation.
7.2 Connecting Normative Frameworks and the MAS
Simulation in the Action Arena
As discussed in Section 5.5, as a result of the special features of the design-time
model, when developing it, a system designer could not take into account participants’
reasoning capabilities and is required to incorporate artificial artifacts in the model.
In case of our WMG these artifacts included the explicit tracking of whether a
channel or a handset is busy or not. This further required adjusting the power
and permissions to perform certain normative framework actions accordingly, or the
necessity to explicitly model time as well as its transition. With the agent simulation
in place, we can avoid these problems and concentrate on the modelling of the
normative aspects only. In this section we will therefore explain how the design-time
model presented in Section 5.4 (page 97) can be cleared of all artifacts. Afterwards
we highlight how the agent simulation and hence the participants with reasoning
capabilities can be connected to the normative framework.
7.2.1 The Run-Time Model
In starting to develop the run-time model, the first important thing to keep in mind
is that for a given normative system, both the design-time and run-time model should
have the same normative intentions, making the design-time model a good starting
point for the development of the run-time one. A sensible next step is to remove
rules and conditions that deal with simulating a running system. Figure 7.3 gives one
example of design-time specifications that are being removed because of not being
required in the run-time case14. All the specifications that are printed in bold are
kept in the run-time model, whereas all other specifications will be removed.
14The complete run-time specifications as well as their comparison to the design-time specifications
are provided in Appendix B.
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1 institution grid;
2
3 type Handset;
4 type Chunk;
5 type Channel;
6 type Time;
7
8 %% exogenous events %%
9 exogenous event download(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
10 exogenous event send(Handset,Chunk);
11 exogenous event deadline
12 exogenous event clock;
Figure 7.3: Declaration of Types and Events in the Run Time WMG Model
– Example
The purpose of the run-time model is solely to observe and keep track of normative
behaviour, not the system’s behaviour. Thus, it only monitors the external events
resulting from agents’ actions and does not predetermine all agent behaviour. As a
consequence of moving to a run-time model, we no longer need to be concerned with
modelling system data.
Concretely for our example, this means that the model does not have to track
whether a channel is being used at a given moment or that a particular handset is
incapable, from a technical perspective, of sending or receiving chunks. These are
properties of the agents, but not normative information as such.
This means starting from the original design-time specifications, we can remove
all rules that deal with these issues.
One implication of not having to model busy states of handsets and the base-
station any more is that the exogenous event clock (Figure 7.3, line 12) and the
normative framework event transition are no longer required. By the same reasoning,
we longer need fluents to indicate that a handset or channel is engaged or to indicate
elapsed time. With all of these events and fluents gone, the type Time is no longer
needed either (line 6).
Removing the rules involving these events and removing the fluents from the
remaining rules as well as the concretisation statements or the time transition we
are almost left with that part of the run-time specification that is printed in bold
print. One component that in the design-time model is explicitly controlled by the
time transition, is the deadline event, for which an normative framework event was
automatically generated when the time transition had reached point 1. In the run-
time model this deadline is not pre-defined in length by the normative framework, but
can be decided upon by the agents. At the point of the deadline an exogenous (and
no longer normative) event is generated by the agents and the obligation statements
will be checked as a consequence. That is the reason why in the run-time model
we need to introduce the exogenous event deadline and can delete the respective
normative event as well as the statements relating to it. However, modelling the
deadline as an exogenous event means that we need to add the permission to perform
this exogenous deadline event to the normative framework specifications. To highlight
their addition to the run-time model we have printed the respective definitions in
italics (Line 11 in Figure 7.3).
In the design-time model we penalise misbehaviour by taking away the power
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of a handset to receive chunks. While this may be a reasonable simplification in
a design-time model for verification purposes, it cannot be enforced in a running
system unless one expects agents to penalise themselves. Instead, the system notes
the violation and agents may use this information in future interactions with the
offending agent. Thus, we keep the violation event misuse that still can be generated
as a result of the deadline passing for the obligations that the agents have agreed to
fulfill, but delete the consequence rules that take away power from the agents as a
result of the misuse, as well as any rules that assume the ability to terminate the
power of agents.
In contrast to the design-time model, in which the chunk attribution to agents (i.e.
the initial configuration of the agent/chunk combinations indicated by the ’initially’
identifier in the normative specifications) is pre-determined, in the run-time model this
changes. Thus, one cannot pre-determine the assignment configuration in advance,
but it is the agents who after meeting and deciding to cooperate and negotiating
which agent is to download and share which chunk. Hence, the concretisation part
(i.e. part 3.2 in Figure 5.7 on page 93) of the normative specification file is determined
at run-time and added to the template specification, whenever agents inform the
normative framework (see sections 7.2.2 for details) about their negotiation results15.
7.2.2 Monitoring Dynamic State
The UML component diagram in Figure 7.4 shows the components of the run-time
MAS simulation model. The two main components of the run-time architecture
are the Jason MAS simulation at the bottom of the figure as well as the normative
framework (with the normative template specifications) at the top of the figure. We
link Jason with the normative model and answer set solver using system calls.
In order to maintain the normative state in our running system we introduce
a special type of agent or entity: the Governor, which when created is given the
template part16 of the normative framework specifications. The governor is a well-
known concept in the agent community and has been used in earlier works such as,
for example, the PhD dissertation of Noriega (1997).
The governor component – which is implemented in Java – is conceptually located
between the Jason MAS simulation and the normative framework and (i) handles
all the instantiations of the normative framework, (ii) stores the normative states
and the respective domain files, and (iii) helps to decouple the normative framework
and the agents. Thus, using the governor entity, the agents do not need to know any
specifications of the internal structure, the semantics or the syntax of the normative
framework, but can pass on simple information to the governor who then translates
this information to be usable in the normative framework component. In detail, the
interaction between the three components just described works as follows: When
agents agree to collaborate, one agent of the group contacts the governor with the
specifications of the collaboration to establish a contract through a new instantiation
of the normative framework. The specifications that are passed on to the governor
include a unique group ID (that is used as an identifier for the group) as well as the
names of all group members and information about which chunk which group member
15As well as the concretisation component of the normative specifications, the domain file is also
created dynamically in the run-time case.
16See Figure 5.7 on page 93 as well as the description of the figure for more information.
150 The Basic WMG Scenario
<<component>>
Jason MAS simulation
<<component>>
Normative Framework
AgentEnvironment
<<service>>
Governor
<<excecutable>>
instal2asp
<<excecutable>>
clingo
<<specifications>>
domain, concretisation & 
event information
<<file>>
normative template
percepts
<<query and inform>>
<<use>>
<<ground and solve>> <<translate>>
<<use>>
Figure 7.4: The Components of the Run-Time Normative MAS simulation
has been assigned to the governor. The governor uses this collaboration information
to create the domain file as well as the concretisation part of the InstAL specifications
and combines these with the template part. These complete specifications are then
used to determine the first state of the agents’ contract. When the state needs
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updating (a new exogenous event takes place)17, the governor combines the template
part of the InstAL specification with the current state and solves the correpoding
AnsProlog program with a time-step of length 2. The resulting answer set is then
parsed to obtain the new normative state, which the governor stores in respective
data structures.
Having the information for the initial contract as well as tracking the normative
state of each contract by analysing the respective exogenous events, the governor
can act as a normative query processor for the agents. Contracting agents can query
the current state and obtain consequences of potential actions.
At this point, we have implemented three kinds of queries that are useful for
agents:
 queries about the current state, including the norms applying to that state (e.g.
“What norms affect my current situation?” or “Given the current situation,
following the norms, am I allowed to execute action acY ?”),
 queries about the possible impact of the agent’s own actions (e.g. “What is
going to happen if I take action acY (e.g. download chunk x1 from channel
1)?”), and
 general queries on what might happen in the future (e.g. “What would happen
if a series of actions (e.g. events eA,eB,eC and eD) take place?”).
7.3 Simulation Experiments
Having discussed the structure and implementation of the MAS simulation, in this
section we now focus on the simulation experiments. We start by introducing our
simulation hypotheses and in a second step derive the simulation setup from these
hypotheses. The results of the simulation experiments are presented in Section 7.3.2.
7.3.1 Simulation Hypotheses and Setup
Recalling Chapter 3, one of the main drivers behind the WMG idea was that in
WMG cooperation has the potential to reduce energy consumption of mobile phones.
Hypothesis 1: Higher cooperation levels in the WMG reduce the energy consump-
tion in the WMG.
Despite this generally assumed energy advantage of WMGs, as expressed in Section
3.2, without any enforcement the cooperation (and thus the WMG advantages) is
at risk if the participants try to cheat in order to save their own battery, which is
required for sending. We also explained that not all users necessarily follow the same
decision rationales, but can react differently in cooperation situations based on their
personal attitude to cooperation and the WMG. Because cooperation is very much
17We have implemented the MAS simulation in such a way that every exogenous event will have a
reference to the contract (i.e. agent interaction group) it refers to. This reference is the unique group
ID. Using this ID, the governor is able to distinguish between several contracts and can attribute
the exogenous event to the correct normative framework instance.
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dependent on the mobile phone users’ decisions, and that these decisions are guided
by their cooperation attitudes (which we summarized as behavioural types earlier),
we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: The composition of the agent population (in terms of the numbers
of each behavioural types present in the population as well as the percentage
of each type) has an effect on the energy consumption.
One huge advantage of MAS is that it can incorporate entities (i.e. agents) with
very different decision concepts. In theory, one can think of an infinite number of
behavioural types, however in order to keep the simulation as simple as possible and
still allow for very different decision processes, we use the three different behavioural
groups presented in Section 7.1.3. Thinking about these different groups and their
expected interaction behaviour – assuming Hypothesis 2 to be correct – we can extend
our analysis to check the impact that particular groups in the population have on the
energy consumption. To give an example of this detailed analysis, we assume that, as
honest agents will always cooperate if given the chance, an increase in the percentage
of honest agents in the total population should increase cooperation and reduce
defection, and therefore reduce the overall energy consumption rate18 (Hypothesis
2.1). If no honest agents exist in a WMG system, the agents in the system are
very likely to cheat – either because of their malicious preferences, or because their
utility considerations indicate that without any punishment to fear, defection is the
better option. As a result, all interaction attempts should result in not achieving
cooperation. However, for the initial communication to find cooperation partners
(that the agents can cheat on), energy is required (for sending the communication
messages). We hypothesize that this additional energy commitment will increase
the overall energy consumption with all agents still having to download everything
themselves. Therefore a completely unsuccessful WMG (in cooperation terms) –
where every mobile phone user downloads everything himself without even trying to
find cooperation partners – leads to higher energy consumption than in situations
where no WMG is present in the first place (Hypothesis 2.2).
Hypothesis 2.1: The percentage of honest agents in the population is correlated
to the energy consumption rate.
Hypothesis 2.2: In systems in which no honest agents are present, the overall
energy consumption is worse than in scenarios without any WMG, i.e. when
all agents download everything themselves.
Finally, we pointed out the importance of location in the earlier chapters of this
dissertation. As a result of the bounded rationality assumption made, agents will not
be able to perceive (and interact with) all other agents in the system, but only agents
18In the experiments we understand the term energy consumption rate as the quotient between the
energy consumed in the simulation experiments (Esim) and the battery power that would have been
consumed if no WMG was in place and the agents would download everything themselves, without
even considering cooperation (EnoWMG). An energy consumption rate of 1 therefore implies that
in the simulation experiments the total energy consumption is equal to a scenario with no WMG,
whereas a value higher / lower than 1 implies that the system is battery-wise disadvantageous /
advantageous in comparison to a situation without a WMG.
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that are within their visibility radius at a given point of time. The more agents
within the visibility radius, the more agents a particular agent can interact with. If
no other agents are in the radius, the agent must download its required chunks on its
own. We therefore hypothesize that ρneighbourhood (i.e. the average number of other
agents an agent can detect) has in impact on the cooperation attempts of the agents
and therefore also on overall energy consumption.
Hypothesis 3: The neighbourhood density (ρneighbourhood) affects the overall data
transfer and consequently the energy consumption.
For the experiments in the later chapters, it will be important how likely it is
to interact with a given agent again. One parameter to determine this likelihood is
ρneighbourhood. However, ρneighbourhood on its own is not sufficient, as | A | can also
influence the probability that agent pairs interact repeatedly. Thus, with a fixed
ρneighbourhood, if | A | increases, the pool of agents the neighbours can come from
increases as well. If agents move randomly, interacting with an agent again can be
compared to randomly choosing ρneighbourhood elements from | A |. With an increasing
| A | the likelihood for a particular element being chosen from ρneighbourhood decreases.
As we do not use any enforcement mechanism, which implies that the agents will
not use information from past interactions with other agents, every interaction is
like a new interaction to them. Therefore, we hypothesize that in the basic WMG
scenario, the size of | A | will obviously affect the absolute number of interactions (and
therefore also the number of defections), but does not affect relative measurements
such as the cheating ratio or the energy consumption rate, etc.
Hypothesis 4: In the basic WMG simulation settings the absolute number of agents
in the system (| A |) does not affect the relative simulation results.
In order to test the hypothesis just presented, we execute factorial experiments
using our simulation. Each of these experiments is structured similarly to the design-
time model presented in Section 5.4. Each agent is repeatedly given the task of
obtaining a file and then deciding how to go about doing this by using the decision
process shown in Figure 7.1. In order to increase cooperation and make comparison
between the results easier, we opted to have a large number of agents wanting to
download the same file and to use only five different files, assigned at random to
the agents. All these files have exactly the same file size, which is high enough to
make cooperation interesting (with regard to the opportunity cost decision)19. With
regard to the files in the simulations, we furthermore assume that after obtaining a
file, the agents do not keep it permanently; hence, if downloading the same file again,
they cannot rely on old chunks of the file being present on their mobile phone.
Besides this general setup, in order to test our hypotheses we must decide how to
structure our experiments and which values to assign to the variables that define
our simulation. Table 7.1 shows the setup of the Basic WMG Scenario experiments
resulting from these considerations.
19This decision makes node 1 in Figure 7.1 always result in the agents checking their neighbourhood
and not downloading the file themselves straight away because of high opportunity cost. One might
argue that this decision step therefore could have been neglected in the simulation. We nevertheless
kept it in the simulation for testing purposes as well, to leave options to extend the simulation later
on with a larger variety of files.
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Table 7.1: Experimental Setup for Basic MAS Simulation of the WMG
Scenario
Input Factors Values
| A | 200, 400, 800
Number of Interactions per Agent 50
Utility Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Malicious Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Honest Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Enforcement Mechanism None
Movement Pattern Simple Boundless Random Waypo-
int
ρneighbourhood 10, 20
Measurements Type
Number of Defection Actions N
Number of Cooperation Actions N
Communication-related Data Transferred
per Agent per Interaction
R
Download-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Reception-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Sending-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Integrity Constraints Formula
Full Partitioning Utility Agents % + Honest Agents
% + Malicious Agents % = 100
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The first input parameter that we test corresponds to Hypothesis 4. It is the
number of agents in the simulation (| A |). The upper limit of | A | was chosen due
to technical simulation restrictions (i.e. the computational resources available only
allowed for executing stable simulations with a maximum of 800 agents), whereas the
remaining two numbers were picked following the power distribution on page 130.
The number of interactions per agent was kept fixed at 50 throughout all experi-
ments. It was chosen for statistical purposes, i.e. to have a large enough number of
interactions to be able to apply means comparisons, which is required for ANOVA
analysis (Field, 2009), and at the same time small enough to be able to execute a
large set of different experiments.
The next three input parameters affect the composition of the agent population
by determining which proportion of each agent behavioural type is present in the
simulation. Given the full partitioning constraint, the value of the third percentage
can always be determined by the first two. It is consequently not independent as
required by ANOVA analysis. That is why in ANOVA analysis at most two agent
behavioural type percentages are required to determine the remaining percentages
being considered. Using the three percentages we have the input parameters required
for Hypotheses 2–2.2. Finally, the input parameter ρneighbourhood is relevant for
Hypothesis 3. We have chosen the relatively high neighbourhood densities of 10 and
20 to ensure the likelihood of agents finding another agent within their vicinity that
wants to obtain the same file, thus giving an incentive to cooperate and to better
determine the effect of the parameter20. The ρneighbourhood parameter was indirectly
set in the experiments by adjusting the visibility radius of the agents depending on
the number of agents.
Looking at the measurements, two sets of measurement parameters can be
distinguished. The first set is comprised of numbers indicating the number of defects
as well as cooperation actions in the simulation. This allows us to make statements
about the relative and absolute defects and thus the cooperation success of the WMG.
Therefore, it is important to note that the absolute figures depend on | A | and can
only be compared for settings with equal numbers of agents.
The second set of measurements considers the amount of data transmitted for
downloading, sending, receiving as well as communicating per agent. Using this data
as well as the power value and data rate specifications given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 on
page 59, we are not only able to determine the overall energy consumption and energy
per bit ratio for the overall system, but can also distinguish these figures according
to the behavioural groups (or even single agents) and communication protocols. This
enables us to verify Hypotheses 2–2.2 as well as 3 and 4. As a result of knowing the
number of interactions each agent has to perform (i.e. the number of times it has to
obtain a file) as well as the size of the files the agent has to obtain, we are able to
calculate the energy consumption required if the agents do not try to participate in
the WMG, but download everything themselves. This allows us to verify Hypothesis
1, i.e. the general underlying assumption of WMGs that higher cooperation leads to
a better (i.e. lower) overall energy consumption rate.
20In the real world, limits to the number of maximum connection per handset can exist. These
limits are not exceeded by the chosen ρneighbourhood = 20.
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7.3.2 Simulation Results
The simulation experiments consist of running 50 experiments for each parameter
combination given in Table 7.1. This means that a total of 50 simulation runs for
90 parameter combinations (i.e. 4,500 simulation runs in total) are executed for
the basic WMG simulation experiments for this chapter. The aggregated results for
all runs per parameter combination are logged in txtfiles, which are used for the
statistical analysis.
As previously mentioned, we used ANOVA to test the significance relationship
between the independent variables (i.e. the parameters in the simulation) and the
dependant variables (i.e. the number and ratio of defections as well as energy
consumption rate) in our experiments and thus test Hypotheses 2–4. However, before
performing the ANOVA analysis, we focus on Hypothesis 1; this predicts a correlation
between the cooperation (or defection) level and the battery consumption. For the
purpose of checking this correlation all cheating events as well as all interaction
group sizes (both per simulation run and per parameter setting) are logged in the
experiments. As pointed out in Section 5.4.1 on page 98, we set up the experiments
in such a way that in each interaction group, each agent is assigned one chunk to
download and share. As a result of this setup, the sum of the interaction group
sizes gives us the number of chunks that are supposed to be sent in total by the
agents. In combination with the sum of the cheating events per run this number
is used to determine the defection rate per experiment, which is compared to the
energy consumption in the respective run. The calculation of the correlation of
the defection rates and the respective energy consumption results in the correlation
value 0.9932, which specifies that the energy consumption and the defection rate are
statistically strongly positively correlated, i.e. that high energy consumption rates
result from high defection rates. As cooperation rates are the direct counterpart of
defection rates, this also implies that an increase in cooperation results in lower energy
consumption rates and affirms Hypothesis 1. With Hypothesis 1 being proven, we now
focus the analysis on Hypotheses 2–4 in order to determine which factors influence
the cooperation ratio and the energy consumption. For this purpose we perform a
multi-way (n-way) ANOVA, which tests the effects of multiple factors (i.e. population
composition, ρneighbourhood and | A |) on the mean of the battery consumption rates.
Table 7.2 shows the results of the ANOVA for all three input factors for which we
have formulated hypotheses. For each of these, the null hypothesis is that the factor
does not have an effect on the energy consumption rate, whereas the alternative
hypotheses state that an effect of the respective factor exists. ANOVA tests the
null-hypothesis. When the p-value of the test is significant21, then it is assumed that
enough evidence is found to reject the null hypothesis and assume the alternative
hypothesis.
Table 7.2 shows that the p-value (given in the last column of the table) for all
three input factors is approximately zero and is therefore significant. The n-way
ANOVA generally tests the effects that the group of n given input factors (as a group)
has on the dependent variable (i.e. the energy consumption rate in our simulation
experiments). The n-way ANOVA focuses on results of the group of input factors.
21The typical significance level chosen is 0.05, i.e. any p-value below or equal to that value is
significant. We use this significance level throughout this dissertation.
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Table 7.2: Analysis of Variance for Hypotheses 2–4
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 261.445 14 18.6747 25197.22 < 0.0001
ρneighbourhood 0.482 1 0.4817 649.88 < 0.0001
| A | 0.056 2 0.0282 38 < 0.0001
Error 3.322 4482 0.0007
Total 265.305 4499
This implies that we can dismiss the null hypothesis that the group of input factors
we have chosen does not have an effect on the energy consumption rate. However in
order to determine the contribution of the different input factors, this effect needs
further analysis in the form of a post hoc test. The test we choose to apply for the
in-depth analysis is Tukey’s test. If the sample sizes of the experiments are equally
large and have similar group variances, and if the experiments consist of large sample
sizes (which is the case in our simulation experiments), this test can be used to
analyse differences in means in the input factors as well as for the variables chosen
for the different input factors. Tables 7.3–7.5 show the results of this detailed post
hoc test.
Table 7.3: Analysis of Variance in Comparison of the Population Composition
– Post Hoc Test
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 261.445 14 18.6747 21699.7 < 0.0001
Error 3.86 4485 0.0009
Total 265.305 4499
Table 7.4: Analysis of Variance in Comparison of | A | – Post Hoc Test
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
| A | 0.056 2 0.02816 0.48 0.6204
Error 265.249 4497 0.05898
Total 265.305 4499
The results of the post hoc tests allow us to verify Hypotheses 2–4. The post
hoc tests for Hypotheses 2 and 4 show a significant p-value (i.e. 0 and 0.0043 - see
Tables 7.3 and 7.5). This indicates that we can reject the null hypotheses that these
two values do not have an impact on the energy consumption rate, whereas the
p-value for | A | is not significant (i.e. 0.6204 > 0.05) in Table 7.4, indicating that
for Hypothesis 3 we cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Analysing Tables 7.2–7.5 more closely, one further result of the ANOVA test is
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Table 7.5: Analysis of Variance in ρneighbourhood – Post Hoc Test
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
ρneighbourhood 0.482 1 0.48167 8.18 0.0043
Error 264.823 4498 0.05888
Total 265.305 4499
that the population composition is the factor that influences the energy consumption
the most. This is indicated by its sum of squares value in Table 7.2 as well as the
individual p-values of the three factors in the Tables 7.3–7.5, in which the population
composition has the lowest and therefore most significant value, indicating that
analysing the population composition in more detail is worthwhile. As a result of the
simulation setup shown in Figure 7.1, 15 different compositions of the total population
are checked in the simulation experiments. We use a Tukey’s test to compare the
means of the energy consumption rates of these 15 compositions. The results of the
analysis are shown in Figure 7.5, which shows the means comparison of all population
compositions in comparison to settings with 100% utility maximizing agents. In
Figure 7.5 all means that are not significantly different from the means we compare
with are coloured in black, whereas all means for population compositions with a
significant difference are coloured in red. The results indicate that all population
compositions with no honest agents have means that are not significantly different to
each other and are higher than all means of compositions that include honest agents.
The means are averaged around the value 1, i.e. at a point where Esim = EnoWMG.
With the increase of honest agents in the system the mean values decrease significantly,
whereas the composition of the remainder of the population does not seem to be
significantly relevant to the energy consumption, as all populations with the same
percentage of honest agents are in the same means range (i.e. on one vertical line),
independent of the percentages of utility or malicious agents. These findings support
Hypothesis 2.1.
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To tests Hypothesis 2.2 we perform a one-sided t-test on the simulation runs with
populations settings without any honest agents. In the t-test we compare two means:
the means of the difference between the battery consumption with the WMG and
without a WMG, and the means of the no-WMG scenario. The result of the t-test is
a significant p-value, which allows us to conclude the correctness of Hypothesis 2.2.
Besides the population composition, as discussed above, ρneighbourhood and | A |
were candidates for factors having an impact on the energy consumption. Having
run the simulations with different values for these two input factors, we now analyse
to what extent the choice of values for the input factors affects the simulation results.
For this purpose we use Tukey’s test again to compare the means of the energy
consumption rates for the different values of these two input factors. Figures 7.6
and 7.7 show the results of the test. In these figures the marginal means coloured in
blue are the ones that the test used for the comparison. If no significant difference is
found the marginal means are coloured in grey, otherwise they are red.
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Figure 7.6: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of | A | Marginal
Means – Post Hoc Test
From the test we see that the marginal means for the two different values of
ρneighbourhood are significantly different (the two bars do not overlap vertically), with
the experiments with ρneighbourhood = 20 having lower marginal means than those
with ρneighbourhood = 10. This indicates that a higher neighbourhood density results
in lower energy consumption rates. Reasons for this are the potential larger number
of cooperation partners an agent can choose from, and cooperate with in case of a
higher ρneighbourhood. Thus if more agents can cooperate, the individual chunks each
agent has to contribute is reduced, and if the cooperation is successful the energy
consumption rates decreases. In contrast to ρneighbourhood, for the different values of
| A | no significant difference can be detected in the marginal means.
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Figure 7.7: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of ρneighbourhood
Marginal Means – Post Hoc Test
7.4 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the basic WMG simulations without any enforce-
ment mechanisms. We furthermore explained in detail how our simulation, as well
as the experiments, are constructed. We have explained the general simulation im-
plementation as well as the different simulation components, by using the underlying
factors of the IAD framework (i.e. the biophysical characteristics, the attributes of
the community and the rules-in-use) as presentation structure. We have conducted
the first set of simulations with this basic WMG simulation. The results of these
experiments show that the cooperation level in a system is strongly correlated with
the population’s energy consumption. Further results are summarized in Table 7.6.
The results show that in scenarios without any enforcement, the population
composition (especially the percentage of honest agents) as well as the neighbourhood
density are factors influencing the energy consumption, and thus all the hypotheses
in this chapter can be assumed to be valid. For WMGs to be successful in the
long run, the dependency on the percentage of honest agents in the system is
a particular vulnerability. It calls for mechanisms to change this situation by
encouraging agents to cooperate. In the next chapter we experiment with enforcement
mechanisms as one means to govern WMGs and thereby reduce the cooperation
problems and dependencies on honest agents highlighted here. The results gained
from the simulations without any enforcement mechanism conducted in this chapter
thereby serve as a “worst case” reference point for the enforcement simulations.
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Table 7.6: Basic WMG Simulation Results Description Table
Input Factors Measurement α Relationship
Population
Composition
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The population composition influ-
ences the energy consumption in the
WMG.
% Honest
Agents
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 A higher percentage of honest agents
results in an overall reduction in en-
ergy consumption.
ρneighbourhood Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The neighbourhood density influ-
ences the energy consumption in the
WMG.
| A | Energy
Consumption
Rate
0.38 The population size does not influ-
ence the energy consumption in the
WMG significantly.
Chapter 8
Enforcement Mechanisms for
the Wireless Mobile Grid
Simulation
The previous chapter showed that the WMG’s energy consumption is particularly
dependent on the number of honest agents in the system when no enforcement
mechanisms are employed. Without any honest agents present, the WMG itself is at
risk.
Enforcement offers an option to alter this situation, and in this chapter we explore
the addition of enforcement mechanisms to the WMG simulation. Though WMGs
are currently in an early prototyping stage, the results from these simulations provide
a first impression of the effectiveness of the different enforcement mechanisms in
reducing the cooperation dilemma in WMGs.
To begin our analysis of enforcement mechanisms and their effects on the WMG
scenario, in Section 8.2 we present a taxonomy of enforcement mechanisms. We
show how three of these mechanisms can be represented in the context of a WMG
as well as how they may be implemented for our simulation purposes. Section 8.3
focuses on the simulation of the WMG, using the enforcement mechanisms. For this
purpose – as in the previous chapter – we discuss the simulation hypotheses and
the corresponding simulation setup first. This is followed by the presentation of the
simulation results.
8.1 Retrospective: A Taxonomy for Fostering Norm
Compliance
This section presents a taxonomy of different enforcement mechanisms based on
which we select three mechanisms for implementation in the simulations.
We start our taxonomy by recalling Figure 2.1 on page 27 which shows the
summary of the enforcement process described in Section 2.3.3.
In this enforcement process we distinguish four distinct phases, each associated
with a set of roles for the participants in a system. The roles are not mutually
exclusive, and system participants can play several roles simultaneously. The roles
highlighted in white in Figure 8.1 are those that are responsible for the performance
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VIOLATION
DETECTION
ENFORCEMENT
DETERMINATION
ENFORCEMENT
APPLICATION
ASSIMILATION
Normative Context
Norm Applicability
Violation identification
(premise holds,
 consequence does not hold,
 action observed)
Enforcement Cost =  f( 
        Violation Cost,
        Enforcement Effect,
        Normative Context)
EnforcementType
Enforcement
Enforcement Cost
Enforcement Supervision
Features
Roles
Target
Beneficiary
Violator
Victim
Profiteer
Observer
Violator
Victim
Profiteer
Judge
Violator
Victim
Supervisor
Executor
Adaption and Learning
of Behaviour and Norms
Figure 8.1: The Enforcement Process (Recalled)
of the main enforcement-related actions in the phases. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume the judge and the executor to be the same entity in an open distributed
system without any central enforcement entity. This allows us to use the distinction
of the different actors performing each highlighted role to arrive at a taxonomy for
enforcement. This taxonomy is shown in Figure 8.2.
It is structured along two axes. Horizontally we have the phases of our enforcement
process and vertically the distinction between regimentation as well as incentive-based
enforcement (that – for simplicity – we refer to as enforcement) is shown. With
respect to the enforcement process, we focus especially on the violation detection
and the enforcement application stage. The assimilation stage is left out, because it
is not a distinct part of the enforcement act, but the rather result of it. Due to the
assumption that the judge that determines the enforcement sanction is also to the
enforcing entity, we have no included the enforcement determination phase in detail
in the taxonomy, and point only out examples in the fourth column.
The main taxonomy is derived from columns two and three, which specify
actors for the roles highlighted in the violation detection phase and the enforcement
application phase in Figure 8.1. The specified actors in the table are those presented
in Section 2.3.3. By sensibly combining the different actors serving as observers and
executors, we can distinguish six taxonomy elements (cells with a white background
shown in the last column of Figure 8.2). We now describe these elements in more
detail 1.
8.1.1 Utilization of Normative Empowered Entities
The utilization of normative empowered entities can be thought of in terms of the
implementation of entities with normative power W (i.e. some kind of police) that
participate in the system (in our example the WMG) and have permission from the
system owner to punish negative behaviour (i.e. non-compliance) with sanctions, if
detected. These normative empowered entities are given their special rights by the
system designer who gives them the normative power W to perform specific sanction-
related actions in the normative framework. However, in contrast to regimentation,
the normative empowered entities do not control all actions but only act as enforcers
1The aim of this taxonomy is to present the basic elementary enforcement concepts. While any
combination of them is conceivable, we present all taxonomy elements separately.
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if violations are detected. Detection of the violations is done by the normative
entities themselves, who test the behaviour of entities and react to what they detect.
Concerning the kind of sanctions that can be applied by the entities, several can
be thought of, depending on the severity of the non-compliance, such as a complete
exclusion from the WMG or penalty payments.
8.1.2 Normative Framework Assisted Enforcement (Second-Party
/ Third-Party)
The concepts of normative framework-assisted enforcement are very closely related
to the idea of the utilization of normative framework entities. Normative empowered
entities act as compliance enforcers, ensuring that entities can make use of sanctions.
However, in contrast to the concept of the normative empowered entities, specifically
empowered entities do not act as observers; this is done either by the entity that
was acted upon, i.e. the one deceived by its transaction partner (second-party
observer), or by a third-party, i.e. an entity that is not involved in the transaction
but has observed the non-compliance of one actor. These observers then report
their observations to the normative empowered entities to issue the sanction in
order to assure compliance. Hence, in normative framework-assisted enforcement,
additional communication is required. This gives rise to two problems. Firstly, the
additional communication needed might result in a longer reaction time and, secondly,
the normative entities empowered by the normative framework need to verify the
testimonies made to them, as the reporting entities might purposefully lie in order
to have sanctions issued to rival entities (and thereby profit themselves).
8.1.3 Social Control (Second-Party / Third-Party) and
Promisee-Enforced Norms
Three other concepts that can be thought of where entities are directly involved in
an interaction or third party entities act as observers are social control concepts
(either with second and third party enforcement) and promisee-enforced norms. In
these concepts, the observer entities act as executors, either by spreading negative
reputation information about the violator in the system (in the case of social control)
or by using the image information gained in new encounters with the same possible
cooperation partner (in the case of promisee-enforced norms). In the case of promisee-
enforced norms, if the cooperation partner does not perform as promised, that
promisee can punish the non-compliance by for example not interacting with the
agent once more, etc.
A contrasting case is that of social control, where third-party entities that observe
a transaction form their own image of the transaction participants. Individual images
of entities are shared between the system participants (either by the third party
observers or the entities directly involved in the interaction) and hence are publicly
criticised by society (e.g. with the help of gossip). Entities that did not comply
with the norms of the normative framework therefore have to fear that every entity
that receives the information about their non-compliance will not act with them in
the future. Hence, in this example the whole society functions as enforcers. As was
previously the case, one major shortcoming of these types of system is the spread
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of false information (a detailed description of the problems inherent in reputation
systems was given in Section 2.4.3).
8.1.4 Self-Control
The last part of the taxonomy is self-control. In contrast to all other compliance-
ensuring mechanisms presented so far, it does not include any additional party, but
only the entity performing an action itself. This entity is assumed to have its own
normative value system and to constantly check whether his actions are contradictory
with the normative framework (i.e. the entity is its own observer). Based on the two
normative value systems, the entity can then decide to punish itself. An example
of such a self-control scenario in a WMG could be that a mobile phone user that
did not contribute his assigned chunk, for example due to technical reasons, offers to
resend the respective chunk to his transaction partner.
8.1.5 Selecting Enforcement Mechanisms
Having presented our taxonomy for mechanisms that help to ensure normative com-
pliance, we must next determine which mechanisms will be used in this dissertation.
Due to time limitations we cannot implement all mechanisms presented. When
deciding which mechanisms to choose, we need to balance between covering as wide a
range of different mechanisms as possible, as well as using mechanisms that are well
established in the literature and therefore offer a solid basis for our simulations. As a
result of these considerations we opted to implement the following three mechanisms:
normative empowered agents, promisee-enforced norms (i.e. an image related concept)
and third-party social control in the form of a reputation mechanism. We do intend
to develop any completely new enforcement mechanisms, but as formulated earlier
in the research questions: we want to show how enforcement mechanisms could be
integrated in a WMG and what effects their integration might yield. This is why –
especially for the reputation mechanisms implemented – we rely on existing work
and include only existing and well-discussed mechanisms here.
8.2 Implementing the Enforcement Mechanisms
In the previous section we presented our taxonomy of mechanisms for ensuring
compliance with the norms of a normative framework and selected three mechanisms
to be used in our simulation. In this section we explain in detail how these three
different mechanisms are integrated into the basic WMG simulation.
8.2.1 Normative Empowered Agents
When using normative empowered agents as enforcement mechanisms for the WMG
simulation, in addition to the “normal” users with their mobile phones, agents that
have been empowered to execute sanctions by the normative framework, and that
police the WMG are added to the simulation. The idea of normative empowered
agents is that some users participating in the wireless grids are helping to enforce
cooperation in the system. They do so for some form of (financial) benefit. One
typical example of normative empowered agents in the real world are police officers.
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They are paid by the state to help to ensure that the law is upheld. It is important
to note is that they do not have superior physical abilities than “normal” citizens
(i.e. no “superhero powers”) but are given special rights and powers to carry out
their job. Thinking of a WMG, enforcement agents might be mobile phone users
that help to patrol the WMG system in exchange for free or reduced mobile phone
service prices. As a result of the incentive to have cheaper mobile phone service, we
assume the normative empowered agents always to act honestly in order not to lose
this benefit.
The sanctions imposed could, for example, take the form of limitation of service
or fines, or the sending of battery intensive messages to violators. The reception of
such messages causes the battery consumption of the violators to rise and thus limits
the gains from cheating. Here, we use the option of fining the cheating agents, where
the amount of the fine is determined by the size of the chunks the cheating agents
have not sent.
The implemented normative empowered agent in our simulation is in large parts
similar to normal agents. One thing that differs however is that the normative
empowered agent is not assigned a chunk (or perceives a chunk that it wants to
download) at the beginning of a simulation and thus does not send cooperation
proposals itself, but only becomes active whenever a cooperation proposal for any
chunk is being sent. It will accept the cooperation proposal and join the group if is
not already engaged in another group.
When assigned a chunk the normative empowered agent will always contribute
its share. The energy consumption costs that the normative empowered agent incurs
in doing so, are added to the total energy consumption in the WMG in order to
account for the additional energy the enforcement mechanism consumes. After the
deadline for cooperation has passed, it checks which other agents have cooperated
by comparing the list of group members (i.e. all agents that were supposed to send
a chunk) with the agents that it has received a chunk from. All the agents that
have not sent any chunks to the normative empowered agent despite having been
assigned one by the group are reported by the normative empowered agent and a
sanction is applied to them. In our simulation experiments this sanction (for easier
calculation) is measured in terms of energy consumption and was set to three times
the relative gains the agents had from cheating, i.e. it was calculated in accordance
with the size of the chunk the agent was supposed to sent. When determining
whom to issue sanctions to, the normative empowered agent does not distinguish
between the intentions of the agent, but only determine which agents have not sent
a chunk to him. Consequently, agents that intended to send their assigned chunks
but did not manage to do so before the deadline receive sanctions in the same way
as agents that did intend not to send the chunk at all. It is important to note that
the simulation ensures that agents cannot be punished twice for the same action, by
checking whether an agent has already been punished for a particular act before the
sanction is applied. If two normative empowered agents happen to observe the same
interaction and detect the same cheaters, the cheaters only receive one sanction.
Besides the addition of the normative empowered agents, the remaining agents
are the same as the ones used in the basic WMG simulation experiments. The only
change that is made concerns the utility consideration of the utility agents. As before,
the utility agents compare the costs of defection and cooperation in order to determine
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whether they will cooperate or not. However, the new potential punishment costs
involved with cheating need to be accounted for by the utility agents. In order to
do this, we have added a counter cheating(X) to the agents’ code. The agents use
this counter to determine the number of events X in which they have cheated so far.
When calculating the possible costs associated with defection, the agents sum the
fines they had to pay prior to the event and divide it by the number of times they
have cheated. The result of this division is the average fine for cheating. If this
number is higher than the possible gains of cheating, the utility agents will decide to
cooperate, whereas otherwise they will decide to defect.
8.2.2 Image Information
In contrast to normative empowered agents, when image information is used as a
means of enforcement, no additional entities are required in the system. Recalling
Definition 7 (page 25), image information is information an agent has acquired about
another agent through personal experiences with that agent (e.g. by cooperating
with it). Agent using image information are very similar to the agents presented in
Chapter 7, however when being offered collaboration by other agents, the agents of
this class consider their past experiences.
When being sent a collaboration proposal by another agent, the agents will check
the image information they have about the sender of the cooperation request. Using
the information they have, they then decide on whether or not to collaborate with
the other agent. If they have positive image information from past interactions,
they will decide to cooperate with the agent, whereas in the opposite case, they will
punish the agent by not interacting with it again. The threshold up to which degree
of cheating an agent will cooperate with other agents can theoretically be determined
by each agent individually. For ease of analysis, we have however set this threshold
uniformly for all agents in such a way that they will not interact with an agent again
if they have previously been cheated by this agent. Agents that the agent has not
interacted with before (i.e. has no image information about) are given the benefit of
the doubt and considered to have good image information.
Resulting from this utilization of image information, the utility considerations of
the utility agents with regard to the costs associated with defecting again need to be
changed.
Again, we utilize a counter to keep track of information. This counter tracks
the number of times the agent has been denied an interaction because of its bad
past behaviour. To calculate the possible costs of defection the agent determines the
number of times it was denied an interaction because of its image in respect to the
total number of interactions it has performed so far. This quotient is then weighted
together with the size of the chunk to send and the number of group members. The
latter plays a significant role as a larger number of group members automatically
results in more agents adding negative image information to their belief base, if the
agent decides to cheat.
The advantage of image information is its reliability, which is why we have chosen
to implement it in this dissertation. However, one problem that however is often
associated with image mechanisms is that an agent first needs its own experience to
acquire some form of image information, and consequently it can be cheated at least
once by a cheater. Reputation mechanisms have been proposed as one way to avoid
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this problem.
8.2.3 Reputation
In reputation mechanisms the image information of the individual agents is circulated
(see Definition 6 on page 25). In the literature a large number of reputation mechan-
isms have been proposed for different situations. In Balke et al. (2009), an overview
of the mechanisms most commonly employed in MAS settings is given. In order to
decide on a mechanism suitable for WMG, we start this section by examining the
requirements for a reputation mechanism to be used in a WMG.
Despite this dissertation using a MAS simulation to represent the actors and
interactions in a WMG, when being brought to market, it will obviously be humans
that interact in it. To support human users, the mechanism employed needs to allow
for subjective expressions of trustworthiness based on the different perceptions each
individual has. Furthermore it needs to be suitable for human cognition, i.e. allowing
for verbal (non numeric and non monotonic) expression of degrees of trustworthiness.
Earlier on in this chapter we pointed out that one major problem for any reputation
mechanism is to deal with the problem of incorrect information. The mechanism
should therefore have the means to take into account the sources of information and
to identify sources that deliberately provide false information.
One mechanism that meets all these criteria was proposed by Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes (2000), which we use in this dissertation2. This mechanism is typically only
referred to by the authors’ names in the literature and we adhere to this convention.
In their mechanism Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes propose that every agent carries a
network of trust relationships in a database, which they can query for information
themselves information or when being asked for feedback about another agent.
Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes define a “trust-relationship” as a vectored connection
between exactly two entities, which in some circumstances can be transitive. In this
way they distinguish between direct trust relationships (“Alice trusts Bob.”) and
recommender trust relationships (“Alice trusts Bob’s recommendations about the
trustworthiness of other agents”), and thus allows entities to account for the source
of reputation information as well as collecting and evaluating information about the
reliability of recommenders. Another interesting contrast to the other formalizations
lies in the fact that due to the qualitative nature of trust, Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes
do not work with probability values or the [−1, 1] interval, but use a multi-context
recording model with abstract trust categories that are easier to understand by
humans. These trust values relate to certain contextual information (“Alice trusts
Bob, concerning “table”-transactions. However, she does not trust him when it
comes to “chair”-transactions.”). The trust categories used by Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes can be seen in Table 8.1.
As a result of their context-dependant reputation considerations, Abduhl-
Rahman and Hailes define reputation as a “troika” (agent− ID, Trust− Category,
Trust− V alue), with trust categories for example being “cooperation partner” or
“recommender”. Each agent stores such reputation information in its own database
and uses it to articulate recommendations. For this database Abdul-Rahman and
2The Java implementation of Abdul-Rahman and Hailes’ reputation mechanism employed in this
dissertation was developed as part of the EU-funded eRep project at the University of Bayreuth in
collaboration with the Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (IIIA) in Barcelona, Spain.
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Table 8.1: Discrete trust value (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997, p. 53)
Value Significance for direct trust
relationship
Significance for recommender trust
relationship
−1 Distrust - completely
untrustworthy
Distrust - completely
untrustworthy
0 Ignorance - cannot make
trust-related judgement about
entity
Ignorance - cannot make
trust-related judgement about
entity
1 Minimal - lowest possible trust
2 Average - mean trustworthiness
(most entities have this trust level)
3 Good - more trustworthy than
most entities
4 Complete - completely trust this
entity
Hailes suggest two data structures, set Q and set R. In the former an agent should
store all the agents it directly trusts for a specific context, whereas the latter contains
experiences with recommenders. The core of Abduhl-Rahman and Hailes’ papers
propose a recommendation protocol that can be used to communicate recommend-
ation requests and statements as well as updating inquiries within an MAS. In
the protocol a recommendation request is passed on until one or more agents are
found which can give information for the requested category and which is trusted by
the penultimate agent in the chain. Based on this idea Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
propose a mathematical algorithm for the rating phase in which the requesting agent
can use the following equation to calculate the trustworthiness of a recommendation.
For tv(Rx) as the recommender trust value of the different recommendations of the
involved agents and rtv(T ) as the trust value articulated by the last agent3 the
trustworthiness is given by the following equation:
tvr(T ) =
tv(R1)
4
∗ tv(R2)
4
∗ . . . ∗ tv(Rn)
4
∗ rtv(T )
As we do not employ any routing considerations in our WMG and any routing of
requests as envisioned by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes would result in large amounts
of network traffic which would reduce the energy advantage of a WMG tremendously,
we altered this component of the reputation mechanism to better suit the WMG. In
our mechanism, the agent seeking a recommendation about a target sends out one
broadcast message to its neighbours and if no answers are given in response to this
request, the agent will not wait for further information, but as in the case of image
information will cooperate with the target.
In their decision process the agents use the reputation mechanisms as follows:
whenever being approached to cooperate, the agents check their own image informa-
tion about the potential cooperation partner. If this query does not yield any results,
i.e. if they have not interacted with the agent before, the agents will send a request
3In case an agent receives more than one recommendation about another agent, the values are
averaged.
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for recommendations to their neighbouring agents and wait for replies. If no replies
arrive, they will decide to interact with the other agent. Otherwise, they will check
the information they have about the information sources. If the information about
the recommender is negative, the agents will not rely on the information, whereas
otherwise they will take it into consideration. If the recommendations about the
target agent are negative (and the recommendation is being considered), the agent
will decide against cooperation, otherwise it will cooperate.
This general procedure is the same for all agents, nevertheless in respect to
answering recommendation requests, differences between the agent types are made.
Whereas the utility maximizing agent prefers not to send any information, as energy
consumption is involved in answering a message, honest as well as malicious agents
answer on average one request per interaction event. This limitation to one message
per interaction is made in order to reduce the energy consumption involved in
answering message requests. Despite this similarity, the malicious and the honest
agents differ significantly in the content of their answers to the request. If not being
asked about itself, the malicious agent will always give negative feedback for the
target in order to appear better in comparison to the other agents. In contrast, an
honest agent will report truthfully if it has any information about the target, trying
to help to improve information in the system.
8.3 Simulation Experiments
In the last section we described how the three different enforcement mechanisms
chosen are implemented in our simulation. In this section we hypothesize how these
different mechanisms might effect the WMG and how the results will compare to our
basic scenario presented in the previous chapter.
8.3.1 Simulation Hypotheses and Setup
Beginning with the simulation hypotheses, the primary reason for testing enforcement
mechanisms is to improve cooperation and thereby energy consumption in the WMG.
Our first hypothesis covers this aspect by assuming that a difference in the energy
consumption rate with and without enforcement exists, and that this difference
is such that the introduction of enforcement mechanisms results in lower energy
consumption rates.
Hypothesis 5: The introduction of enforcement mechanisms reduces the average en-
ergy consumption rate in comparison to the basic WMG simulation experiments
without enforcement mechanisms.
Although we assume enforcement mechanisms to have an effect on the energy
consumption rate, one question remains. That is, to what extent the significant effects
that we observed relating to the values of the simulation input factors in the basic
WMG simulation experiments remain the same with the introduction of enforcement
mechanisms. As – with ρneighbourhood constant – the size of the population determines
the likelihood by which an agent cooperates again, we form the hypothesis that, in
contrast to the experiments conducted earlier, | A | has an impact on the energy
consumption rate. For the remaining two input parameters, we can see no reason for
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any change in their significance with respect to the energy consumption rate. Given
that, we formulate the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5.1: The success (in terms of the average energy consumption rate) of
a WMG employing normative empowered agents as enforcement mechanism
is dependant not only on the population composition and the neighbourhood
density ρneighbourhood, but also on the population size.
Hypothesis 5.2: The success (in terms of the average energy consumption rate) of a
WMG using image-based enforcement is dependant not only on the population
composition and the neighbourhood density ρneighbourhood, but also on the
population size.
Hypothesis 5.3: The success (in terms of the average energy consumption rate)
of a WMG using reputation-based enforcement is dependant not only on the
population composition and the neighbourhood density ρneighbourhood, but also
on the population size.
The final hypothesis we test in the simulation experiments is concerned with
normative empowered agents. So far in the simulations experiments the one input
factor for which we alter values is | A |, i.e. the size of the population. As well
as being able to adjust the population size, in the simulation experiments we can
also test whether the number of normative empowered agents influences the energy
consumption rate, i.e. whether more normative empowered agents automatically
result in lower energy consumption rates. Assuming this correlation to be true, that
is, more normative empowered agents are able to observe more interactions and
therefore can detect and punish more defecting agents, we formulate Hypothesis 5.4.
Hypothesis 5.4: An increase in the percentage of normative empowered agents
will result in a reduction of the average energy consumption ratio.
In order to test the hypothesis just formulated, we use the experimental setup
shown in Table 8.2. In this table, all the changes to the experimental setup from the
previous chapter (i.e. Table 7.1) are highlighted in bold. In addition to the obvious
difference that enforcement mechanisms are now in place, three more changes have
been made. The first of these is directly linked to the enforcement mechanisms. In
order to test Hypothesis 5.4 we introduce two different percentages of normative
empowered agents (the percentages are given in relation to the total number of agents
in the system), i.e. 1% and 5%. Another change is the exclusion of settings with 100%
honest or 100% malicious agents from the experiments4, as these two agents groups
have fixed strategies that are not influenced by changes in the normative framework.
Therefore results with all agents coming from either of the two groups would not be
meaningful5. The final change we make is the extension of the dependant variables
being tested by three new values. The value “Number of Detected Defection Actions”
specifies how many defection action the normative empowered agents have detected,
4This change is not directly highlighted in bold as both numbers are excluded from the table.
5As a result of this change – in order to avoid any distortion of results – we excluded all
experimental results from settings with 100% honest or malicious agents from Chapter 7 in the
comparative analyses in this chapter.
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Table 8.2: Experimental Setup for Enforcement Experiments
Input Factors Values
| A | 200, 400, 800
Number of Interactions per Agent 50
Utility Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Malicious Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75
Honest Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75
Enforcement Mechanism Normative Empowered Agents,
Image Information, Reputation
Information
Percentage of Normative
Empowered Agents as % of | A |
1, 5
Movement Pattern Simple Boundless Random Waypo-
int
ρneighbourhood 10, 20
Measurements Type
Number of Defection Actions N
Number of Cooperation Actions N
Number of Detected Defection
Actions
N
Number of Punishment Actions N
Number of Correctly Punished
Malicious Actions
N
Communication-related Data Transferred
per Agent per Interaction
R
Download-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Reception-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Sending-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Integrity Constraints Formula
Full Partitioning Utility Agents % + Honest Agents
% + Malicious Agents % = 100
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whereas the “Number of Punishment Actions” refers to the punishments that were
issued. While it might seem at a first glance that they point to the same information,
the two numbers can have different values. If two normative empowered agents detect
the same defection for example, two detected defection actions are added. However,
as a result of the previously stated rule that each defection should receive only one
sanction, the second sanction is not counted. Thus, the difference between the two
numbers tells us the number of extra work done by the normative empowered agents.
The last number specifies the number of correctly punished malicious actions, i.e. the
number of times the normative empowered agents issued a sanction to an agent that
did not send a chunk deliberately. Using this number in combination with the total
number of cheating events and the number of sanction events we are able to compute
the false positive and the false negative rates for the experiments with normative
empowered agents involved. These two rates will not be part of the analysis in this
chapter as they are not covered by any hypothesis, however they are discussed with
regard to the multi-stakeholder impact in Chapter 10.
8.3.2 Simulation Results
After presenting our hypotheses in the previous section we turn to the analysis of
the simulation results in order to test the hypotheses made6.
We first look at differences in the mean energy consumption rates in simulation
experiments with and without enforcement and compare these with the help of
ANOVA, by testing whether the null hypothesis that the enforcement mechanisms
account for no difference can be rejected or not. Table 8.3 shows the results of this
comparison.
Table 8.3: Analysis of Variance Comparing Simulation Experiments with and
without Enforcement
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Enforcement 224.759 4 56.1898 1539.94 < 0.0001
Error 709.842 19454 0.0365
Total 934.601 19458
As the significant p-value suggests, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that the utilization of enforcement results in a difference in the average energy
consumption rates. However, looking at the table more closely, a high error rate
can be detected, indicating that a difference exists between the three enforcement
mechanisms that are grouped in the ANOVA. In order to examine this effect more
closely, as well as to determine the extent to which each enforcement mechanism
contributes to this difference, we perform Tukey’s test as post hoc analysis. Figure
8.37 shows the results of this analysis and Table 8.4 gives on overview of the respective
statistical values per enforcement mechanism.
6For testing the hypotheses formulated in this chapter, we use the same statistical tools and file
setup as in the previous chapter.
7Normative empowered agents are denoted as “Police” in the figure.
176 Enforcement Mechanisms for the WMG Simulation
0.
5
0.
55
0.
6
0.
65
0.
7
0.
75
0.
8
0.
85
0.
9
re
pu
ta
tio
n
po
lic
e2
po
lic
e1
im
ag
e
no
En
fo
rc
em
en
t
Enforcement Mechanism
En
fo
rc
em
en
t M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
F
ig
u
re
8
.3
:
M
u
lt
ip
le
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
(T
u
k
ey
’s
T
es
t)
R
es
u
lt
s
o
f
M
a
rg
in
a
l
M
ea
n
s
fo
r
C
o
m
p
a
ri
n
g
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
E
x
p
er
im
en
ts
w
it
h
a
n
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
–
P
o
st
H
o
c
T
es
t
8.3 Simulation Experiments 177
Table 8.4: Analysis of Variance in Comparison of the Enforcement Mechanisms
– Post Hoc Test
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Image-Information 26.969 1 26.969 684.73 < 0.0001
Normative Empowered
Agents (1%)
76.276 1 76.6272 1871.18 < 0.0001
Normative Empowered
Agents (5%)
65.642 1 65.6416 1623.26 < 0.0001
Reputation 12.308 1 12.3078 332.01 < 0.0001
As the p-values in Table 8.4 show, all mechanisms have an average energy
consumption rate significantly different to the experiments with no enforcement,
however looking at the Tukey’s test results it is clear that the results for the
reputation mechanism stand out. Thus, whereas the results indicate that we can
confirm the Hypothesis 5 for image-related information and normative empowered
agents, the Tukey’s test for the reputation mechanism show that the experiments
using this mechanism, have an on average higher mean than when no enforcement
is used. This implies that the utilization of reputation information increased the
average energy consumption rate. We examine this initially rather surprising effect
later when discussing Hypothesis 5.3 in more detail, and summarize the results for
Hypothesis 5 as follows: enforcement mechanisms with image information as well as
with normative empowered agents help to decrease the average energy consumption
ratio, but Hypothesis 5 is incorrect for the reputation-information based enforcement
mechanism implemented.
A second interesting effect we can observe in Figure 8.3 is that our Hypothesis 5.4
(that an increase in the percentage of normative empowered agents will result in a
reduction of the average energy consumption ratio) seems incorrect. In the figure, the
average mean energy consumption rate for experiments with 1% normative empowered
agents is lower than the one with 5%. A one-tailed paired-sample t-test8 performed
based on this observation, in order to test for significant evidence against the null
hypothesis that the means of the results with 1% normative empowered agents are not
smaller than the results with 5% normative empowered agents, results in p-value of
1.7889× 10−18. This implies that we have to reject the null hypothesis, which in turn
means that the lower average energy consumption values for results with 1% normative
empowered agents are not a result of chance. Looking for reasons for this effect,
comparing the number of cheat events in the simulation experiments with normative
empowered agents by performing a t-test, only a slight, and not significant, advantage
for experiments with 5% normative empowered agents can be found (the p-value of
the one-tailed t-test is 0.3980), i.e. that in these settings normative empowered agents
only added slightly to the total energy consumption. This implies that the improved
detection of violations resulting from the larger number of normative empowered
agents, is outweighed by the additional energy they consume. In economic terms
8We opt for the one-tailed version of the t-test as we have a hypothesis which of the two means
is larger. As a result of our assumptions that the means of the cases with 5% normative empowered
agents are higher, we choose the left-tailed option in the one-tailed test.
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this means that the lower percentage of normative empowered agents perform better
with regard to satisficing cooperation under consideration of the energy consumption
rate. In economics, satisficing refers to a decision-making strategy that attempts to
meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an optimal solution (Simon, 1956).
Thus, although not optimal with regard to the detection of violations (1% normative
empowered agents will detect less than 5%) the costs associated with them (i.e. the
energy they consume for performing their observation and punishing actions) are
significantly lower, making them more advantageous in terms of the overall energy
saving.
Analysing the results to check whether Hypothesis 5.1 is correct, the ANOVA
gives the values shown in Tables 8.5 and 8.6:
Table 8.5: Analysis of Variance for Hypothesis 5.1, 1% Normative Empowered
Agents
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 122.391 12 10.1993 1667.62 < 0.0001
ρneighbourhood 2.957 1 2.95707 80.49 < 0.0001
| A | 0.0313 2 0.15625 4.17 0.0154
Table 8.6: Analysis of Variance for Hypothesis 5.1, 5% Normative Empowered
Agents
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 109.739 12 9.14495 1096.28 < 0.0001
ρneighbourhood 2.828 1 2.82762 79.1 < 0.0001
| A | 0.205 2 0.10231 2.81 0.0604
As the p-values in both tables indicate, as hypothesized, similarly to Chapter
7, for both ρneighbourhood as well as the population composition we can reject the
null hypothesis and therefore assume the input parameters to be relevant for the
energy consumption rate. Concerning | A | Tables 8.5 and 8.6 suggest a biased
picture. Whereas | A | is significant enough to reject the null hypothesis in case of
1% normative empowered agents, this significance is marginally missed (at an level
of p < 0.05) in case of 5% normative empowered agents. Thus, a clear tendency
towards a significance can be seen, but it is not reached. Looking at reasons for the
marginally non-significance value in case of 5% normative empowered agents, the
extra energy consumption by the greater number of normative empowered agents
seems to have reduced the general effect. In summary, we have established that
Hypothesis 5.1 is correct for ρneighbourhood and the population composition, but only
can be partially proven for | A |, as the increased energy consumption caused by the
normative empowered agents weakens the effect.
Looking at the ANOVA results for image and reputation information based
scenarios, the values in Tables 8.7 and 8.8 can be determined from the experimental
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results.
Table 8.7: Analysis of Variance for Hypothesis 5.2, Image Information
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 100.244 12 8.35369 963.03 < 0.0001
ρneighbourhood 0.57 1 0.5704 16.67 < 0.0005
| A | 1.545 2 0.77266 22.74 < 0.0001
Table 8.8: Analysis of Variance for Hypothesis 5.3, Reputation Information
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees
of Free-
dom
Mean
Squares
F Prob >
F (= p-
value)
Population Composition 77.117 12 6.42641 663.29 < 0.0001
ρneighbourhood 0.031 1 0.03118 1.05 0.3052
| A | 10.166 2 5.08315 188.08 < 0.0001
For simulations in which image information is being used, as hypothesized, we can
reject the null hypothesis for all input factors (i.e. have enough evidence to assume
that Hypothesis 5.2 is correct). For the simulations with reputation information
this is not the case. Although – as expected – for both the population composition
and | A | we can reject the null hypothesis that they have no impact on the energy
consumption rate, the null hypothesis for ρneighbourhood can clearly not be rejected
with a p-value of 0.3052. We performed post hoc tests (as before we use Tukey’s
test) for ρneighbourhood and the population composition. The latter is analysed in
more detail due to it having the highest impact on the energy consumption rate of
all three input factors. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the results of the post hoc tests.
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Figure 8.4: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of ρneighbourhood
Marginal Means in Settings with Reputation Information – Post Hoc Test
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Looking at Figure 8.5 first and comparing it to Figure 7.5 (page 159), several
interesting differences can be observed, which also explain the unexpected mean
difference between reputation information and no enforcement discovered earlier (see
Figure 8.4).
The first difference to notice is that the means in the settings with reputation
information have a wider distribution around each mean value (indicated by the
horizontal bars), which implies that the results in the simulation runs with identical
settings resulted in a larger variance in energy consumption rates. The second aspect
to notice is that minor (but not significant) improvements of the energy consumption
rates for the settings which performed worse in the basic WMG experiments can be
detected. Thus, at the upper end of the energy consumption spectrum, consumption
decreases as a result of the enforcement can be detected. The problem in case
of reputation, however, is the cases with lower energy consumption rates, which
overshadow this positive result by an increase in the consumption rate.
Digging deeper into the differences in the energy consumption rate the reason
for this effect becomes apparent. As a result of the large amount of additional
messages with reputation information being transmitted, the communication costs
are disproportionately high and thereby worsen the energy consumption. Thus,
especially in cases with large numbers of honest agents which would prefer cooperation
even without enforcement mechanisms, the reputation requests and answers do not
improve enforcement but rather produce additional energy consumption.
This effect of the additional communication costs can also be seen when looking
at the Tukey’s test result for ρneighbourhood (i.e Figure 8.4), which shows that – in
contrast to Chapter 7, Figure 7.7 – a higher ρneighbourhood tends to result in a worse
energy consumption rate (the difference is not significant as the two bars in Figure 8.4
overlap), which can again be attributed to the raised number of cooperation messages
in these settings (with a higher ρneighbourhood more agents get and answer messages).
A second effect that had negative consequences for the reputation mechanism was the
negative information induced by the malicious agents. Our simulation experiments
were set up in such a way that if in doubt (i.e not verifiable), reputation information
was considered to be correct. As a result of this, especially in the beginning of each
simulation experiment, by giving negative reputation information, malicious agents
were able to discourage agents from cooperating with potential rivals, which also had
the side-effect that agents could gather less image information on their own. As a
consequence, they were more likely to have to trust uncertain reputation information
in the following interactions causing problems for the overall reputation mechanism.
Summarizing, for Hypothesis 5.3 we can only verify the hypothesized effect for | A |
and the population composition, whereas for the neighbourhood density the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
8.4 Summary
Starting with the results from the simulation experiments in Chapter 7 as a basis
for comparison in this chapter we introduced enforcement mechanisms to the WMG.
Table 8.9 summarizes the main findings.
Of the enforcement mechanisms introduced, the normative empowered agents
especially help to improve the energy consumption rate. Although the results we
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Table 8.9: Simulation Results Description Table for Enforcement Mechanisms
Input
Factors
Measurement α Relationship
Image
Information
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The utilization of image information
helps to improve the energy con-
sumption rate compared to settings
without enforcement.
Normative
Empowered
Agents
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The utilization of normative em-
powered agents helps to improve the
energy consumption rate compared
to settings without enforcement.
Reputation
Information
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The utilization of reputation inform-
ation does not help to improve the
energy consumption rate compared
to settings without enforcement.
% of
Normative
Empowered
Agents
Energy
Consumption
Rate
< 0.0001 A decrease from 5% to 1% decreases
the energy consumption rate.
Population
Composition
Energy
Consumption
Rate
> 0.99 The population composition has a
significant impact on the energy con-
sumption rate. This result is inde-
pendent of the enforcement mechan-
ism chosen.
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present are strongly linked to the specific mechanisms chosen, nevertheless some
general findings can be made.
The first of the findings is that, similar to the basic WMG experiments, the popu-
lation composition again accounts for the majority of the impact of the input factors
on the energy consumption rate. Secondly, the costs associated with the enforcement
can outweigh the benefits. In the case of normative empowered agents this resulted
in the situation that fewer agents produced a better absolute result in terms of the
energy consumption rate, while “only” satisficing the detection of violation actions.
Similar effects could be seen in experiments with reputation information, where the
message overhead produced by the reputation request and answers outweigh the
benefits of the mechanism. One further aspect that influenced the performance of our
reputation information-based enforcement mechanism negatively is false information.
This is particularly important as we implemented an adaptation of a mechanism
that tried to account for this problem. However it did not have sufficient interaction
numbers to have any significant effect, as the mechanism by Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes – like any reputation mechanism – works better the higher the number of
repeated interactions. Unfortunately this seems unlikely in a WMG, suggesting that
reputation mechanisms in general might be unsuitable for such settings.
184 Enforcement Mechanisms for the WMG Simulation
Chapter 9
On the Effects of Movement in
the Wireless Mobile Grid
Simulation
In the predeceasing chapters we emphasised the importance of location and vicinity.
As a result of the limited range of WLAN transmission and the bounded rationality
assumption made in this dissertation, the vicinity of the agents in the simulation
determines their possible interaction partners. It therefore has a huge impact on the
WMG. To represent the movement behaviour of mobile phone users as accurately
as possible in the simulation experiments, ideally real movement traces would be
required. However, as a result of a lack of tools as well as legal problems for
monitoring time-resolved movement of individuals (Gonza´lez et al., 2008), no real
movement traces are available for this dissertation. This necessitates the use of
abstract models for determining the movement of the mobile phone users. Up to
this point, the simulations have used a simple one-dimensional boundless random
waypoint movement model that is characterized by agents choosing random locations
in the interval [0;1] and stopping after each move to decide on some new action
(which could either be to move again or to obtain a file).
Despite random waypoint or random walk1 models often being used in (wireless)
telecommunication systems simulations (see Bettstetter (2001b) for a list of works
using the random waypoint or random movement model), the model itself was often
criticized, mainly for its simplifying assumptions (Yoon et al., 2003). Following
Camp et al. (2002) and Bettstetter (2001a), who amongst others show that the
choice of movement model can have significant effects on simulation results, we
now move away from the random waypoint movement model used in the simulation
experiments conducted so far. Instead we employ three different movement models
in the simulation experiments and test to what extent the movement models effect
the results found earlier.
We first give a brief overview of the movement models currently employed in
simulations of user movement in mobile telecommunication networks. Afterwards we
1Random walk models differ from random waypoint models in the respect that they do not
explicitly assume the moving entities to stop for a certain period of time after a walk, but that the
moving entities directly move into a new direction with a step. A random waypoint model can be
transformed into a random walk model by setting the pauses between two movement steps to zero.
186 On the Effects of Movement in the WMG Simulation
explain the three models we have chosen to implement for the simulation experiments
in more detail (both from a theoretical as well as an implementation perspective). As
in the two previous chapters, we will then briefly outline the simulation experiment
hypotheses and setup. We conclude this chapter by presenting and discussing the
results of the simulation experiments.
9.1 Extending the Basic Movement Pattern
9.1.1 Movement Patterns for Wireless Mobile Grids
Looking at surveys dealing with movement models for open distributed systems in
general or focusing on human mobile phone user movement in particular, a broad
distinction between two groups of movement models can be found in these surveys:
 entity movement models, and
 group movement models (Camp et al., 2002).
Entity movement models view the movement of the individual mobile phone
users as independent of each other, whereas group movement models assume some
form of dependency (i.e. some form of social structure) between the individuals.
For both groups of movement models, a large number of variants with different
specifications exist. Camp et al. (2002) for example discuss seven different synthetic
entity movement models2:
Random Walk Movement Models (and their many derivatives): In mod-
els belonging to this category, new locations and possibly the speed by which
the location is reached are determined at random.
Random Waypoint Movement Models: As the name indicated, in these mod-
els, waypoints are chosen at random. Furthermore, this model extends the
random walk movement model by introducing stops between two movement
step.
Random Direction Movement Models: This mode assumes the area in which
the mobile phone users move to be bounded (typically having the form of a
rectangle). The individuals in these models have to travel to one edge of the
area first, before they can change directions (and speed) again.
Boundless Simulation Area Movement Models: In these models the 2D rect-
angular space is converted to a boundless area by connection of the opposite
edges of the rectangle. This shape is referred to as a torus. Although described
as separate model by Camp et al. (2002), it can be implemented as variant to
any of the model described here.
Gauss-Markov Movement Models: The Gauss-Markov movement models are
based on the random models. However they use a so-called tuning parameter
2Camp et al. (2002) uses the term “mobility” rather “movement” when referring to the locomotion
of individuals. For reasons of consistency with the terminology used in this dissertation we use
movement instead of mobility when describing the research presented by Champ et al.
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to enable the utilization of different degrees of randomness in the mobility
patterns (Tolety, 1999).
Probabilistic Versions of the Random Walk Movement Models: These
models utilize a set of additional probability values to determine the next
positions the mobile phone users move to.
City Section Movement Models: In the city section movement models the sim-
ulation area in which the mobile phone users can move is a street network that
represent a city in which the mobile network exists. With the help of speed
limits, etc. for certain streets, different city structures can be represented.
In addition to these seven movement models classified by Camp et al. another
movement model that is characterised by its assumption that mobile phone users
exhibit sedentary movement behaviour can be found in literature(Gonza´lez et al.,
2008). Sedentary behaviour implies that mobile phone users typically have a couple
of locations (e.g. home or work) that they regularly return to, whereas random
movement is assumed otherwise. Due to a lack of a common term in literature, we
refer to the models exhibiting these characteristics as sedentary movement models.
With regard to the group movement models, Camp et al. (2002) distinguish five
different sub-models:
Exponential Correlated Random Movement Models: In these kind of group
movement models a motion function which is applicable for the whole group is
used to determine new locations for the members of the group.
Column Movement Models: These models are characterized by the members
of the group being always located uniformly along a line. This movement is
uniformly forward, keeping the uniform distribution between the individuals.
Nomadic Community Mobility Models: In contrast to other group movement
models, in these models the whole group does not always move together to a
new location, but only a subset of the group. Individuals can still move around
freely but have a certain probability to arrange their movement to return to
the group’s location.
Pursue Movement Models: As the name implies, in this kind of group movement
models, the mobile phone users follow a single target.
Reference Point Group Movement Models: In reference point group move-
ment models, a local center of a group is determined. When members of
the group move, the local center changes and the remaining group members
will try to adjust their location around the new logical center.
Looking at all the briefly described movement models, there are to many to
integrate them all into the WMG simulation. Instead we selected a few models.
The selection criteria that we used for our decision, are two fold: (i) we want to
represent a wide range of different models, both accounting and not accounting for
social structures between the individuals, (ii) the chosen models should represent
real movement patterns as well as possible, without unnecessarily increasing the
complexity of the simulation.
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Based on these two criteria we chose to implement three different movement
models. These movement models are, a probabilistic version of the basic movement
model, a sedentary movement pattern as well as a movement model combining
the advantages of the pursue movement model and the nomadic group approach.
The models were chosen based on comparative study by Camp et al. (2002) who
analyse movement models with regard to their realism. They conclude that for
entity movement models especially boundless simulation areas – which we use in
our simulations – increase realism and furthermore highlight probabilistic models
being good in their portrayal of realism despite being very simple. In addition
we decided to follow the ideas presented by Gonza´lez et al. (2008) who were the
first research team that was able to obtain real mobile phone user movement data
from a telecommunications provider. Based on this data, Gonza´lez et al. concluded
that especially nomadic properties in combination with daytime considerations are
important to model human movement. Thus, humans are likely to be at home during
nighttime and travel to work in the morning, etc. As we use an event-based, rather
than a continuous time definition in this dissertation, we do not include the time
aspect Gonza´lez et al. describe but focused on a nomadic movement model.
With respect to the group movement models Camp et al. (2002) point out the
realism of both nomadic group and pursue movement models, however they criticize
the lack nomadic character in the latter. One problem with nomadic group models
is that few specifications are given on which part of the group to focus on when
determining a location. This makes them difficult to implement. We therefore
combine the nomadic group and the pursue movement model in this dissertation and
thereby try to benefit from the advantages of both models.
Having decided to extend our simulations with these three models, we provide a
more detailed description of them in the next section and furthermore we explain how
we implement them in the simulation. Afterwards we will focus on the simulation
experiments. We provide the simulation hypothesis for the simulation experiments
before discussing the resulting simulation setup.
9.1.2 The Extended Random Waypoint Pattern
We start with on extension of the original movement pattern to include probabilistic
values that distinguish the movement of the individuals. The probabilistic value is
a mobility index that determines the size of the steps a single individual can move
by when changing its location. This probabilistic value was first discussed in the
Gauss-Markov movement models (Bettstetter, 2001b) and expresses the idea that
humans have different probabilities to travel large distances, either for example due
to physical restraints or as a result of social constraints. The idea of the mobility
index is that each individual has a certain likelihood for travelling large distances.
Businessmen for example might be more likely to travel large distances on a regular
basis (e.g. by plane) then elderly people whose mobility could be restricted due
to physical problems. The mobility index (or maximum step size) accounts for
this by giving a mobility level to every individual. It determines how far it will
move at maximum within one movement step. Making no assumptions about which
population groups are more likely to move short or far distances, in the simulation
experiments we assign mobility values to each individual by using random numbers.
When using the extended random waypoint movement model, at the beginning of
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each simulation experiment, each agent picks a random number rm ∈ [0, 1] (with
the number in the interval being uniformly distributed) that is used as the agent’s
mobility index throughout one simulation run (i.e. for the complete 50 interactions).
In the movement process when determining a new location and obtaining rd, the
agent multiplies rd × rm to determine the final distance it will move. As a result of
this multiplication, agents with a low rm are more likely to choose new locations
that are close to the old location than agents with a high rm. The multiplication
also has the effect that the distances the agents move, instead of being uniformly
distributed between −1 and 1, will get closer to a normal distribution with mean 0.
9.1.3 The Nomadic Pursue Group Pattern
The second additional movement pattern we include in the simulation experiments
is a nomadic pursue group pattern. This pattern represents members of a group
moving together with some members of the group performing individual steps in
between (Dalu et al., 2008). An example of such a movement in the real world is
a group of friends that move closely together very often when they do something
together. While the group tends to move together, the friends will not always do
everything together but at certain times some of them might be in another location
and do something else instead, and join the group later again.
To simulate this movement pattern, at the beginning of the simulation experiments,
the agents are distributed into groups. For the size of these groups we choose sizes
that are uniformly distributed in the interval [8,12] and have a mean that is the
same as the lower ρneighbourhood value used in the simulations so far. In nomadic
group movement models a probability value rα is used to determine whether the
agents follow the group or not. At each step, the agents pick a random number
and if that number is lower or equal to rα they follow the group, otherwise they
choose a random location independent of the group. In our simulation experiments
rα had a value of 0.5, to allow for a strong group relationship, but at the same time
give agents a chance to perform individual movements3. The problem in nomadic
group movement models is how to define the group location at a given point in time.
Averaging the location of all group members is not a sufficient solution as the result
will be distorted by the group members that have decided to choose a location away
from the group. In order to solve this problem, in the simulation experiments we
combined the nomadic group movement model with another movement model that
was identified as having a high realism by Camp et al. (2002): the pursue movement
model. In this model the group pursues a single predetermined target at every step
of the simulation, i.e. the group follows the target to whatever location it moves to.
The targets are chosen at random at the beginning of the experiment and remain
constant. When the agents are sorted into groups, we assign the first agent sorted to
a specific group to be the target for that group. Hence when choosing a new location,
the agents check for this “group leader” (i.e. the target) and follow it to a location
within its visibility radius. The target chooses its location using the simple random
waypoint movement pattern we employed in the experiments so far.
3We use rα = 50% in all simulation experiments that employ a nomadic pursue group movement
pattern. The simulation is however written in such as way that rα can be set to any value in [0, 100]
and different values for rα can be tested.
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9.1.4 The Sedentary Movement Pattern
The third additional movement model we test in this chapter is a sedentary movement
model. For reasons of simplicity and because the representation of time is based on
discrete events, we did not associate any temporal parameters with the sedentary
locations as suggested by Nguyen et al. (2011). Instead, in the simulation experiments,
we attribute two random sedentary locations to each agent and define a sedentary
level rsed
4. When the sedentary movement model is being used, if an agents wants
to determine its new location it picks a random number (∈ [0, 100]). If the number
is higher than rsed, the agent picks a random location according to the random
waypoint model, otherwise it will chose one of the two sedentary location5.
9.2 Simulation Experiments
9.2.1 Simulation Hypothesis and Setup
In the introduction to this chapter we pointed out that works by Camp et al. (2002)
as well as Bettstetter (2001a) suggest that the choice of movement model does have
an effect on the results in a simulation. We take their statements as hypothesis for
our experiments.
Hypothesis 6: A change in the movement model used in the simulation experiments
will effect the enforcement mechanism results.
As a result of this hypothesis, the experimental setup shown in Figure 9.1 is
the same as in Chapter 8, except for being extended with respect to the movement
model employed (highlighted in bold print). In the movement experiments conducted,
we repeated the experiments conducted in Chapter 8 three times, using a different
movement pattern each time.
9.2.2 Simulation Results
After presenting our hypothesis, we now focus on the analysis of the simulation
experiments. Due to a lack of computational resources, we were not able to determine
the results of the n-way ANOVA for the three enforcement mechanisms (in comparison
to the situation without any enforcement). So for the analysis we compared the results
for each single enforcement mechanism separately and will draw our conclusions form
these results. Figures 9.1–9.4 show the results of the ANOVA for each movement
model (analysed by enforcement mechanism) and the respective post hoc Tukey’s
test results. In all four figures, the bar representing the means of the initial setting
(with the random waypoint movement) is coloured in cyan. If no significant evidence
against the null hypothesis can be found (i.e. that no difference between the respective
movement model and the random waypoint model exists), the respective bars are
coloured grey, otherwise they are coloured red.
Looking at the figures, no coherent picture for the movement patterns can be
determined, but their performance varies a lot and we have to drop Hypothesis 6. Of
4Similar to rα, in the simulation experiments we set rsed to 50%, but developed the simulation
in such as way, that it can be started with any rsed ∈ [0, 100].
5Both sedentary locations have approximately equal chance of being picked by the agent.
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Table 9.1: Experimental Setup for Movement Pattern Experiments
Input Factors Values
| A | 200, 400, 800
Number of Interactions per Agent 50
Utility Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Malicious Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75
Honest Agents as % of | A | 0, 25, 50, 75
Enforcement Mechanism Normative Empowered Agents, Im-
age Information, Reputation Inform-
ation
Percentage of Normative Empowered
Agents as % of | A |
1, 5
Movement Pattern Simple Boundless Random
Waypoint, Sedentary Move-
ment, Reference Point (No-
madic) Group Movement
rα, rsedentary 50%
ρneighbourhood 10, 20
Measurements Type
Number of Defection Actions N
Number of Cooperation Actions N
Number of Detected Defection Actions N
Number of Punished Actions N
Number of Correctly Punished Malicious
Actions
N
Communication-related Data Transferred
per Agent per Interaction
R
Download-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Reception-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Sending-related Data Transferred per
Agent per Interaction
R
Integrity Constraints Formula
Full Partitioning Utility Agents % + Honest Agents
% + Malicious Agents % = 100
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Figure 9.1: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of Movement Model
Marginal Means for Experiments with 1% Normative Framwork Empowered
Agents – Post Hoc Test
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Figure 9.2: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of Movement Model
Marginal Means for Experiments with 5% Normative Framwork Empowered
Agents – Post Hoc Test
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Figure 9.3: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of Movement Model
Marginal Means for Experiments with Image Information – Post Hoc Test
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Figure 9.4: Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of Movement Model
Marginal Means for Experiments with Reputation Information – Post Hoc Test
the twelve simulation experiments with different movement patterns, in seven cases
(i.e. more than half) no significant difference could be found, two times the average
consumption rate decreased and three times it increased. In detail, the introduction
of the mobility index twice resulted in a worse energy consumption rate, while on
two occasions no significant difference was found; the sedentary movement produced
a better result once and three times no significant difference; and the nomadic group
movement pattern resulted in one worse, one better and twice a not significantly
different energy consumption rates.
Looking at the individual enforcement mechanisms, the mechanism using image
information is the most stable mechanism in all movement model conditions. A
similar statement is true for the reputation mechanism which has no significant
difference, except when the mobility index is employed. In contrast, when normative
empowered agents are used as enforcement mechanism, the result is very diverse
between the two settings with different percentages of these agents tested in the
simulation experiments. Whereas in the case of 5% normative empowered agents,
the energy consumption rate improves for the different movement patterns, in case
of 1% a different picture appears. Except for one mechanism with no significant
difference, the performance of the enforcement mechanism with respect to the energy
consumption rate decreases. One reason for this poor performance of the mechanism
with 1% normative empowered agents might be that it already produced very good
results, and further improvement was difficult, but without further experiments
and analysis no general conclusions can be drawn. Despite the seemingly negative
impact of movement models on the normative empowered agents, in absolute terms,
these still performed the best of all four enforcement mechanisms. The reputation
information based mechanism showed the worst performance. The only difference
now is that systems with 1% normative empowered agents performed similarly to
systems with 5%, which implies that the advantage (in terms of energy consumption
rate) that the 1% normative empowered agents had in the previous experiments is
lost.
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9.3 Summary
To make the simulation experiments more realistic, in this chapter we introduced
movement patterns to the simulation. We implemented three different movement
patterns, including a pattern which focused on social (i.e. group) movement and one
that incorporated sedentary information. Analysing the results of the simulation
experiments with enforcement, normative empowered agents still help to reduce the
energy consumption rate the most effective. Concerning the impact of the movement
in general, unfortunately no clear pattern could be detected. Overall the image-
information based enforcement mechanism showed the most stable performance (with
respect to the energy consumption rate) whereas for the remaining three enforcement
mechanisms at least one movement pattern resulted in a significant difference. Due to
the large number of experiments, it appears unlikely that these significant differences
are a product of chance, but to be able to draw more specific conclusions, further
tests with more fine-grained settings are required. These however are beyond the
scope of this dissertation.
Part IV
Evaluation

Chapter 10
Further Simulation Analysis
The previous chapter concluded the description of the simulation experiments con-
ducted in this dissertation. The analysis of the simulation results has so far focused
in particular on the energy consumption rates, i.e. on the energy efficiency of the
scenarios. In this chapter we examine the results in a broader context by analysing
them using the evaluation criteria defined in Section 6.3. First, the analysis focuses
on the WMG business case study described in Chapter 3. In Section 10.2 we broaden
the view and discuss the implications of the findings for open distributed systems in
general.
10.1 Implications of the Simulation Results for the
Business Case Study
Summing up the results from the simulation experiments so far, we have compared
three different enforcement mechanisms (with one mechanism being tested with
different input parameters), of which the normative empowered agents performed
best as regards to the energy consumption rate. In contrast the reputation-information
based mechanism that we implemented suffered from false information as well as
severe message-based energy consumption overhead, making the energy consumption
rate higher than in cases where no enforcement is used.
In their IAD framework, Ostrom et al. (1994) argue that patterns of interaction
resulting from interactions in the action arena (which are the outcomes of the
simulation experiments in this dissertation) always have to be seen in the light of the
evaluation criteria relevant for the system or governance decision being evaluated. In
Section 6.3 we highlight that for real world business initiatives, the evaluation criteria
need to account for the various interests of the multiple stakeholders in the system,
and incorporate inter-dependencies between them. Resulting from this challenge we
established six major evaluation criteria covering technical as well as economic and
social aspects, namely:
 scalability,
 robustness,
 infrastructural cost savings,
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 enforcement costs and their distribution across stakeholder groups,
 cost and benefit distribution between users, and
 false positive and false negative rates.
In this section, we will in turn discuss the performance of the four enforcement
mechanisms presented with respect to these criteria. When the presentation of the
results of all experimental settings would distract from the finding of our analysis
(e.g. due to the mere number of results), we do not analyse all four enforcement
mechanisms, but concentrate on normative empowered agents because of their
good performance in previous experiments. Starting with scalability as the first
criterion and recalling the p-values for the population size affecting the enforcement
mechanisms in Tables 8.5–8.8, of the mechanisms presented, normative empowered
agents were the one least affected by population size | A | and the chosen reputation
mechanism was affected the most. This implies that in terms of scalability, normative
empowered agents are likely to perform equally well in small as well as in large
settings if their percentage is kept constant. Although being advantageous in that
respect, in real world settings, keeping the percentage of normative empowered agents
constant and scaling with the number of system participants will not always be easily
possible. As expressed beforehand in Section 8.2.1, in a WMG setting, normative
empowered agents are likely to be normal mobile phone users that help to control
the WMG for some form of financial benefit such as a a free mobile phone contract.
As these incentives typically have a long term nature it may be difficult to increase
(and especially decrease) the number of mobile phone users required to keep the
percentage of normative framework empowered agents constant in a system quickly.
The burden of determining the number of normative empowered agents that will
be required in the WMG lies with the iPr. Any over or underestimation can have
negative consequences: an underestimation can result in the loss of the control of the
system, while an overestimation can result in unnecessarily high enforcement costs,
both financial and in terms of the energy consumption rate. In contrast, reputation
and image based mechanisms scale automatically with the number of users in the
WMG. These mechanisms however can have practical implementation problems
relating to scalability. Being decentralized enforcement mechanisms, both rely on
information stored with the agents. In a WMG, the image/reputation information
the agents acquire will therefore need to be stored on the mobile phones of the agents.
This storing of information is therefore restricted by the amount of physical storage
capacity on the phones that users are prepared to allocated, which sets an upper
bound to the amount of information that can be dealt with.
Looking at the robustness criterion, all enforcement mechanisms are affected by
malicious agents and perform significantly worse if more malicious agents join the
system. Of the enforcement mechanisms tested the normative framework empowered
agents functioned best in punishing the malicious agents, but were not able to stop
the malicious behaviour. This is not surprising, because the malicious agents in the
simulations preferred always to cheat, no matter what the associated costs. In the
simulation experiments we tested with up to 75% malicious agents to determine the
robustness of the system. In a real world setting, it seems very unlikely that such a
high percentage of agents would adopt the malicious strategy. The mechanism that
was worst affected, was the reputation mechanism. As outlined in Section 8.3, one
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major reason for this is the spreading of false image information by malicious agents,
which the mechanism could not tolerate. As discussed in the previous chapter, this
problem might be dealt with by choosing another reputation mechanism.
Considering the economic / financial criteria, the first criterion is especially
interesting for the iPr: the infrastructural costs saving resulting from less data being
requested from the base stations. As we pointed out in Section 6.3, according to Buck
(2010) approximately 31% of the costs per user for an iPr are related to infrastructural
costs and of these costs approximately 50% are attributable to the base stations
Gruber (2005). As a consequence, any saving with respect to base stations is very
advantageous for the iPr if it can be achieved without having any negative effects
on the mobile phone users. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 show the average reduction in the
data transmission in the experiments without any enforcement (Figure 10.1) and
in the experiments with the highest reduction in the energy consumption rate, i.e.
experiments with 1% normative empowered agents (random waypoint movement
model) (Figure 10.2)1. The values in the figures are given in percentages.
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Figure 10.1: Base Station Transmission Savings (in %) – No Enforcement
Looking at Figure 10.1, the first aspect to notice is that in some runs no saving
were made and all the data that would have been downloaded in the absence of WMGs.
These runs did not include any honest agents in their configuration and therefore no
cooperation took place. This is evidence that cooperation is not only advantageous
for energy consumption, but also helps the iPr by reducing the base station load.
Looking at the base station savings when 1% normative empowered agents were
introduced to the simulation experiments (i.e. comparing Figures 10.1 and 10.2)
a significant increase in the base station transmission savings can be observed. In
more detail, the minimum, maximum and mean base station transmission savings2
specified in Table 10.1 can be calculated for the two simulation experiments.
Besides confirming the already visually obvious increase in transmission savings
with normative empowered agents, the numbers also give a first insight about
the scale of the savings possible with a WMG, which in case of the utilization
1In order to be able to compare the two different data sets, in the analysis of the data of the
experiments without any enforcement we excluded all settings with only honest and only malicious
agents.
2For the individual figures, the mean energy savings have little informative value, as the simulation
settings within each simulation experiment are not comparable. We only specify the mean values to
show the large differences between the two figures.
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Figure 10.2: Base Station Transmission Savings (in %) – 1% Normative
empowered Agents
Table 10.1: Comparison of Base Station Transmission Savings
No Enforcement 1% Normative
empowered Agents
Minimum Value 0% 12.4%
Mean Value 25.0% 46.4%
Maximum Value 66.9% 80.9%
of normative empowered agents increase by approximately 20%. For the largest
mobile telecommunications provider in Germany – T-Mobile – which in the mobile
telecommunications sector had a total revenue of e 8,349 million, an EBIT margin
of 19.6% and approximately 34.7 million customers (T-Mobile, 2010, pp. 77-79), a
20% increase in base station infrastructural costs accounts for several million euro.
These values always have to be discussed keeping in mind that they are results of
simulation experiments and as such have a validity strongly linked to the simulations
and its assumptions. Thus, in the experiments we for example assumed very highly
multicastable traffic. As Scellato et al. (2011) suggest examining geographical social
cascades for twitter video streams, only a small fraction of traffic has these properties.
Furthermore, base station transmission savings cannot directly be translated to
savings in infrastructural costs, as we cannot account for fixed infrastructural costs
with the saving calculation for example. Nevertheless, the numbers are indicative
that a functioning WMG could reduce infrastructural costs and thereby increase
EBIT margins.
One set of costs that can counter these cost savings are the additional costs
required to maintain the WMG, namely those for enforcing cooperation. With
respect to these costs, the three different enforcement mechanisms we have presented
have very different characteristics: whereas for image and reputation information
based enforcement mechanisms the costs are mainly energy, which are carried by
users and offset yb more energy-efficient downloads, for normative empowered agents
the costs have to be paid by the iPr. Furthermore, besides the additional energy
costs (accounted for in the simulation experiments) for normative empowered agents
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additional costs could accumulate. When first describing the idea of normative
empowered agents in Section 8.2.1, we explained that one incentive for them to help
control the system could be financial benefits such as free mobile phone contracts.
Currently, mobile telecommunication providers have an average monthly revenue per
user of approximately e 15 (ie Market Research, 2010), which is mainly generated
from mobile phone contracts. Assuming that the provider employs 1% normative
empowered agents, for an iPR like T-Mobile with 34,694,000 customers, this results
in costs of approximately e 5.2 million, which need to be weighed against benefits
of the WMG (e.g. energy savings or possibly higher subscriptions numbers if users
embrace the WMG idea). As a result of the scale of these costs, it is very unlikely
that enforcement in WMGs is economically viable under the assumptions made
in this dissertation. Instead of offering normative empowered agents completely
free service contracts, it might be of benefit to the providers to give less generous
incentives to the normative empowered agents, i.e. to only offer them the marginal
costs of their contract to reduce the costs for this kind of enforcement. Furthermore,
it is likely that if iPr employ normative empowered agents, they will only employ a
smaller percentage and combine the normative empowered agents with other less
expensive enforcement mechanisms (e.g. image information). As we did not analyse
any combined mechanisms in this dissertation, this analysis is subject to future work.
The final set of evaluation criteria we discussed in Section 6.3 focuses on social
aspects of the chosen enforcement mechanisms. For these criteria, the Lorenz curve
with the respective Gini Coefficients and the false-positive / false-negative rates are of
interest. For the limitations mentioned on page 198, we cannot present the social data
of all simulation experiments with all input parameter settings. Instead we focus on
one setting only which will be analysed as an example. The criteria for this one setting
being used are (i) that all behavioural groups of agents are represented in the example
and (ii) that the majority of agents are utility maximizing, as this is the type of agent
that is most likely to be encouraged to change its behaviour. Furthermore we opt for
a small population of only 200 agents, because computational restrictions limit the
handling of anything larger. Summing up, the setting we used has the following basic
features: (i) | A |= 200, (ii) utility agents = 50%, honest agents = 25%, malicious
agent = 25%, (iii) ρneighbourhood = 10, and (iv) random waypoint movement model.
Figure 10.3 shows the Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients for energy consumption
in the agent population in the basic WMG simulation experiments plus those with
enforcement mechanisms. Besides showing the basic shape of the Lorenz curves,
each behavioural type is encoded with one colour (i.e. blue for honest agents, red
for utility agents, yellow for malicious agents and black for normative empowered
agents3).
3Resulting from the inclusion of normative empowered agents in the respective experiments, the
bottom two sub-figures show more than | A |= 200 agents.
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As Figure 10.3 shows and the low Gini Coefficients corroborate, with the above
settings, all Lorenz curves have progressions that are close to the line of perfect
equality (i.e. the 45-degree-line), with the normative empowered agents having
the highest Gini Coefficient values. Looking at the distribution of agent types in
the Lorenz curves, there is no group of agents that is particularly advantaged or
disadvantaged. This is an indicator of equally distributed energy consumption.
Although from an enforcement point of view it is desirable that malicious agents
are disadvantaged and honest agents advantaged in the system, the almost equally
distributed energy consumption is positive for the users (and therefore indirectly
positive also for the iPr) to the extent that cheaters are not favoured.
The final evaluation criterion we examine is the false negative / false positive rate.
This rates indicate the percentage of cheating events not detected by the normative
empowered agents, and to what extent agents have been wrongly punished for
cheating when they did not cheat. Table 10.2 shows the results of these experiments.
Table 10.2: False Positive and False Negative Values for Simulation Settings
with 1% and 5% Normative Framework Empowered Agents
1% Normative
empowered Agents
5% Normative
empowered Agents
Cheat Events 3,935 4,500
Punishment Events 533 1,074
Correctly Punished 533 1,074
False-Positive 0 0
False-Negative 3,402 3,426
The values in Tables 10.2 indicate that the false positive problem we were initially
concerned about does not occur at all. This is advantageous for both the iPr as well
as the mobile phone users in the WMG. In contrast, we have false negative effects
in both experimental settings, i.e. with 1% and 5% normative empowered agents.
Whereas in the former case only 13.6% of all defection actions have been detected,
in the latter the case the deployment of five times as many normative empowered
agents resulted in a detection rate of 23.9% (i.e. approximately a doubling of the
detection rate). These numbers support the conclusion drawn in Section 8.3.2, that
although in absolute terms 5% normative empowered agents are able to detect more
violations, a 1% proportion of agents has a better marginal detection rate, i.e. on
average more detections per normative framework agent. Concerning the absolute
percentage numbers, despite the numbers appearing to be relatively low, we cannot
draw any conclusions to what extent detection rates of approximately 13.6% or 23.9%
are sufficient for the general (and not only energy savings-related) success of a WMG
and further analyses are required.
10.2 Generalisation of the Results for Open
Distributed Systems
In Chapter 1, we set out the two theses for this dissertation:
1. Governance decisions such as the introduction of enforcement mechanisms can
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help to reduce the cooperation and collaboration problems in open distributed
systems.
2. Normative frameworks and multi-agent system simulations can be used to
model and reason about the interaction of users with one another as well as
with the norms in an open distributed system.
In order to test these theses, we have used a WMG case study which served as an
example throughout this dissertation. In this section we focus on the generalisation
of the results from the specific case study. Before doing so we first briefly recall the
properties of open distributed systems and explain how WMGs fit into them.
Definition 5 on page 18, characterises open distributed systems with the help of
the following features:
 They contain autonomous entities which are free to join and leave the system
and which perform actions, based on their own goals as well as their bounded
rational perception of the system.
 The actions of these entities contribute to a global system result, which in
contrast to the actions of the individual entities in the system, can be perceived
externally.
Examining WMGs against this definition, human mobile phone users interact
in a WMG. They are autonomous, can freely decide to participate in the WMG
and base their decisions on their limited perception of the network as well as on
what they perceive to suit their needs and goals best. The individual actions of the
users (in particular their decisions to cooperate or defect) result in the global system
result which is the failure or the success of the WMG. In contrast to the decision
of the actors in the system, this success/failure result can be observed from outside
the system (e.g. through reports of the results). The WMG therefore fulfills all the
criteria of an open distributed system and we can continue to analyse to what extent
the results that we have found for this particular open distributed system can be
transferred to other systems. It needs to be noted that we used WMG specific values
for the simulation experiments, such as the specific energy consumption rates of the
Nokia N95 for certain transmission protocols. As a consequence, when generalising
we cannot draw any conclusions about absolute values, but rather focus on relative
results.
Starting with the most high level result, we can observe that successful enforcement
increases cooperation and improves sharing of resources. Other generalisations
concern the input factors of our simulations. We were able to show that ρneighbourhood
had a significant impact on the success of enforcement as it determined the likelihood
that two participants would interact again. Another parameter important for the
success of enforcement is population composition. We consider the importance of
these two input parameters to be generally true for all open distributed systems.
In our experiments, we were able to demonstrate that the costs associated with
enforcement need to be considered, as they can significantly alter the cost/benefit
ratio of a mechanism. We believe this finding also to be generally true.
In case of the WMG we focused on a scenario very similar to P2P networking file
sharing systems in which files are collaboratively obtained. As presented in Table
10.3 Summary 205
2.1 on page 19, file sharing is not the only collaborative idea in open distributed
systems and shared bandwidth/transmissions are not the only shared resources, but a
variety of open distributed systems specifications exist. Despite their differences, with
respect to cooperation they all have the same problem: the contribution of shared
resources needs to be encouraged whereas free-riding (i.e. obtaining resources without
contributing any) needs to be discouraged. The type of resources that are being
shared has very little influence on actual results. The only problem we see with respect
to the different shared resources of open distributed systems applications concerns
virtual teams. All shared resources of the other presented systems are physical
resources that can be divided to some degree making their sharing, distribution and
allocation relatively easy. In contrast in virtual teams the resources can be special
character properties and skills, whose division is considerably more difficult, which
in turn demands other collaboration models.
A second difficulty we see is that in our simulations we focused on direct reciproc-
ation only, in which collaboration always focuses on immediate quid pro quo (i.e. for
sending its share an agent expected the receiving of the shares of its partners in the
same transaction). This neglects the idea that the contribution of an agent to the
system and its benefit from the system might have a time discrepancy. In routing
scenarios for example, an agent might act as a relay node passing on messages on
one occasion, hoping that in future when it needs to send information other nodes
will do the same. The agents are not in a direct debitor-creditor relationship, but
instead indirect reciprocity is required. The mechanisms presented here all relied on
direct observations and interactions. Removing direct interaction makes enforcement
harder to apply, which is why we see difficulties with the generalisation of our results
for all application with indirect reciprocity.
These two constraints apart, we believe the general conclusions drawn from our
simulation experiments to be valid for open distributed systems in general. This
is supported by our simulation results confirming some of the known enforcement
problems in open distributed systems, such as the slow spreading of image information
and the significant negative effect of badmouthing on the performance of reputation
mechanisms.
10.3 Summary
In this section, we expanded our analysis of the results of our simulation experiments
from a pure focus on energy consumption rates (Chapters 7–9) to include criteria
that we view as particularly important in a multi-stakeholder context. These criteria
covered technical, economic / financial as well as social aspects. Summing up the
results of this analysis, it becomes apparent that these criteria have an effect and can
even change the preference order for enforcement mechanisms for the iPr as well as
mobile phone users. This becomes especially apparent when looking at the normative
empowered agents, i.e. the enforcement mechanism that has previously shown
the best energy efficiency values. Despite performing well in respect to scalability
as well as robustness, infrastructural costs savings and costs/benefit distribution
between the users, under the given model assumption, the costs associated with this
mechanism may make it unattractive for an implementation by the iPr. Instead
from an iPr’s perspective it might be favourable to lower the incentives for the
206 Further Simulation Analysis
normative empowered agents (e.g. by only only offering them the marginal costs
of their contract), or to combine this mechanisms with an image-based mechanism
in order to reduce the percentage of normative empowered agents required in the
system and thereby reducing the costs of enforcement.
Furthermore, we discussed the extentto which our WMG specific simulation
results can be generalised for open distributed systems. The negligence of indirect
reciprocity as well as the assumption of easy divisibility of the shared resources
limits the generalisation partially. Nevertheless, we demonstrated that as long as
no absolute values need to be transferred, a large degree of the general simulation
findings (e.g. which input parameters are important for the success of enforcement)
are applicable in all open distributed systems.
Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusions
Having presented all the supporting research, we now reflect on the results and
establish whether the theses set out in the introduction of this dissertation have been
successfully satisfied.
11.1 Contributions
The research reported is driven by the two theses that we formulated in Chapter 1:
1. Governance decisions realized through the introduction of enforcement mech-
anisms can help to reduce the cooperation and collaboration problems in open
distributed systems.
2. Normative frameworks and multi-agent system simulations can be used to
model and reason about the interaction of users with one another as well as
with the norms in an open distributed system.
In the pursuit of the proof of these theses, we have presented and analysed three
different enforcement mechanisms in order to test, in an early prototyping stage of
WMGs, to what extent these mechanisms could be used to address the cooperation
problem in WMGs. The results of this analysis successfully show that enforcement
mechanisms can reduce the cooperation problem in open distributed systems and
can reduce the load on shared resources. This is true even if the system participants
act selfishly and have private utility functions that are not known to the system
designer (Chapter 8). This proves the first thesis of this dissertation.
In order to prove the second thesis, we presented normative frameworks and
demonstrated how they can effectively be applied to model the cooperation problem
in WMGs in the form of a design-time model (Chapter 5). Our model shows that
one can develop complete (though simplified) realistic scenarios. We show that the
development of a design-time model is an easily comprehensible way of developing
powerful first normative models to analyse the impact of governance decisions. These
models can be used to evaluate whether it makes sense to pursue the governance
decision at all and whether it is worth investigating its impact further.
The design-time model provides a useful first approach to explore governance
mechanisms, but cannot properly account for user autonomy. Consequently, thanks
to the positive results from the design-time model, we moved into a second phase,
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deriving a run-time model, and in doing so a novel methodology for the design to
run-time model derivation process. We furthermore showed how the run-time model
can efficiently be combined with MAS simulations that generate the exogenous events
for the it (Chapter 7). To the best of our knowledge, this run-time model is the
first of its kind. We successfully demonstrated its functionality by implementing it
for the WMG case study. With this implementation and the design and run-time
methodology, we provide practical, powerful and easily accessible tools to assess
the impact of governance decisions at an early prototyping stage. This successfully
confirms our second thesis.
Using the run-time model of the WMG we demonstrated the effectiveness of
our approach by performing a comparative analysis of three different enforcement
mechanisms: image information, reputation information and normative empowered
agents. The results of this comparison provided us with good insights into WMGs as
well as the role of different input parameters on enforcement (Chapters 8 and 9).
Governance decisions such as the introduction of enforcement mechanisms always
have impact on several stakeholder groups in a system. Therefore we identified
potential criteria of importance for the stakeholders of a WMG by analysing them with
respect to the simulation results, creating a better understanding of the significance
and impact of multi-stakeholder interests (Chapter 10).
Summing up, we conclude that we have fully established the two theses on
which this dissertation rests. Furthermore we have made the following important
contributions:
 We gave in-depth insight into wireless mobile grids and the cooperation problem
in them.
 We successfully demonstrated how to use normative frameworks to develop a
design-time model of a normative system.
 We provided a detailed methodology on how to generate a run-time model from
the design-time model and how to combine it effectively with a multi-agent
system simulation.
 We significantly increased the understanding of how different enforcement
mechanisms affect cooperation in open distributed systems and how different
stakeholders’ perspectives need to be incorporated in governance decisions.
11.2 Future Work
Our design and run-time models have shown themselves to be powerful, easy to build
and particularly useful in the early prototyping stage, and we have demonstrated
effectiveness by performing our comparative analysis of enforcement mechanisms.
However, we could only some of the many aspects of modelling and analysing
governance decisions (in particular the introducing of enforcement mechanisms) in
open distributed systems.
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11.2.1 Relaxing Model Assumption
As in every model representing real world phenomena (even though the technology
we discuss is still in a prototyping stage), we had to make assumptions with respect
to all three components of the underlying factors of the IAD framework to keep the
model simple and significant. Lifting these assumptions is direction for future work.
With respect to the biophysical characteristics, we relied on the flat earth model
and made a full coverage assumption for the base stations, i.e. assuming that every
spot in the simulation area is covered at least by one mobile phone base station
and that consequently the simulated mobile phone users have access to the 3G
mobile phone network at any point in time (given that the base station is not busy
otherwise). By removing this assumption we can more appropriately simulate rural
or urban areas (with low or high coverage) and analyse the effects on these specific
areas. Furthermore, we currently assume that after having obtained a file in a
simulation run, the agents delete it. Hence, in an interaction the agents cannot rely
on existing files in the system but need to start obtaining files from scratch. By
keeping track of which files an agent already possesses, we could for example allow
for indirect reciprocal situations in which an agent that already possesses the file
another agent wants, sends this file to the other agent without directly benefiting
from the interaction. The agent might nevertheless contribute his file, hoping that
other agents behave the same way and it will benefit in another interaction. Thus
would allow us to check to which extent this reduces the amount of data the base
stations have to send as well as how fast data spreads in the system.
Concerning the attributes of the community, in future work the simulation
experiments could be extended by employing more sophisticated agents. In our
simulation experiments we have employed three kinds of agents that pursue very
different strategies in order to test how sensitive the simulation is to very one-sided
behaviour (e.g. always defect or always cooperate). In an actual deployment of a
WMG such a one-side behaviour might not be very realistic. Therefore in future
work agents with more sophisticated reasoning processes that exhibit more diverse
responses to the successes or failures of cooperation situations are needed. One
extension could for example be to allow malicious agents to cooperate occasionally
in order to make them harder to detect for other agents, or to allow for variations in
the reactions to sanctions by the utility maximizing agents.
Finally with regard to the rules-in-use, i.e. the third component of the underlying
factors of the IAD framework, extensions of the enforcement mechanisms employed
are a good direction for future work. In this dissertation we have implemented three
different enforcement mechanisms and have given our rationale for selecting them.
We assumed that only one of them can be employed at any given time and that the
choice of mechanism is constant throughout a simulation experiment. We plan to
extend the work by relaxing this assumption and combining different enforcement
concepts in the simulation experiments. One combination to test could be to employ
both image information and normative empowered agents at the same time, in order
to support the good results from the latter with the easy to obtain image information
from the different agents.
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11.2.2 Extending the Simulation Experiments
Besides merely relaxing assumptions made in the course of the modelling process,
we might also the simulation experiments, both with respect to the parameters and
set-up as well as their scale (i.e. the number of agents simulated).
The enforcement mechanism that produced the best results (in terms of reducing
the energy consumption rate) are normative empowered agents. For this mechanism,
parameters that are good candidates for further exploration are the percentage of
normative empowered agents in the system, and the level of fines. Furthermore, the
introduction of coordination between the normative empowered agents seems sensible.
Our simulation experiments suggested that – with respect to the energy consumption
rate – 1% normative empowered agents are more efficient in the simulated WMG
than 5% of these agents, because the energy costs produced by the normative
empowered agents in the latter case outweighed their detection benefits. It would
be interesting to investigate how the system performs for any percentages between
these two numbers (e.g. 3%) or below 1% in order to determine in more detail at
which point the detection advantages and the energy costs cancel each other out. As
a second extension, when calculating the fines for the defecting agents, the normative
empowered agents could take into account the number of times an agent already
has been detected cheating, and increase fines for repeat offenders. Currently the
individual normative empowered agents all act independently without coordinating
with one another. Despite this lack of coordination, resulting from the relatively
small percentages of these agents chosen in the experiments, we only had very few
occasions on which two normative empowered agents observed the same interaction.
Nonetheless, for more effective enforcement, a limited level of coordination between
these agents could be useful, such as pre-assigning specific areas to specific normative
empowered agents.
On a technical level, directions for future work include the scaling of experiments
to include more agents and thus allow for simulations of more realistically sized
WMG scenarios as well as advancing the single normative framework model to
one allowing for several (possibly interacting) normative frameworks. Concerning
the former extension, the Jason simulation environment allows for running the
simulation distributed on several computers in order to scale up simulation experiment
size. One platform that might be suitable candidate for this purpose could be
AgentScape1, which is an open distributed agent middleware developed mainly at
the TU Delft, as AgentScape offers specific support for Jason agents. In real world
situations, we observe that often more than one normative framework is active
within a system. Extending our run-time model to account for multiple normative
frameworks is therefore another direction future work can take. In Cliffe et al.
(2007b), the authors present the concept of multi-normative frameworks where events
in one normative framework cause events in another or change another normative
framework’s state. Extension of the Governor to accommodate reasoning about
several possibly interlinked normative frameworks is an important part of future
work, along with the issue of using conventional distributed systems techniques, such
as replication, as a means to avoid the Governor becoming a bottleneck and a single
point of failure.
1For more information on AgentScape see http://www.agentscape.org/.
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One further direction is the inclusion of more real world data in the simulation,
once this is available. As already outlined in Chapter 9, due to a lack of mobile phone
user movement traces, we had to abstract from real human movement behaviour with
the help of generic movement models. Obtaining more realistic movement traces –
and to implement them in the simulation experiments – therefore is a goal for future
work. One further area where we hope to be able to obtain real data concerns the
demands of mobile phone users in respect to WMGs. In this area currently a study
is being developed by C. Buck based on the findings in (Buck, 2010). The results of
this study could help to improve the choice of simulation parameters as well as the
analysis of the simulation results with respect to the multiple stakeholders. One final
aspect we would like to consider in future work is the inclusion of larger number of
iPr. In this dissertation, we assumed that only one iPr exists and that all mobile
phone users have their contracts with this particular iPr. By allowing for different iPr
which provide different networks, it would be interesting to analyse effects between
both for the mobile phones users as well as the iPr.
11.2.3 Adaptive Learning of Norms
One final direction for future work is the adaptive learning of norms. In our simulation
experiments the designer of the simulation had to determine the governance changes
in advance of the simulation. The changes had to be implemented and tested in order
to get an initial idea whether the proposed governance decision have the desired
influence on the actors’ decisions and whether they will contribute to the system
goals in the way expected. Even if an effect can be asserted for the tested governance
decisions, it is far from clear whether the changes introduced by the governance
decisions are already the ideal setting for inducing the desired system behaviour.
The brute-force mechanism of testing all possible options for a governance decision
is one solution to this problem, but this approach would be very time and resource
consuming and might even be infeasible because of the large number of different
setting combinations for governance decisions to be tested. In order to tackle
this problem, future work could be directed at developing an adaptive governance
mechanism for these systems that constantly tries to induce behaviour of the actors
in the systems in a way that they behave in accordance with the systems objectives
by updating the norms at run-time. In detail we envision this process of adapting
norms at run-time to consist of four stages:
1. First of all the overall desired macro system results need to be identified. If
this is not feasible at least desired actions by the actors need to be determined
and a first set of norms been drafted.
2. Once the norms are incorporated in the system and the system is running, the
results of the running system compared to the desired results.
3. Based on the comparison of the actual and desired system results, conclusions
about the effectiveness of the norms as well as deductions on the preferences
and utilities of the actors can be drawn.
4. Having acquired these two components, the adaption – if required – needs to
take place. The process for this adaption is a learning process, including the
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learning of the actors’ preferences as well as their respective reactions to the
norms in the system.
Using this four-stage process we might therefore be able to eliminate the strong
interdependence between the initial governance decisions and the system results, and
to determine good governance decisions more effectively at run-time and thereby
arrive at better enforcement mechanisms.
Summing up, we believe that developing better tools for designing and testing
governance decisions for open distributed system is a valuable and highly important
undertaking, however for its successful accomplishment, much work is still required.
11.3 Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation we have focused on the modelling and analysis of governance
decisions in open distributed systems. By its nature, governing open distributed
systems in which actors with a multitude of different interests interact is complex and
difficult. We have contributed to addressing this by proposing a practical, powerful
and easily accessible methodology that can be used to analyse norms and their impact
on the interactions in these systems. We proved the effectiveness of this methodology
by successfully implementing a prototype which we used for analysing the effects of
introducing different enforcement mechanisms to an open distributed system.
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Appendix A
The Jason Simulation Code
This Appendix presents the Jason agent code used for the simulation experiments.
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*
i
.
e
.
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
i
s
t
h
e
f
a
i
r
s
h
a
r
e
t
i
m
e
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
239
o
f
2
6
6
*
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
i
t
s
.
*
/
2
6
7
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
=
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
*
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
D
;
2
6
8
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
2
6
9
/
*
u
p
d
a
t
e
e
n
e
r
g
y
c
o
s
t
s
*
/
2
7
0
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
r
e
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
_
c
o
s
t
s
(
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
,
E
)
;
2
7
1
/
*
g
e
t
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
b
i
t
s
f
r
o
m
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
*
/
2
7
2
?
t
o
t
a
l
_
c
h
u
n
k
_
n
u
m
b
e
r
(
G
N
,
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
)
;
2
7
3
R
e
s
t
=
(
(
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
-
1
)
*
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
-
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
;
2
7
4
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
s
e
l
f
(
N
O
,
R
e
s
t
)
.
2
7
5
2
7
6
+
!
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
r
e
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
:
n
o
t
s
e
n
t
2
7
7
<
-
?
g
r
o
u
p
k
e
y
(
G
N
,
K
E
Y
)
;
2
7
8
.
c
o
u
n
t
(
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
(
G
N
,
_
,
K
E
Y
,
_
)
[
s
o
u
r
c
e
(
_
)
]
,
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
D
)
;
2
7
9
/
*
A
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
:
e
a
c
h
a
g
e
n
t
s
e
n
d
s
h
i
s
f
a
i
r
s
h
a
r
e
i
f
i
t
s
e
n
d
s
t
h
.
a
t
a
l
l
.
,
2
8
0
*
i
.
e
.
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
i
s
t
h
e
f
a
i
r
s
h
a
r
e
t
i
m
e
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
2
8
1
*
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
i
t
s
.
*
/
2
8
2
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
=
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
*
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
D
;
2
8
3
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
2
8
4
/
*
u
p
d
a
t
e
e
n
e
r
g
y
c
o
s
t
s
*
/
2
8
5
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
r
e
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
_
c
o
s
t
s
(
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
,
E
)
;
2
8
6
/
*
g
e
t
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
b
i
t
s
f
r
o
m
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
*
/
2
8
7
?
t
o
t
a
l
_
c
h
u
n
k
_
n
u
m
b
e
r
(
G
N
,
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
)
;
2
8
8
R
e
s
t
=
(
(
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
-
1
)
*
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
-
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
;
2
8
9
.
w
a
i
t
(
3
0
0
0
)
;
2
9
0
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
s
e
l
f
(
N
O
,
R
e
s
t
)
.
2
9
1
2
9
2
+
!
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
r
e
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
:
s
e
n
t
2
9
3
<
-
?
g
r
o
u
p
k
e
y
(
G
N
,
K
E
Y
)
;
2
9
4
.
c
o
u
n
t
(
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
(
G
N
,
_
,
K
E
Y
,
_
)
[
s
o
u
r
c
e
(
_
)
]
,
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
D
)
;
2
9
5
/
*
A
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
:
e
a
c
h
a
g
e
n
t
s
e
n
d
s
h
i
s
f
a
i
r
s
h
a
r
e
i
f
i
t
s
e
n
d
s
t
h
.
a
t
a
l
l
.
,
2
9
6
*
i
.
e
.
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
i
s
t
h
e
f
a
i
r
s
h
a
r
e
t
i
m
e
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
2
9
7
*
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
i
t
s
.
*
/
2
9
8
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
=
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
*
(
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
D
-
1
)
;
2
9
9
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
3
0
0
/
*
u
p
d
a
t
e
e
n
e
r
g
y
c
o
s
t
s
*
/
3
0
1
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
r
e
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
_
c
o
s
t
s
(
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
,
E
)
;
3
0
2
/
*
g
e
t
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
b
i
t
s
f
r
o
m
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
*
/
3
0
3
?
t
o
t
a
l
_
c
h
u
n
k
_
n
u
m
b
e
r
(
G
N
,
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
)
;
3
0
4
R
e
s
t
=
(
(
T
C
H
U
N
K
S
-
1
)
*
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
-
T
o
t
a
l
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
;
3
0
5
.
w
a
i
t
(
3
0
0
0
)
;
3
0
6
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
s
e
l
f
(
N
O
,
R
e
s
t
)
.
3
0
7
3
0
8
3
0
9
/
*
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
p
l
a
n
s
*
/
3
1
0
3
1
1
/
*
*
3
1
2
*
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
:
f
o
r
t
h
e
m
e
t
h
o
d
t
h
e
o
l
d
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
b
e
i
n
g
u
s
e
d
:
T
h
e
o
l
d
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
3
1
3
*
n
e
e
d
e
d
t
o
d
e
l
e
t
e
i
t
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
b
e
l
i
e
f
b
a
s
e
a
n
d
t
h
e
n
e
w
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
3
1
4
*
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
a
d
d
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
b
e
l
i
e
f
b
a
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
g
e
n
t
.
3
1
5
*
/
3
1
6
+
!
m
o
v
e
:
t
r
u
e
3
1
7
<
-
?
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
(
L
)
;
3
1
8
r
e
m
o
v
e
_
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
(
L
)
;
3
1
9
!
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
_
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
;
3
2
0
?
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
(
M
)
;
3
2
1
M
n
e
w
=
M
+
1
;
3
2
2
-
+
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
(
M
n
e
w
)
;
3
2
3
m
o
v
e
_
a
g
e
n
t
(
L
,
M
n
e
w
)
;
3
2
4
!
c
a
l
c
_
r
a
n
d
o
m
;
3
2
5
!
m
o
v
e
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
.
3
2
6
3
2
7
/
*
*
3
2
8
*
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
e
s
t
h
e
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
o
f
a
n
a
g
e
n
t
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
(
e
.
g
.
p
a
r
t
e
r
s
,
.
.
.
)
:
3
2
9
*
T
h
i
s
m
e
t
h
o
d
i
s
u
s
e
d
t
o
e
n
s
u
r
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
a
g
e
n
t
i
s
n
o
t
c
o
n
f
u
s
i
n
g
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
i
f
i
t
3
3
0
*
i
s
t
r
y
i
n
g
t
o
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
a
n
e
w
f
i
l
e
a
n
d
g
e
t
s
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
w
i
t
h
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
f
o
r
m
,
b
u
t
3
3
1
*
w
i
t
h
o
t
h
e
r
c
o
n
t
e
n
t
.
3
3
2
*
/
3
3
3
+
!
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
_
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
:
t
r
u
e
3
3
4
<
-
?
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
(
M
)
;
3
3
5
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
3
3
6
?
c
h
e
a
t
i
n
g
(
C
)
;
3
3
7
.
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
(
_
)
;
3
3
8
+
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
3
3
9
+
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
(
M
)
;
3
4
0
+
c
h
e
a
t
i
n
g
(
C
)
.
L
is
ti
n
g
5:
h
o
n
es
t
a
ge
n
t.
as
l
cl
a
ss
1
/
*
*
2
*
A
g
e
n
t
h
o
n
e
s
t
_
a
g
e
n
t
i
n
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
T
h
e
s
i
s
_
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
3
*
T
h
i
s
a
g
e
n
t
a
l
w
a
y
s
a
c
t
s
h
o
n
e
s
t
l
y
,
i
.
e
.
a
l
w
a
y
s
t
r
i
e
s
t
o
f
u
l
l
f
i
l
l
4
*
i
t
s
c
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
5
*
6
*
@
a
u
t
h
o
r
T
i
n
a
B
a
l
k
e
7
*
@
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
2
3
-
0
6
-
2
0
1
1
8
*
9
*
/
1
0
1
1
/
*
i
n
h
e
r
i
t
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
o
t
h
e
r
a
g
e
n
t
c
l
a
s
s
e
s
*
/
1
2
{
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
(
"
a
g
e
n
t
.
a
s
l
"
)
}
1
3
{
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
(
"
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
_
a
g
e
n
t
.
a
s
l
"
)
}
1
4
/
*
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
J
a
s
o
n
,
a
g
e
n
t
s
c
a
n
n
o
t
o
v
e
r
w
r
i
t
e
i
n
h
e
r
i
t
e
d
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
,
b
u
t
1
5
*
b
u
t
t
h
e
n
e
w
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
a
r
e
a
d
d
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
i
n
h
e
r
i
t
e
t
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
;
t
h
i
s
c
a
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
1
6
*
a
n
a
g
e
n
t
h
a
v
i
n
g
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
t
w
i
c
e
,
w
h
a
t
i
n
t
u
r
n
w
i
l
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
t
h
e
1
7
*
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
p
l
a
n
s
b
e
i
n
g
c
a
l
l
e
d
t
w
i
c
e
!
1
8
*
/
1
9
2
0
/
*
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
*
/
2
1
c
h
e
a
t
i
n
g
(
0
)
.
2
2
2
3
/
*
p
l
a
n
s
*
/
2
4
+
!
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
_
c
h
u
n
k
(
G
N
,
N
O
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
:
t
r
u
e
2
5
<
-
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
.
2
6
2
7
+
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
:
f
r
e
e
(
_
)
2
8
<
-
?
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
_
c
h
u
n
k
(
G
N
,
N
O
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
;
2
9
c
h
e
c
k
_
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
)
;
3
0
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
.
3
1
3
2
+
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
:
n
o
t
f
r
e
e
(
_
)
3
3
<
-
.
s
e
n
d
(
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
a
s
k
O
n
e
,
f
r
e
e
(
_
)
,
R
e
p
l
y
)
;
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3
4
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
.
3
5
3
6
+
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
:
p
o
w
e
r
(
P
)
&
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
(
P
E
)
&
P
=
=
t
r
u
e
&
P
E
=
=
t
r
u
e
3
7
<
-
?
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
_
c
h
u
n
k
(
G
N
,
N
O
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
;
3
8
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
3
9
.
s
e
n
d
(
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
t
e
l
l
,
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
)
;
4
0
/
*
u
p
d
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
e
n
e
r
g
y
c
o
s
t
s
*
/
4
1
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
o
s
t
s
(
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
,
E
)
;
4
2
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
_
e
v
e
n
t
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
)
;
4
3
.
s
e
n
d
(
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
u
n
t
e
l
l
,
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
)
;
4
4
!
s
e
n
d
i
n
g
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
.
4
5
4
6
+
!
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
:
p
o
w
e
r
(
P
)
&
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
(
P
E
)
&
P
=
=
f
a
l
s
e
&
P
E
=
=
f
a
l
s
e
4
7
<
-
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
.
4
8
4
9
+
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
:
n
o
t
f
r
e
e
(
_
)
5
0
<
-
.
s
e
n
d
(
b
a
s
e
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
a
s
k
O
n
e
,
f
r
e
e
(
_
)
,
R
e
p
l
y
)
;
5
1
!
c
h
e
c
k
_
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
_
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
.
5
2
5
3
/
/
N
o
d
e
5
5
4
/
*
*
5
5
*
a
l
w
a
y
s
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
5
6
*
/
5
7
+
!
s
e
n
d
i
n
g
_
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
:
t
r
u
e
5
8
<
-
?
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
_
c
h
u
n
k
(
G
N
,
N
O
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
,
C
H
U
N
K
S
I
Z
E
)
;
5
9
?
c
o
l
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
o
r
s
(
G
N
,
G
R
O
U
P
)
;
6
0
?
g
r
o
u
p
k
e
y
(
G
N
,
K
E
Y
)
;
6
1
?
e
v
e
n
t
(
E
)
;
6
2
.
m
y
_
n
a
m
e
(
N
A
M
E
)
;
6
3
/
*
s
e
n
d
i
n
g
*
/
6
4
.
s
e
n
d
(
G
R
O
U
P
,
t
e
l
l
,
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
(
G
N
,
C
H
U
N
K
N
U
M
B
E
R
,
K
E
Y
,
N
A
M
E
)
)
;
6
5
+
s
e
n
t
;
6
6
/
*
u
p
d
a
t
e
e
n
e
r
g
y
c
o
s
t
s
*
/
6
7
u
p
d
a
t
e
_
s
e
n
d
i
n
g
_
c
o
s
t
s
(
C
H
U
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Appendix B
Implementing the Basic
Wireless Mobile Grid Scenario
Looking at the actual implementation for representing the mobile phones users and
their individual behavioural specifications as agents in the WMG scenario, we used
five different agent classes: agent.asl, interaction agent.asl, honest agent.asl,
util agent.asl, and malicious agent.asl all shown in Figure B.11. The class
agent.asl contains general agent behaviour. interaction.asl specifies the inter-
action information that is common to all agents (regardless of their behavioural
type), whereas the final three classes define the behavioural-specific reasoning. We
refer to the latter four classes as general interaction agents, because they contain
the information for the agents that engage in WMG sharing interaction. In the
simulation experiments, for each agent of one particular behavioural type, an instance
of the respective agent class is created. This instance is then parameterised with
agent specific parameters (e.g. the initial location of the agent).
Figure B.1 shows two more agent classes that we use in the simulation experi-
ments: base station.asl and sim agent.asl. The class base station.asl contains
the reasoning for the base stations (i.e. their internal check on whether they are
busy or not). The class sim agent.asl is used to generate an agent that directs the
simulation by initialising all other agents as well as finishing the simulation after
all interaction agents have performed their actions. The sim agent.asl class is only
instantiated once in each simulation experiment.
Figure B.2 contains a code snippet from the interaction agent.asl class that
shows the initial plans and beliefs of the agent as well as its decision considerations
for decision node 1 in Figure 7.1, i.e. the checking of the opportunity costs of
sharing/downloading a file2.
The three central elements of the AgentSpeak code are: (i) goals the agent is
supposed to achieve which are specified by an exclamation mark (e.g. !start in
line 16). (ii) beliefs the agent has about its environment which are expressed as
1The extension .asl stands for AgentSpeak language, which is used is in Jason to to define
agent behaviour.
2In order not to distract from the presentation of the description of implementation of the
agent behaviour, we only present extracts of the agent code, and do not go into detail about the
technicalities of the complete code. The interested reader is referred to Appendix A where all the
agent code (including explanatory comments) is presented.
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agent.asl
(src/asl)
sim_agent.asl
(src/asl)
base_station.asl
(src/asl)
honest_agent.asl
(src/asl)
util_agent.asl
(src/asl)
malicious_agent.asl
(src/asl)
interaction_agent.asl
(src/asl)
general interaction agents
Figure B.1: Class Diagram of Implemented Jason Agent Classes
literals (e.g. event(-1) in line 10)3, and (iii) plans (i.e. the steps an agent has to
take to achieve its current intention) that have the following form +/- !intention
: precondition ← plan steps (e.g. +!download file(NO,SIZE): oppCosts(X) & X
>= SIZE → !download self(NO,SIZE) in lines 57–58). A plan can have several plan
steps. These steps are separated by the “;” operator.
In the code itself all characters (as well as any sequence of them) starting
with a lower-case letter are atoms4, whereas all the ones starting with upper case
letters are interpreted as logical variables. These variables are initially free and
are grounded in the process of the simulation. The “ ” operator in AgentSpeak
is the anonymous variable. This means that it can unify with any value and is
therefore often used if the respective value represented is irrelevant for the rest
of the plan. The not operator, as in ASP, is understood in terms of negation-as-
failure, whereas classical negation is denoted by the “∼” operator. Finally, the +/-
operators in front of events and plans refer to the addition/deletion of the respective
beliefs/goals and specify when the agents will execute a certain plan or act on a
certain belief. +!download file(NO,SIZE): precondition ← plan steps for example
specifies that an agent will execute the plan steps only if beforehand the intention
download file(NO,SIZE) was added to its belief base. Interpreting the belief/goal
addition/deletion as events taking place, this corresponds well with our event-driven
notion of time described in Section 4.3.2 and is one of the reasons that we opted for
the Jason Simulation Platform.
Looking at the code fragment shown in Figure B.2 in more detail, what it expresses
is the following: initially the agent has the belief event(-1) which it uses to check
how many interactions it has already performed5, by comparing the value with the
3It should be noted, that beliefs in Jason are based on the modalities of truth as understood in
the modal logic literature. As distinct from a statement of absolute truth, a belief simply expresses
the fact that the agent currently believes the statement to be true.
4We understand the terms literal and atom as explained on page 85.
5We limited the number of interaction per agent to the value of 50 in the simulation experiments.
This value was chosen for statistical reasons. Thus Field (2009) suggests that a minimum of 50
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9 /* Initial beliefs and rules */
10 event(-1).
11
12 /* Initial goals */
13
14 /* Plans */
15 +start: true
16 <- !start.
17
18 +!start: true
19 <- !calc_random;
20 get_number_interactions;
21 /*Set Agent properties */
22 set_mobility_level;
23 set_location;
24 !move_decision.
25
26 /**
27 * Checking whether the agent has performed more then a certain number of
28 * downloads (download events). If this is the case, then it sends a message
29 * to the sim_agent. This agent checks whether all agents have sent him a
30 * message and if so, stops the simulation. If the event threshold is not
31 * met the agent simply continues with download_file.
32 */
33 +!check_event: enoughInteractions
34 <- .send(sim_agent,tell,end).
35
36 +!check_event: not enoughInteractions
37 <- downloading.
38
39 enoughInteractions :- event(X) & num_interactions(Y) & X >= Y-1.
40
41 /**
42 * In case the percept download_file(NO,SIZE) is made, generate a goal with
43 * the same name.
44 */
45 +download(NO,SIZE): true
46 <- !update_event;
47 ?event(E);
48 set_alternative_battery_costs(SIZE,E);
49 get_opportunity_costs;
50 !download_file(NO,SIZE).
51
52 //Node 1
53 /**
54 * In case the size of the file is so small that a cooperation does not pay off
55 * (opportunity costs are higher then the respective file size) download self.
56 */
57 +!download_file(NO,SIZE): oppCosts(X) & X >= SIZE
58 <- !download_self(NO,SIZE).
59
60 /**
61 * In case the opportunity costs are smaller then the size
62 * check for neighbours (query environment
63 * for neighbour percepts and count the total number of neighbours).
64 */
65 +!download_file(NO,SIZE): oppCosts(X) & X < SIZE
66 <- ?location(LOCATION);
67 check_neighbours(LOCATION);
68 .count(neighbour(_),NoNeighbours);
69 !cooperate_decision(NO,SIZE,NoNeighbours).
Figure B.2: Code Fragments of the interaction agent.asl class
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number of actions it is meant to perform (line 39) whenever the enoughInteractions
criterion is checked as a precondition to executing a plan (e.g. in line 33). At the
beginning of a simulation experiment the agents are sense the belief start. Whenever
they do so, they add the intention !startto their belief base (lines 15–16). This
addition results in the execution of the related plan (lines 18–24) and the step-wise
execution of the plan steps. These steps include the basic configuration of the agents
(e.g. an initial location). The actual interaction considerations described in Section
7.1.3.2 start whenever the agent acquires the belief that it wants to obtain a file (line
45). If this happens, it will increment the event belief by one (line 46) and use its
environment6 to determine which opportunity costs might be incurred if it decided to
cooperate to obtain the particular file (line 49). These costs are added as the belief
oppCosts(X) to the agent’s belief base, with X denoting the value of the opportunity
costs. After finishing this plan step the intention to download the file is triggered (line
50) and the plans for that intention are called, and their preconditions are checked
(lines 57–69). In the case where the opportunity costs of the download are larger
than the size of the file itself (line 57) the agent will chose to download the file by
executing the respective plan (line 58). In the opposite case (i.e. oppCosts(X) & X <
SIZE, line 65), the agent will check its current location and look for neighbours in its
vicinity, (lines 66–67)7 and count them to then check whether enough neighbours are
in its vicinity to consider cooperation (line 68). As a result of the agents’ bounded
rationality, they can only detect (and communicate with) agents which are within
their mobile phone range (we refer to these agents as neighbours). Any agent that
is not in the searching agent’s neighbourhood therefore is not found and cannot be
considered for any cooperation.
Similar to the pattern for Node 1, the remaining nodes of the agent decision
process are encoded in Jason. The only point where the code differs is when agents
consider whether to cooperate or to defect in Node 5. This is why for this node, each
behavioural group file has different plans. These can be seen in Figures B.4–B.5.
18 //Node 5
19 /* Never cooperate and never download right at the beginning */
20 +!assigned_chunk(GN,NO,CHUNKNUMBER,CHUNKSIZE): true
21 <- ...
22 ?event(E);
23 update_download_costs(CHUNKSIZE,E);
24 external_event_download(GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
25 ...
26 !control_reception(GN,CHUNKSIZE).
Figure B.3: Cooperation Decision Code Fragments of the malicious agent.asl
class
Looking at the differences in code, after being assigned a chunk all three agent
types will download the assigned chunks. In doing so they use some battery that is
added to their download costs. Afterwards, the malicious agents will not send their
samples are required in order to be able to apply tests focusing on mean comparison.
6Plan steps in which the agents perceive their environment to obtain some information do not
have any preceding symbol such as !, ? or .
7If called, any plan that fulfills its preconditions is executed. For the opportunity costs we
therefore chose the preconditions to have no intersection at all, resulting in only either of the two
!download file(NO,SIZE) being executed.
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17 +!assigned_chunk(GN,NO,CHUNKNUMBER,CHUNKSIZE): true
18 <- ...
19 ?event(E);
20 update_download_costs(CHUNKSIZE,E);
21 external_event_download(GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
22 /* determine the costs of sending and defection */
23 ?cheating(C);
24 get_utility_sending(CHUNKSIZE,E,C);
25 ?sending_costs(S);
26 ?defection_costs(D);
27 !sending_decision(GN,CHUNKSIZE,S,D).
28
29 //Node 5
30 /*
31 * If sending is more expensive (battery-wise) then cheating --> cheat
32 */
33 +!sending_decision(GN,CHUNKSIZE,S,D): S > D
34 <- ?cheating(C);
35 Cnew = C + 1;
36 cheat(GN);
37 -+cheating(Cnew);
38 !control_reception(GN,CHUNKSIZE).
39
40 /*
41 * If sending is less expensive (battery-wise) then cheating --> cooperate
42 */
43 +!sending_decision(GN,CHUNKSIZE,S,D): S <= D
44 <- ?assigned_chunk(GN,NO,CHUNKNUMBER,CHUNKSIZE);
45 ?collaborators(GN,GROUP);
46 ?groupkey(GN,KEY);
47 ?event(E);
48 .my_name(NAME);
49 .send(GROUP,tell,sharing(GN,CHUNKNUMBER,KEY,NAME));
50 +sent;
51 external_event_sending(GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
52 /* update battery costs */
53 update_sending_costs(CHUNKSIZE,E,GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
54 !control_reception(GN,CHUNKSIZE).
Figure B.4: Cooperation Decision Code Fragments of the util agent.asl class
15 //Node 5
16 /**
17 * Always cooperate
18 */
19 +!sending_decision(GN,CHUNKSIZE):true
20 <- ?assigned_chunk(GN,NO,CHUNKNUMBER,CHUNKSIZE);
21 ?collaborators(GN,GROUP);
22 ?groupkey(GN,KEY);
23 ?event(E);
24 .my_name(NAME);
25 .send(GROUP,tell,sharing(GN,CHUNKNUMBER,KEY,NAME));
26 +sent;
27 /* update battery costs */
28 update_sending_costs(CHUNKSIZE,E,GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
29 external_event_sending(GN,CHUNKNUMBER);
30 !control_reception(GN,CHUNKSIZE).
Figure B.5: Cooperation Decision Code Fragments of the honest agent.asl
class
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chunks, but directly check which chunks they have received from the other agents in
their cooperation group (line 26 in Figure B.3). In contrast to the malicious agents,
the honest and utility agents decide about sending their downloaded chunks to the
other agents in the cooperation group. The honest agents will always decide to send
the chunks and encrypt8 them with a group key, to broadcast them together with the
ID of the chunk as well as their own ID (line 25 in Figure B.5). The utility agents
will consider the utility gained from sending first. Therefore, they calculate the costs
associated with sending as well as the costs that are associated with defecting for
them (e.g. in form of sanctions or the loss of future interaction possibilities) and
weigh one against the other. Hence, they have two plans for their sending decision
intention: one for the case where the costs of sending are higher then the expected
defection costs (line 33 in Figure B.4) and one for the case where the sending costs
are lower then the defection costs (line 43 in Figure B.4). In the former case, the
utility agents will decide not to send their share and directly continue by observing
their reception of chunks from other partners (line 38 in Figure B.4), whereas in the
latter case they will send their share to the other group members (line 38 B.4). For
sending, the agents are charged sending costs depending on the size of the chunk
they have sent (line 53 in Figure B.4 and line 28 in Figure B.5 respectively).
As mentioned earlier, in the experiments conducted for the basic WMG scenario
we did not employ any enforcement mechanisms. This will result in defection costs
close or equal to zero, leading the utility agents to cheat instead to cooperate. We
show that the inclusion of enforcement mechanisms increases the possibility of having
to pay defection costs for the agents, so that for the utility agents the decision
between defecting and cooperating can sometimes be tipped towards cooperation.
8The encryption key is agreed upon by the group members beforehand. It is used to ensure that
only members of the cooperation group can use the broadcasted chunks of the group members and
just obtaining chunks by receiving broadcast messages is useless.
Appendix C
The Run-Time InstAL
Specifications
This appendix contains the InstAL specifications of the run-time model. Figures C.2–
C.7 show the code presented in Section 5.4 again to illustrate the differences between
the design and the run-time model in detail. For this purpose, in contrast to the
design-time specifications, we have printed all the rules that remain when transitioning
from the design to the run-time model in bold print and thereby indirectly point out
which rules can be removed from the design-time model (i.e. all rules not in bold
print). To enable an easier reading of the final run-time specifications, Figures C.8
and C.9 present the complete run-time model without showing the design-time rules.
1 % This is dynamically created in the run-time case
2 Handset: alice bob
3 Chunk: x1 x2 x3 x4
4 Channel: c1 c2
5 Time: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Figure C.1: The Domain File of the Run Time WMG Model
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1 institution grid;
2
3 type Handset;
4 type Chunk;
5 type Channel;
6 type Time;
7
8 %% exogenous events %%
9 exogenous event download(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
10 exogenous event send(Handset,Chunk);
11 exogenous event deadline
12 exogenous event clock;
13
14 %% creation event %%
15 create event creategrid;
16
17 %% normative events %%
18 inst event intDownload(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
19 inst event intSend(Handset,Chunk);
20 inst event intReceive(Handset,Chunk);
21 inst event transition;
22 inst event intDeadline;
23
24 %% violation event %%
25 violation event misuse(Handset);
26
27 %% fluents %%
28 fluent downloadChunk(Handset,Chunk);
29 fluent hasChunk(Handset,Chunk);
30 fluent areceive(Handset,Time); % receiving from handset
31 fluent asend(Handset,Time); % sending by handset
32 fluent creceive(Handset,Time); % receiving from basestation
33 fluent transmit(Channel,Time); % sending by basestation
34
35 %% fluents for time-related aspects %%
36 fluent previous(Time,Time);
37 fluent countdown(Time);
38
39 %% non-inertial fluents %%
40 fluent busyHSending(Handset);
41 % indicates that the handset is sending to a peer
42 fluent busyHReceiving(Handset);
43 % indicates that the handset is receiving from a peer
44 fluent busyBReceiving(Handset);
45 % indicates that the handset is receiving from the base
46 fluent busyChannel(Channel);
47 % indicates that the channel is busy
Figure C.2: Declaration of Types and Events in the Run Time WMG Model
49 %------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 % noninertial rules
51 %------------------------------------------------------------------------
52
53 busyHSending(Handset) when asend(Handset,Time);
54 busyHReceiving(Handset) when areceive(Handset,Time);
55 busyBReceiving(Handset) when creceive(Handset,Time);
56 busyChannel(Channel) when transmit(Channel,Time);
Figure C.3: Specification of the Noninertial Rules in the Run Time WMG
Model
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58 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
59 % countdown rules
60 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
61
62 transition initiates countdown(T2) if countdown(T1), previous(T1,T2);
63 transition generates intDeadline if countdown(1);
64 misuse(A) terminates pow(intReceive(A,X));
65 misuse(A) terminates perm(intReceive(A,X));
Figure C.4: Generation and Consequence Relations for Deadline-Countdown
in the Run Time WMG Model
67 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
68 % rules for downloading
69 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
70
71 % handset A requests a block from the base station on channel C
72 download(A,X,C) generates intDownload(A,X,C) if not hasChunk(A,X);
73 not busyChannel(C), not busyBReceiving(A);
74
75 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
76 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates perm(send(A,X));
77 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates creceive(A,4), transmit(C,4);
78 % handset and channel are busy for 4 time-units when a chunk
79 % is downloaded from the base station
80
81 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates pow(intDownload(A,X1,C1));
82 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates pow(intDownload(B,X1,C));
83 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates downloadChunk(A,X);
84 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates perm(download(A,X,C1));
85
86 download(A,X,C) generates transition;
87 clock generates transition;
88
89 transition initiates transmit(C,T2) if transmit(C,T1), previous(T1,T2);
90 transition initiates creceive(A,T2) if creceive(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
91 transition initiates pow(intDownload(A,X,C)) if creceive(A,1);
92
93 transition terminates creceive(A,Time);
94 transition terminates transmit(C,Time);
Figure C.5: Generation and Consequence Relations for Downloading in the
Run Time WMG Model
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96 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
97 % rules for sharing
98 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
99
100 send(A,X) generates intSend(A,X) if hasChunk(A,X), not busyHSending(A),
101 not busyHReceiving(A);
102
103 send(A,X) generates intReceive(B,X) if not hasChunk(B,X),
104 not busyHSending(B), not busyHReceiving(B), hasChunk(A,X),
105 not busyHSending(A), not busyHReceiving(A);
106
107 intSend(A,X) initiates asend(A,2);
108 intSend(A,X) terminates pow(intSend(A,X));
109 intSend(A,X) terminates perm(intSend(A,X));
110
111 intReceive(A,X) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
112 intReceive(A,X) initiates areceive(A,2);
113 intReceive(A,X) terminates pow(intReceive(A,X));
114 intReceive(A,X) terminates perm(intReceive(A,X));
115
116 send(A,X) generates transition;
117 clock generates transition;
118
119 transition initiates asend(A,T2) if asend(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
120 transition initiates areceive(A,T2) if areceive(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
121 transition initiates pow(intReceive(A,X)) if areceive(A,1);
122 transition initiates pow(intSend(A,X)) if asend(A,1);
123
124 transition terminates asend(A,Time);
125 transition terminates areceive(A,Time);
Figure C.6: Generation and Consequence Relations for Sharing in the Run
Time WMG Model
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127 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
128 % countdown
129 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
130
131 initially countdown(20), pow(transition), perm(transition),
132 perm(clock), pow(intDeadline), perm(intDeadline); perm(deadline);
133
134
135 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
136 % downloading - dynamically created at run-time
137 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
138
139 initially pow(transition), perm(transition), perm(clock),
140 pow(intDownload(A,B,C)), perm(intDownload(A,B,C)),
141 perm(download(alice,x1,C)), perm(download(alice,x3,C)),
142 perm(download(bob,x2,C)), perm(download(bob,x4,C)),
143 downloadChunk(alice,x1), downloadChunk(alice,x3),
144 downloadChunk(bob,x2), downloadChunk(bob,x4);
145
146 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
147 % sharing - dynamically created at run-time
148 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
149
150 initially pow(transition), perm(transition),
151 perm(clock), pow(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
152 perm(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
153 pow(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
154 perm(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
155 obl(send(alice,x1), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
156 obl(send(alice,x3), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
157 obl(send(bob,x2), intDeadline, misuse(bob)),
158 obl(send(bob,x4), intDeadline, misuse(bob));
159
160 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
161 % time
162 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
163
164 initially previous(20,19);
165 initially previous(19,18);
166 initially previous(18,17);
167 initially previous(17,16);
168 initially previous(16,15);
169 initially previous(15,14);
170 initially previous(14,13);
171 initially previous(13,12);
172 initially previous(12,11);
173 initially previous(11,10);
174 initially previous(10,9);
175 initially previous(9,8);
176 initially previous(8,7);
177 initially previous(7,6);
178 initially previous(6,5);
179 initially previous(5,4);
180 initially previous(4,3);
181 initially previous(3,2);
182 initially previous(2,1);
Figure C.7: Initial State of the Run Time WMG Model, Post-Negotiation
Phase
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1 institution grid;
2
3 type Handset;
4 type Chunk;
5 type Channel;
6
7 %% exogenous events %%
8 exogenous event download(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
9 exogenous event send(Handset,Chunk);
10 exogenous event deadline
11
12 %% creation event %%
13 create event creategrid;
14
15 %% normative events %%
16 inst event intDownload(Handset,Chunk,Channel);
17 inst event intSend(Handset,Chunk);
18 inst event intReceive(Handset,Chunk);
19
20 %% violation event %%
21 violation event misuse(Handset);
22
23 %% fluents %%
24 fluent downloadChunk(Handset,Chunk);
25 fluent hasChunk(Handset,Chunk);
26
27 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
28 rules for downloading
29 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
30
31 handset A requests a block from the base station on channel C
32 download(A,X,C) generates intDownload(A,X,C) if not hasChunk(A,X);
33
34 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
35 intDownload(A,X,C) initiates perm(send(A,X));
36
37 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates downloadChunk(A,X);
38 intDownload(A,X,C) terminates perm(download(A,X,C1));
39
40 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
41 % rules for sharing
42 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
43
44 send(A,X) generates intSend(A,X) if hasChunk(A,X);
45
46 send(A,X) generates intReceive(B,X) if not hasChunk(B,X), hasChunk(A,X);
47
48 intReceive(A,X) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
49 intReceive(A,X) terminates perm(intReceive(A,X));
50
Figure C.8: The Run Time WMG Model – Part 1
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51 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
52 % countdown
53 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
54
55 initially perm(deadline);
56
57 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
58 % downloading - dynamically created at run-time
59 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
60
61 initially
62 pow(intDownload(A,B,C)), perm(intDownload(A,B,C)),
63 perm(download(alice,x1,C)), perm(download(alice,x3,C)),
64 perm(download(bob,x2,C)), perm(download(bob,x4,C)),
65 downloadChunk(alice,x1), downloadChunk(alice,x3),
66 downloadChunk(bob,x2), downloadChunk(bob,x4);
67
68 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
69 % sharing - dynamically created at run-time
70 %--------------------------------------------------------------------
71
72 initially pow(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
73 perm(intReceive(Handset,Chunk)),
74 pow(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
75 perm(intSend(Handset,Chunk)),
76 obl(send(alice,x1), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
77 obl(send(alice,x3), intDeadline, misuse(alice)),
78 obl(send(bob,x2), intDeadline, misuse(bob)),
79 obl(send(bob,x4), intDeadline, misuse(bob));
Figure C.9: The Run Time WMG Model – Part 2
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Appendix D
Comparing Single- and
Multi-Threaded Jason
Simulations
In order to run simulations with high numbers of agents, the Jason simulation
environment allows for the running the simulation in a multi-threaded mode, which
reduces the response time of individual agents as well as allows more agents to take
part in the simulation with in total. When using a single-threaded simulation it was
only feasible to work with 200 agents at most, whereas running the same simulation
in a multi-threaded fashion allowed for four times as many agents (i.e. 800). Since
the number of agents participating in a system can have a significant impact and
low agent numbers are inappropriate for representing large scale telecommunication
systems, in thi dissertation we opted for the multi-threaded simulation runs. To test
that in Jason multi-threaded simulation runs do not yield different simulation results
then the respective single-threaded execution, we run both both execution modes of
the simulation (i.e. single- and multi-threaded) with exactly the same setup for 50,
100 and 200 agents (i.e. up to the maximum number of the single-threaded mode)
and compared the results with the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric tesst that used
to determine whether two underlying probability distributions (resulting from finite
samples) significantly differ from each other. The resulting goodness-of-fit statistic
defines the largest absolute difference between two cumulative distribution functions
as a measure of disagreement. The classical two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
thereby checks whether the null hypothesis that the distribution of values in the
samples are the same.
For the simulation this means that the single-threaded results are taken as control
sample, against which the observed multi-threaded simulation results are tested. The
significance level at which the test was conducted was 0.05
To specify single- or multi-threaded runs we alter the parameter infrastructure:
in the Jason project file, by setting it to Centralised(pool,X). For single-threaded runs
we set X = 1 and for multi-threaded runs X = 4. This configuration is only possible
when Jason is run on a single machine.
The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov showed no significant evidence against
the null hypothesis (with all p-values > 0.6), which allows us to assume that multi-
272 Comparing Single- and Multi-Threaded Jason Simulations
threaded experiments will not have significantly different results from single-threaded
ones.
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